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1. Peacebuilding Compared and the 
Solomons conflict
Statebuilding that neglects specific sources of 
conflict
The Solomon Islands conflict of 1998–2003 is often read simply as a story of a 
failed or fragile state. It was not a state that had been built and then failed. Rather 
it was a state that had never consolidated after decades since independence of 
taking at least as many steps back as steps forward. It was not a formed state; 
up to this point in its history, it has been a state in a process of formation. In 
this book, we conceive peacebuilding as the craft of supporting institutions, 
including non-state institutions, in a process of growing to provide human 
security. We do not conceive it as a process of following an outside architect’s 
plan to erect core pillars of the state such as law, economic governance and 
public administration. We will argue that there is little that is generic about 
statebuilding in Solomon Islands and much that is shadowy in a distinctively 
Solomons way. There is a formal state defined by the nation’s Constitution, but 
it is shadowed by economically, politically and diplomatically powerful figures 
who have shaped the nation’s history, and particularly its history of conflict. In 
our text, we consider William Reno’s (1995) metaphor of the shadow state and 
the earlier metaphor of the shadow (or underground) economy. And we ponder 
the possibility that when pillars of the state are driven into the sand of shadow 
governance that envelops the formal state to influence the outcome in moments 
of crisis, a false sense of security is created. 
We read the Solomons conflict as occurring at the conjunction of a complex of 
fragilities—some in the Parliament, some in the police, some in a fragmented 
nation where the dignity of ethnic identities was exploited, some in the global 
political economy, others in institutions that regulate a scramble for key 
resources: land, forests, fish. Given this intricate knot of fragilities that is a 
legacy of Solomons history and culture, the peacebuilding1 that has been done 
has been surprisingly successful. And in the event, this conflict that seemed 
forebodingly out of control did not spread to most villages of the nation, affecting 
1 We use peacebuilding in the most general sense here to mean any peacemaking, peacekeeping, pre-conflict 




only Honiara and its surrounds, the Weather Coast, parts of North Malaita 
and pockets of Western Province. Perhaps 90 per cent of villages continued 
peacefully working at their village economies throughout, not dependent on 
the modern state and economy, and therefore also not greatly affected by the 
statebuilding intended to rebuild peace. 
We conclude in the final chapter that while peacebuilding in Solomon Islands 
made many large and small mistakes, people learnt from these mistakes. This 
learning of greater humility in peacebuilding could be one reason why the 
Solomons peace has not failed so far. On the pessimistic side, we find it to be 
slow and costly learning. We wonder if there is not some inevitability about 
this. Nevertheless, we draw some lessons from the Solomon Islands intervention 
on how slow learning might be quickened somewhat by rethinking the 
peacebuilding craft. This rethinking involves overcoming fear of ‘mission creep’. 
It means seeing ‘peacebuilding creep’ as about mission contraction as much as 
mandate expansion. The craft of peace as learned in Solomon Islands is about 
enabling spaces for dialogue that define where the mission should pull back 
to allow local actors to expand the horizons of their peacebuilding ambition. 
This leads us to compare the slow-learning approach of the ‘heavy’ Solomon 
Islands intervention initially aimed at rebuilding core pillars of the state with 
the ‘slow-food’ approach (Boege 2006; Bowden et al. 2009) of the Bougainville 
‘light intervention’ (Regan 2010) next door. 
Peacebuilding as launched in Honiara in 2003 has been lauded by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2005:47) as 
an example of ‘good practice’ in a whole-of-government approach. Our analysis 
is more mixed. We see the intervention from 2003 to 2010 as involving a crude 
statebuilding agenda; it was not about unpicking the specificities of a knot of 
fragilities. For the most part, fragile strands in the web of Solomons society 
have been neither strengthened one by one nor rewoven into a more sturdy 
fabric of Solomons society. With such an important set of specific fragilities, 
we worry that there is considerable risk of Solomons society unravelling into 
violence again. Chapters 8 and 9 summarise the structural factors and proximate 
factors that led to armed violence and the peacebuilding weaknesses that were 
also ably identified in the National Peace Council (NPC 2004) strategic plan for 
2004–09. The peacebuilding that has occurred has barely begun to tackle these 
specific weaknesses and sources of the original conflict (summarised in Table 
8.1). Lise Howard’s (2008) comparative study of completed UN multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations found an organisational learning culture in the peace 
operation to be the best predictor of its success:
UN peacekeeping tends to be more successful when the peacekeepers 
are actively learning from the environment in which they are deployed. 
In other words, rather than seeking to impose preconceived notions 
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about how the missions should unfold, peacekeeping is at its best when 
the peacekeepers—both civilian and military—take their cues from the 
local population, and not UN headquarters, about how best to implement 
mandates. (Howard 2008:2) 
The Solomons’ experience is consistent with Howard’s results. The intervention 
was a mix of success and failure that might have been more successful had 
it been adapting and learning earlier and more assiduously from indigenous 
organisations such as churches, women’s groups and the National Peace Council. 
The peace almost unravelled completely on the streets of Honiara in 2006 at 
the hands of people who felt they were not listened to by the state or by the 
foreigners who were propping up its pillars. While recognising the limits that 
the narrower statebuilding strategy might place on the sustainability of the 
peace, we must acknowledge that strengthening the core of the state, especially 
its institutions of law and order, quickly re-established peace and mostly 
maintained it between 2003 and 2010. Or has it been the simple presence of 
peacekeepers for seven years that has maintained it?
This book tells the story of a country that might have had a much more calamitous 
conflict than it did. An international peace operation with an unusually strong 
rule-of-law agenda prevented a larger catastrophe. It is a case of a complex of 
structural grievances being exploited by men with political ambitions in a 
context in which holding power is a fragile accomplishment. These electoral 
conditions arose from a tragic interplay of social fragmentation, indigenous 
traditions of local politics (wantokism)2 and global resource politics. Indigenous 
politicians were used by shadow governments of ethnic others (and vice versa). 
This book argues that the initial policy settings of the peace operation that saved 
Solomon Islands from deeper tragedy might not be settings that would work to 
create a secure future. Those settings might require a further shift of emphasis 
from statebuilding back to village building, from national policing to village 
policing, from incarceration to reconciliation in civil society, from an economics 
of short-term fiscal stabilisation to education for long-term leadership. This is 
even though statebuilding, police-led peacekeeping and fiscal stabilisation have 
saved the day up to a point. 
If indigenous leadership is strong enough, island communities might seize back 
control of sustainable logging and sustainable fishing from foreign interests to 
fund the large investment to create a highly educated future generation who can 
develop new opportunities in tourism, agriculture and mining. A new generation 
of leaders might fix insecure land tenure and the host of other specific problems 
2 Wantok is an adaptable and important concept in Solomon Islands, and Melanesia more generally, meaning 
in its broadest usage ‘one’s people with whom one shares a set of social obligations’. Literally, it is translated 
as people speaking the same language.
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that led to this conflict. If they fail, the Solomons will be an interesting test 
in the decades ahead of whether generic statebuilding that for the most part 
neglects the specificities of a conflict can nevertheless secure continuing peace. 
The Solomon Islands case differs from our Bougainville case in that indigenous 
leadership has so far (until 2010) been less effective in seizing a peacebuilding 
agenda. We will argue that an important reason for this is because it has been 
given less space to do so on a peacebuilding stage crowded with foreigners 
(Kabutaulaka 2006). As the resistance of the government of Manasseh Sogavare 
(2006–07) to the Australian-led intervention will illustrate, Solomons society has 
been more constrained by external forces from fully seizing that local control. To 
date, the Solomons shows much less resilience of reconciliation than Bougainville. 
We will see that when the National Peace Council showed promise as an enabler 
of participatory indigenous peacebuilding and reconciliation, it was snuffed 
out. Sustained reconciliation at many levels of society is important in conflicts 
such as Bougainville and the Solomons because both involve complex, multi-
layered identity politics (see Chapter 7). In part, we read violence as a means 
to assert the dignity of different layers of identity that proponents believe have 
been treated with contempt by others and by the government. In the process, 
identity defenders have sought to heap indignity on the other, including on 
outside identities such as waku (Chinese/Asian). Healing indignity suffered at 
these multiple layers of identity is an unfinished reconciliation agenda. Like 
Morgan Brigg (2009), we see strengths and opportunities in harnessing wantok 
identities for peacebuilding, even as these identities have been factors in the 
conflict (Chapter 7).
External support for statebuilding has been much more intensive than in 
Bougainville or Timor-Leste or perhaps any other case known to us.3 To a 
degree, we will conclude that statebuilding, including state prosecutions, has 
crowded off the political agenda the kind of iterative building of reconciliation 
we see in Bougainville (and to a lesser extent in Timor-Leste). Yet Solomon 
Islands is not like the Indonesian cases of Peacebuilding Compared, where 
there is both elite and grassroots support for what we called ‘non-truth and 
reconciliation’ (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). Especially today in Solomon Islands, 
there is formidable support for both truth and reconciliation. The absence has 
been of effective implementation of that commitment to reveal truths of the root 
3 Iraq is the case that could be more expensive per capita if one is willing to call it a case of peacebuilding. 
Spending on statebuilding per capita in Afghanistan has been unfavourably compared as so much less than 
in Timor-Leste and the former Yugoslavia (for example, Maley 2009). The financial commitment to RAMSI 
from the two largest contributors, Australia and New Zealand, ranged between a low of A$232 million and a 
high of A$263 million per annum for the years 2003–09 (for a population of 500 000) (Parliamentary Inquiry 
2009:101). Admittedly, most of this spending is on the security sector—a pattern of which we will be critical. 
Yet this RAMSI expenditure does not include bilateral aid from these two countries and from many other large 
donors such as the European Union, Japan, the United States and Taiwan, multilateral aid from UN agencies 
such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and from organisations such as Oxfam and World Vision. 
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causes of the conflict and to ground reconciliation in an acknowledgment of 
those truths. One of the problems here is that reconciliation has been gamed for 
cash compensation that was then embezzled by elites. This in turn was a result 
of the opportunities for extortion from and by powerbrokers of multiple shadow 
states that feast off the opportunities created by instability in the formal state. 
As in Indonesia (Braithwaite et al. 2010a), in Solomon Islands, anomie—a 
breakdown of normative orders that previously secured peace—has been part 
of the problem. Breakdown of the sense of duty to the nation among police 
was a key part of this anomie; but so was a willingness of certain politicians 
to risk the future of the nation by playing the ethnic card in a forlorn effort 
to secure their personal political future; and so was the ambition of certain 
young militant leaders in certain parts of the country who cut their followers 
off from the traditional normative guidance of village elders. Anomie created 
conditions in which it was possible for the politicians and militants of 1998–
2002 to loot the state, saddling the current generation with a crippling national 
debt. An intractable part of the problem so far has been the resilience of norms 
of Solomon Islands ‘political culture’ (Morgan 2005) that leave national politics 
available to the highest bidder, and therefore vulnerable to the kinds of crises 
and breakdowns in the confidence in institutions that we saw between 1998 
and 2006.4 Formidable resources have been pumped into rebuilding state 
institutions with inattention to Melanesian realities that compel politicians to 
be servants of networks of obligation and reciprocity with their wantoks much 
more than servants of the nation and its institutions (Allen and Dinnen 2010). 
We see the current Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the transformation of 
education, effective national regulation and ownership of fishing and logging 
and a ‘raising-the-bar’ approach to anti-corruption enforcement (as opposed to 
an across-the-board assault on corruption)5 as gradualist opportunities for that 
nation building. We see elements of the strategic plan of the National Peace 
Council (NPC 2004) that, among other things, provided for nurturing national 
sporting, religious, artistic, indigenous, professional, business, youth and 
women’s associations as another road to nation building via civil society not yet 
fully taken. While that plan was quickly superseded by other developments, 
many of these strands of civil society have been strengthening by dint of their 
own resilience and with support from donors. 
4 ‘Melanesian political culture draws the attention of MPs away from their institutional responsibilities as 
lawmakers and overseers of government’ (Morgan 2005:12). ‘This is exemplified by increasing support for 
locally credible candidates whose major platforms are local development above all else…the political cultures 
of Melanesia lend themselves to patronage politics because of local peoples’ needs for approachable political 
leaders. No Melanesian MP can afford to ignore local demands in favour of national or regional ones because 
unfulfilled promises to constituencies carry with them the threat of electoral defeat and a host of other 
negative social sanctions’ (Morgan 2005:10). 
5 We will argue in Chapter 5 that this raising-of-the-bar approach to tax evasion has indeed been progressively 
applied by Solomon Islands Inland Revenue with resultant progressive improvement in commitment to pay 
taxes to support the nation. 
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In the development of our comparative thinking about peacebuilding, we think 
the most instructive aspect of this case is in its lessons about the strengths 
and limitations of a strategy of strengthening the core pillars of the state. The 
Solomons is not quite statebuilding ‘neat’, but the focus has been on rebuilding 
the core pillars of the central state to the comparative neglect of the specific 
factors that fuelled conflict. Put in its best light, the Solomons intervention 
could be seen as succeeding by strengthening core pillars of a fragile state to 
the point where that state was then able to chart its own path to addressing the 
specificities of the conflict. Yet we will argue that not all aspects of the Solomons 
state were working badly compared with most developing countries finding 
their own path in the aftermath of colonialism. Moreover, village governance in 
Solomons society continued throughout the conflict years to do an outstanding 
job of caring for its most vulnerable and dependent members, as did the 
church. While the Solomons peacebuilding intervention has had some success, 
our conclusion will be that it might have been a more resilient success had it 
worked with Solomons civil society to identify the key peacebuilding risks and 
opportunities where civil society and the state most sought outside assistance. 
Some of those specific priorities would have included elements of statebuilding 
that might have been read off a generic World Bank good-governance template. 
Yet most of them, we will argue, would not have been about core pillars of the 
state. Most would have had a unique connection to Solomons history and to 
specific weaknesses and strengths of its social fabric. 
The structure of this book is to first outline the historical context of the conflict 
in the next chapter, then the story of the descent into conflict and the climb back 
to peace. After attempting to understand the identity politics of the conflict, 
we then reach some conclusions about the drivers of the conflict and how well 
peacebuilding was attuned to those drivers. Finally, we draw some lessons on 
learning the craft of a contextual peace. The present chapter now outlines the 
ambitions—methodological and substantive—of the Peacebuilding Compared 
project, of which this Solomons volume is the third. Readers who have read the 
first chapter of previous volumes (Braithwaite et al. 2010a, 2010b) can skip to 
Chapter 2 without missing much.
Comparing conflict, comparing peacebuilding
The Peacebuilding Compared project hopes over more than 20 years to code 670 
variables in relation to the major armed conflicts that have raged across the world 
since 1990. The first large volume covered seven different Indonesian armed 
conflicts (Braithwaite et al. 2010a), the second the Bougainville conflict. It is 
hoped the fourth volume will appear in quick succession to cover Timor-Leste. 
The project started with the region around the home country of the authors 
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simply because it was easier to learn how to do it in the region with which the 
research team was most familiar. As it happens, this region experienced a great 
deal of armed conflict during the 1990s. 
Peacebuilding Compared started in 2005. During the project’s first five years, 
the senior author managed to do some serious fieldwork across each of the sites 
in the nations where these first 11 conflicts occurred.6 In some cases, including 
Solomon Islands, he was joined by co-authors for that case with far greater 
knowledge of that site and its languages. Joint is better, more reflexive and 
reliable than solitary fieldwork, but often is not logistically possible. Thankfully 
in the Solomon Islands case, John Braithwaite was able to share two fieldwork 
trips with Sinclair Dinnen and one with each of the other authors in 2006 and 
2009. Peacekeepers and other key international players were also interviewed 
in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and 
Vanuatu between 2005 and 2010. The Appendix summarises the types of people 
interviewed. Sinclair Dinnen and Matthew Allen have also conducted their own 
research on Solomon Islands over many years; where these data are relied on, 
this earlier work is cited. We encourage a participatory approach to the research 
and invite readers to check out the Peacebuilding Compared web site at <http://
peacebuilding.anu.edu.au>, where more information can be found. Please feel 
encouraged to post your ideas and information on that web site at any time 
throughout the 20-year life of the project. 
For the project in general so far, we have been surprised by the level of access 
won to key players such as prime ministers (one current and six former prime 
ministers of Solomon Islands and one of Australia in this case), state and 
insurgent military commanders, foreign ministers, peace agreement negotiators 
and peacekeeping commanders. Yet, as is clear in the Appendix to this volume, 
in comparison with the appendices in our first two volumes that summarised 
the types of players in the conflict who were interviewed, there was always 
uneven coverage in the types of stakeholders accessed. In every case, there were 
regional specialists in the study of this conflict who had secured broader access 
to the key players and who had talked many times to decision makers we did not 
mange to tap. This means it is always more important to attend to the published 
fruits of the fieldwork of others than to one’s own fieldwork notes. 
6 John Braithwaite has been present for about 90 per cent of these interviews so far and he typed up the 
fieldwork notes or used voice-recognition software to record almost 90 per cent of them. The most common 
reason for occasionally not creating an electronic copy of fieldwork notes was that culpability for war crimes 
was discussed in the interview or other information was provided that might conceivably put someone in 
danger. The second most common reason was that there were some interviews that included little that was 
truthful or valuable! Handwritten notes taken during such interviews were still kept, in case a changed 
view of their truthfulness and value emerged later. No interviews were taped. Co-researchers had often done 
extensive fieldwork of their own for quite separate research projects. The latter fieldwork is not included in 
the interview statistics summarised in the appendix at the end of each book.
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Yet this raises the question of what added value there could be in research of 
inferior coverage led by a team coordinator with an inferior background in the 
regions of conflict. One added value is that sometimes inferior researchers whose 
fieldwork engagement is thin are nevertheless lucky enough to gain superior 
access to some significant bits of information. So there is some value from our 
research in adding a little to the superior body of data and insights accumulated 
by the very best experts in each conflict. Yet this is not the main contribution 
of comparative research. Its main added value is in the comparison, and in the 
different ways of seeing that a comparative lens opens out. In each case study 
of Peacebuilding Compared, there tend to be a few scholars who have done the 
most insightful or thorough research on that case. The frequent citation of the 
work of these scholars makes it clear who they are. We are deeply grateful to 
them. Their work remains the scholarship to read on that case, but we do hope 
that by standing on their books, we might be able to peer over their shoulders 
to begin to see more clearly a comparative landscape of conflict patterns across 
the globe. 
Peacebuilding Compared offers a different kind of comparativism than the 
dominant kind that is based on quantitative analysis of statistical information 
from databases maintained by organisations such as the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the US Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and national statistics bureaus. Peacebuilding Compared uses these data 
sets as well to code one-third of its 670 variables in relation to each conflict. 
But most codes are of things not available in these databases, such as whether 
insurgents received training from a foreign power and whether significant 
numbers of the combatants were female, based on our interviews (and published 
fieldwork of others). Good examples of the kinds of variables never coded in 
the leading quantitative research are the dynamics and shape of reconciliation 
processes post-conflict. This is a particularly important gap according to some 
of the theoretical frameworks we address in this volume.
We also attempt to deal with two fundamental problems in the quantitative 
literature. One is that quantitative scholars are often interested only in data 
coded at the national level. The study of ‘civil wars’ dominated by the disciplines 
of political science and international relations is often, moreover, interested 
only in armed conflicts in which one of the combatants is a state.7 Peacebuilding 
7 Peacebuilding Compared studies armed conflicts in which one armed group with a command structure—
even if its organisational auspices were episodic or non-institutionalised—engaged in group attacks with 
weapons on another armed group with a command structure. This means a clash of two warlord armies or two 
armed gangs can count as an armed conflict for Peacebuilding Compared if it passes certain other threshold 
conditions. For the moment, these are that two of the following three conditions are met: that at least 200 
people were killed in the fighting within three years, at least 30 000 people were driven from their homes by 
the fighting and an internationally sanctioned peacekeeping mission was sent to make peace in the war-torn 
region. Including the last condition prevents us from excluding from consideration serious armed conflicts 
that started but were prevented from escalating into mass slaughter by peacekeepers (for example, the arrival 
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Compared seeks to maximise coding at the local or provincial level. Hence the 
code recorded for the separatist conflict in Aceh might be quite different from 
that of the separatist conflict in Papua at the other end of Indonesia. Another 
difference is that Peacebuilding Compared is content to code conflicts that 
are many things at once. Hence, for example, Peacebuilding Compared codes 
both Aceh and Papua as separatist conflicts and also as ethnic conflicts. This is 
different from the approach in the quantitative literature, which tends to force 
conflicts into one category or another. Third, as is clear from the summary in 
Table 8.1, we also enter certain codes as ‘consensus’ codes among scholars and 
other expert commentators on the case, others as ‘contested but credible’. 
A difference from the ethnographic/qualitative literature is that Peacebuilding 
Compared is much less engaged with adjudicating the most contested debates 
about the case. We just code them as contested interpretations and report the 
nature of the contestation in our narrative. What we are interested in doing is 
ruling out non-credible interpretations. Conflict zones are teeming with them—
wild, unsubstantiated rumours, ridiculous theories propagated by people who 
spread lies to protect their culpability, clever pieces of misinformation planted 
by double agents, imagined histories concocted by supposed combatants 
with grandiose visions of their self-importance to saving their nation. A 
significant level of fieldwork on the ground and in the capitals of combatant 
and peacekeeping states (or at UN headquarters) is needed. The intent is not to 
get the research team to the point where it can settle the most contested debates 
among the experts, but to the point where it can rule out most (hopefully all) 
the myriad non-credible interpretations.
A distinctive comparativism
This renders Peacebuilding Compared a distinctive form of comparativism. The 
approach was motivated by reading most of the best research as falling into 
one of two camps. The first is a large number of wonderful studies of particular 
conflicts, or comparing a couple, written by scholars who have deep knowledge 
and long experience of that region. The second is the more recent quantitative 
tradition led by outstanding comparativists such as Ted Gurr, Jack Goldstone, 
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Virginia Page Fortna, James Fearon, David Laitin, 
Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, among others cited in the references. 
In choosing a method that aspires to significant fieldwork engagement that is 
inferior to the best ethnographic work, and is on a smaller number of cases to 
of UN peacekeepers in Timor-Leste in 2006). This, however, is just a starting definition for our armed conflicts 
that could change as new wars occur. It sets a threshold that excludes a lot of conflicts that one might want to 
include. Solomon Islands perhaps only barely passes our threshold for the number of deaths, but more than 
satisfies the other two provisional thresholds we have set for inclusion.
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the best quantitative work, we are simply filling a methodological niche that 
has been under-exploited in the literature. We do not have the view that it is 
necessarily a superior method to the dominant two.8 One of its demands is that it 
requires one person to read very extensively on each case and to be in the room 
or under the tree for most of the fieldwork. Otherwise it would be impossible to 
code the 670 variables consistently across cases. The thematic unity of narrative 
volumes such as this might offer no advance on an edited collection of haphazard 
comparisons, insightful though such casual comparativism can be.
By 2030, we hope that some sort of cluster analysis or fuzzy-set analysis to the 
best quantitative standards of that time will reveal something new about types 
of conflicts. We would also hope to define which might be the most important 
of probably a long list of risk factors that conduce to the persistence of armed 
conflict—and which are the most important protective factors for preserving 
peace. Narrative and analytical books such as this lay an important foundation 
for this future quantitative work. They discover new variables that are worth 
coding for all cases, new complexities in the dynamics among these variables 
that might ultimately account for why certain quantitative models will not 
explain much and why others might do so. 
A final part of the method was to invite the people who seemed to be producing 
some of the best insights on the case to be members of an advisory panel. We 
8 One battleground between large-n quantitative methods and single case studies arises from the qualitative 
critique that quantitative methods freeze (into one code) dynamic phenomena that are one thing at one point 
in time and another thing at another point in an unfolding conflict. This means that case studies of single 
conflicts actually do not have an n of 1. Rather, they are studies of many separate episodes of violence, some 
of which might be more ethnic, others more religious, or involving attacks by different ethnic groups than 
the first episode. Hence, combining the results of X qualitative analyses of protracted conflicts is more like 
a qualitative meta-analysis than it is like combining X cases each with an n of 1. What we are attempting in 
Peacebuilding Compared is a unique kind of meta-analytical hybrid. John Braithwaite deploys his knowledge 
of the narratives of the set of episodes of violence that makes up a particular case to code most variables as 
‘High, Average or Low’ on that variable. If there is some doubt about how to code (a common occurrence), it 
is coded ‘Average’. So ‘Average’ is given the broad meaning of ‘the range on this variable where most cases of 
armed conflict in Peacebuilding Compared lie’. If there is both doubt and thinness of data that make it very 
hard to code, it is also coded as ‘Hard to code’. Imagine coding two variables on the extent to which greed 
and grievance are motivations for fighting. The first point to make is that they can both be high or low, or 
they can have different values. The second is that if greed is highly prominent in some episodes, moderately 
present in most and totally absent in some then the greed variable will be coded ‘Average’. So these three-
point codes are in fact crude summaries from a sometimes large number of data points within the single case. 
For some variables, such as the number of combatants on various sides and the number of refugees, we code 
a specific number (or estimate a midpoint of a best-guess range). But we code both a maximum number (the 
high-water mark of the number of combatants or refugees across all episodes of the conflict) and a separate 
variable, which is an estimated average number across the various episodes of the conflict. All this is perhaps 
only slightly less crude than a purported single quantitative estimate for a single conflict (as in the extant 
quantitative literature). However crude, it is an attempt to quantitatively summarise from qualitative cases 
that are more than narratives of an n of 1. Moreover, this approach to aggregating from a multiple-n sensibility 
for each conflict is combined with actually writing an episodic, dynamic narrative for that conflict. This is 
what we are doing in this book. The hope is that new kinds of insights will ultimately come from the interplay 
between multiple case study narratives and quantitative analysis of the codes with this multiple-n sensibility. 
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asked the advisory panel to suggest important people to interview, to read our 
first draft, comment on erroneous insights within it and on research and lines of 
inquiry that needed to be pursued before the next draft. 
Our ethical obligations under The Australian National University’s Research 
Ethics Committee approval were explained to all participants. These included 
an obligation to report quotes and insights from each informant anonymously 
unless they specifically indicated that they wanted to be quoted as the source 
of an insight. Wherever a quote appears without a citation to some other source 




2. Historical background to the 
conflict
When human beings first arrived on the Solomon Islands of the south-west 
Pacific some 29 000 years ago, one large island joined the islands of Bougainville 
to the western islands of the Solomons, with some other large islands sitting to 
the south and east. As ice melted in subsequent millennia, the Solomon Islands 
physically fragmented into 900 islands and atolls that are now home to 500 000 
people. Most of them still live in some 4000 village communities or hamlets. 
Cultural diversity was increased by Austronesian migrations to the Solomons 
from the north-west three or four millennia ago. Later Austronesian invasions 
swept backwards as Polynesian migrations from the south and east. The nation 
today is 94 per cent Melanesian and 4 per cent Polynesian (a majority on a 
number of the islands), with significant Chinese, European and Gilbert Islander 
(Micronesian) minorities. Racial differences are great—from the pitch-black 
people of the Western Province who are related to neighbours in Bougainville to 
much lighter-skinned Melanesians and Polynesians in the east. At least 64 living 
languages of many dialects are spoken in Solomon Islands (Tryon and Hackman 
1983). Pidjin (English) is the widely spoken lingua franca. Solomon Islands, like 
Melanesia in general, is an extreme case of ethnic fractionalisation. Melanesia 
accounts for about one-thousandth (certainly less than two-thousandths) of the 
world’s population, but one-quarter of its language stock (Fraenkel 2004a:20). 
The state today is still not central to most of the day-to-day existence of the 
overwhelming majority of the population, who live in villages distant from 
towns. Most villagers continue to draw most of their needs for food, water, 
security, recovery from natural and human disasters and recreation from village, 
church and kinship-based social systems that are little buttressed by national 
and international markets or by state taxation and state service provision. 
Vulnerable villagers do not go without food and shelter for the want of state 
welfare. The systems that still care for them predate the state; few villagers 
fall through gaps in those systems of provision compared with the numbers 
that fall through gaps in Western state-based welfare systems. While there are 
urbanisation dynamics that are making all this less true, there have also been 
since the 1980s, and earlier, settlement dispersal dynamics whereby families 
start up new hamlets when villages become so large as to make access to gardens 
a challenge (Hviding 1996:77). 
The focus of this book is on problems of violence and how institutions of land 
disputation, forestry, gender and many others were involved in its spread. As 
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we diagnose all these problems, there is a tendency to lose sight of the basic 
strengths of a society. At various points in our text, we attempt to arrest the 
social problem narrative to take stock of various peacebuilding strengths that 
are also in play. In most villages most of the time, the experience of villagers 
is overwhelmingly one of egalitarian inclusion rather than exclusion (White 
2007). Villagers enjoy multidimensional opportunities for participation in village 
cultural life, religious life, social life and political decision making. Finally, we 
indulge one sweeping observation of the extraordinary joie de vivre, especially 
among children of course, that is so much more palpable as one walks around 
Solomon Islands villages compared with wandering around towns in the West. 
There is a collaborative sociability of Solomon Islands villages and hamlets that 
is palpable most of the time. 
Figure 2.1 Children of Chief Moro’s village in the resource-poor Weather 
Coast region of Solomon Islands, August 2005
Photo: David Jones
Yet because of the diversity of Solomon Islands cultures, general statements about 
them are hazardous. Even within a single locale, Edvard Hviding’s (1996:xiv) 
ethnography of Marovo Lagoon, which is organised around the trope of ‘flow’, 
evinces a ‘strong element of fluidity in the ways that social life is organized in 
Marovo [New Georgia]’. For Hviding, this flow is partly about the continuous 
movement of the sea and of people on it in archipelagic societies. Roger Keesing 
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(1992:vii) cautions about oversimplification as an inevitable risk in writing 
long books about the inland Kwaio of Malaita, given their ‘flexibly adaptive 
cultural tradition’ (see also White 2007:2). Hviding’s (1996) ethnography shows 
that much of the dynamism in Solomons society is driven by opening up new 
networks of inter-island travel that connect one set of interactions between 
coastal people and the ‘bush’ people of the interior of one island to those 
interactions on another island. The conflicts that are the topic of this book are 
very much about social change driven by such inter-island and coastal–interior 
interaction. The glimpses we give in this text of their inadequately documented 
complexity and flux are very partial. 
Our methodological dilemma in writing a book like this is that one comes to 
realise that one knows enough about the diversity of Solomon Islands societies to 
see that one-size-fits-all policies will play very differently at different places and 
times. Yet one does not know enough about even one point in Solomons space-
time to understand what would amount to successful mediation of peacebuilding 
efforts in that one context, let alone the others scattered across time among these 
900 islands. Still, glimpses of diversity help us grasp the disparate character 
of local mediation of peacebuilding efforts that an international intervention 
might enable. Methodological humility requires us not to pretend that we are 
capable of summarising for the reader the nature of the diversity of Solomons 
social systems across time. Instead, our text is about giving enough glimpses 
of war making and peacebuilding at key points in Solomons space and time to 
inform an understanding of factors that have contributed to peace and war and 
to critique extant theories of peacebuilding in a way that leads to constructive 
alternatives. According to our approach, those alternatives must be grounded in 
greater methodological humility than current peacebuilding practice. 
The first key moments in time on which we focus are that Solomon Islands 
became a British Protectorate in 1893 and gained independence in 1978. 
While Solomon Islands was never one of Britain’s strategically prioritised 
colonies, in World War II it actually did become strategically important. Few 
places on Earth are more remote from the West and few places have been more 
attractive to anthropologists because of how culturally different Melanesian 
gift economies are from the West and from one another. Yet, like Bougainville, 
Solomon Islands today is far more consistently and committedly Christian than 
the population of any Western society. Christian traditions of forgiveness and 
their blending with indigenous practices of reconciliation have proved useful 
in transcending outbreaks of warfare that have been exacerbated by other 
centrifugal impulses of the global political economy. Christianity has been the 
one impact of globalisation on the Solomons that has been unifying. We will see 
that other global forces interacted with local schisms in the Solomons in ways 
that increased disintegration and inter-island and inter-communal violence. For 
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all nations, a unified national identity is a historically recent accomplishment. 
Even in 1870, a decade after today’s great power, the United States, had a 
massive civil war, the great power of that time, France, was a ‘nation’ where 
most country dwellers still did not consider themselves members of the French 
nation (Weber 1976). Nation building remains a continuing process, even in 
countries where national identity appears relatively well established. In 2009, 
there are nevertheless few countries that have travelled less distance down the 
road towards forging a unified national identity than Solomon Islands (Dinnen 
2007a; Jourdan 1995b). 
The first widespread contacts with Europeans were with whalers. These were 
the first of a sequence of disintegrative contacts with global forces. At the 
same time, we will see that there were integrative, pacifying contacts as well, 
starting with the church, and most recently with an international peacekeeping 
intervention. Commercially ruthless whaling by the early nineteenth century 
had decimated Atlantic stocks, attracting whalers finally to the far reaches of 
the south-west Pacific. The most valued things the whalers traded to Solomon 
Islanders were steel axes; the most valued trades in return were of women 
(Bennett 1987:30). Slavery seems to have long existed in many Solomon Islands 
societies. Women captured in warfare had been used as, among other things, 
prostitutes. When the demand for sex work from slaves increased—as it did 
from the whalers—we can speculate that this might have motivated increased 
warfare in hope of capturing more slaves. When traders started selling guns 
to both sides in such conflicts, the warfare could have become more bloody 
(Bennett 1987:43, 55, 81–2). Whether warfare, and the lives lost in it, increased 
significantly as a result, we know not. We do know that venereal diseases did 
increase, though this decimation was controlled in places like the New Georgia 
Group of islands, where the practice was to kill women infected by the whalers 
(Bennett 1987:70). 
The prized axes that the whalers, and later the trading posts, sold to Melanesians 
have been estimated by rather credible early ethnography to have increased 
male productivity by more than one-third (Salisbury 1962:109–10, 220). 
Compared with the stone adzes they replaced, steel blades could more quickly 
clear grounds for planting, fell trees, hew canoes and construct houses and even 
shell money. This was an economy in which increased productivity did not 
expand accumulation of goods but rather was transformed into increased status 
(as by big-men giving gifts). Status was also acquired by ceremonial activity 
and headhunting. These activities did increase as a result of the reduced time 
required for subsistence cultivation enabled by steel (Fraenkel 2004a:22). 
Men not tempted to use their newly acquired spare time for headhunting 
2.	Historical	background	to	the	conflict
17
nevertheless had to use it to defend against headhunting, pre-empt and avenge 
it. The globalisation of commercial whaling and of trading diasporas in its wake 
was the first European impact that motivated new wars in the Solomons.
Between 1870 and 1910, about 30 000 Solomon Islanders, mostly Malaitans, 
were taken, sometimes voluntarily, often not, to work as ‘indentured labourers’ 
on plantations in Queensland, but also in Fiji and other destinations (Corris 
1973). The most cherished things returnees from Queensland and Fiji brought 
were muskets to strengthen their group’s position in inter-communal conflicts. 
Communal divisions were opened up by indigenous ‘passage masters’ who 
in effect were entrepreneurs of slave entrapment. While we will see that 
the plantation economy led to pacification of inter-communal conflict, the 
plantations themselves were violent places, as Judith Bennett’s (1993) research 
shows. Violence against masters and overseers who inflicted beatings was a 
common form of resistance by plantation workers—violence that Bennett 
interprets in the frame of James C. Scott’s (1985) ‘weapons of the weak’. These 
can be read as nascent forms of resistance to those in authority who control the 
money, the state and organised violence—resistance from below that becomes 
more organised and political in later periods of Solomons history. 
The Australian colonies pressured Britain to annex Solomon Islands because of 
concern about Germany’s presence and intentions in the region. A new global 
trade reality—increasing copra prices—also made the Solomons an attractive 
site for English investment, channelled through Australian trading firms such 
as Burns Philp, in a plantation economy. Pacification of what Fraenkel (2004a) 
called the headhunting era was necessary for security of this investment. A 
combination of the guns of the colonial administration and the sermons of 
missionaries preaching apology and forgiveness as an alternative to blood feud 
was promulgated with vigour and effectiveness in ending the headhunting era 
before the outbreak of World War II. It had ended 50 years earlier in parts of 
Guadalcanal and New Georgia. War canoes were smashed and guns surrendered 
to the colonial authorities. 
Two great cataclysms of the mid-twentieth century decimated that peaceful side 
of the promise of the plantation era. The first was the depression that pushed 
copra prices down to 7 per cent of their 1926 peak by 1935 (Fraenkel 2004a:29). 
The second was savage fighting between Japanese and American imperial armies 
that destroyed plantation infrastructure, making it mostly uneconomic to re-
establish after the war. This unusually intensive affliction of northern Guns, 
Germs and Steel (Diamond 1997) in the 1940s, especially in Guadalcanal, uprooted 
communities, disrupted subsistence agriculture and introduced epidemics, 
thereby contracting the Solomons’ population as well as its economy. Collapse 
of the plantation economy is one major reason for the underdevelopment that 
saw Solomon Islands ranked 128 out of 177 countries on the United Nations’ 
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Human Development Index in the late 2000s even after some years of impressive 
post-conflict growth. Nevertheless, between 1960 and 1965, copra still provided 
an average of 88 per cent of Solomon Islands’ exports (Fraenkel 2004a:32) and 
most paid workers remained Malaitan plantation labourers. 
In the 1970s, timber and fish were catching up to copra in importance as exports. 
In the 1980s, fish became the dominant export; in the 1990s, timber became 
dominant. This history of extreme underdevelopment and exploitation, by both 
foreigners and Solomon Islanders from other ethnic groups, was a root cause 
of the armed conflict that started in 1998. Another was a new wave of natural 
resource plunder in recent decades by Malaysian, Taiwanese and Korean timber 
multinationals. Mostly this involved zero value adding to the felled timber in the 
Solomons, soil erosion and decimation of environments and village livelihoods. 
Most decisively, corrupt payments by competing logging interests split open 
pre-existing political cleavages in Solomons society, as well as creating new 
ones, contributing to the armed violence we now describe. Large numbers of 
indigenous beneficiaries of logging—concentrated in elites, but not exclusively 
elites—supported unsustainable logging that gave away so much of the future 
of the nation to foreigners at bargain prices.
There are few contexts more remote than the Solomons from where we perceive 
the forces of global political economy to be dominant. Yet here we still find 
global capitalist dynamics pillaging environments and livelihoods, contributing 
to poverty, disintegration and warfare. And we see international institutions 
ranging from the church to the United Nations supporting peacebuilding efforts 
as well.
Roots of tension between Malaita and 
Guadalcanal 
World War II attracted many Malaitans, whose agricultural land was 
overpopulated, to move to Guadalcanal to work for the US military; many 
stayed and more followed in the post-war decades. Subsequent British colonial 
policy increased incentives to stay by concentrating infrastructure investment 
where the export investment opportunities were—mainly Guadalcanal, 
but also Western Province. Malaita, by far the most populous province, was 
neglected by all forms of private and public investment, sometimes because of 
the obstacles Malaitan landowners put in the way of investors. So, increasing 
numbers of hardworking Malaitans moved to the opportunities in Honiara and 
environs (Guadalcanal), as well as to commercial nodes such as Gizo (Western 
Province). The problem was not only slow development, but resentment over 
uneven development. The people of Guadalcanal came to view Malaitans as 
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disrespectful guests on their land. One of the Guadalcanal militia commanders, 
George Gray, explained the importance of this disrespect as a grievance that led 
to violence:
The most important issue that inspired me to join the Guadalcanal 
militancy was what I perceived as the disrespect that settlers (especially 
Malaitans) had towards our people and our land. Since independence 
our people have been murdered, our cultural sites desecrated, our land 
settled without permission and our people have been treated as second 
class citizens in the capital city, which is located on our island. I had 
seen these things since I was a kid and they offended me. (Gray 2002, 
quoted in Fraenkel 2004a:50) 
When marriage occurred between mostly patrilineal Malaitans and mostly 
matrilineal Guales (people of Guadalcanal), the result was a marriage in which 
a claim to land was inherited either through both partners or through neither. 
The latter is particularly likely to engender a sense of disenfranchisement and 
structural grievance. But also when patrilineal Malaitans1 married women from 
matrilineal societies, indigenes often resented this as marriage to obtain their 
land. Guadalcanal male leaders were often tempted to take money for the ‘sale’ 
of land to Malaitan settlers. These were often deals for short-term gain for these 
men; the land was usually in no sense owned by them as individuals but was 
owned by a matrilineage of which the female leaders were the custodians. 
[M]any Guadalcanal people (predominantly males) from areas around 
Honiara were selling customary land to those from other provinces, even 
though Guadalcanal is a matrilineal society where females are regarded 
as the custodians of land. Many individuals were selling land without 
consulting other members of their line (laen, tribe), often causing 
arguments among landowners. What is important to note here is that 
many of those who purchased land did so legitimately either through 
customary procedures or through legal means. The sale of land has, over 
the years, been resented by a younger generation of Guadalcanal people 
who view the act as a sale of their ‘birth right’. (Kabutaulaka 2001:15)
This was a source of profound cultural misunderstanding. When Guale militants 
started evicting Malaitans from Guadalcanal, Malaitans sometimes viewed this 
as uncompensated eviction from lands they had paid to share, while the militants 
saw it as termination of invitations to the Malaitans to be guests on their land. 
Young people rebelled against elders who took money for land that they did 
not own in any continuing sense because in much of Solomon Islands people do 
not own land, but rather the land owns people who are there to take care of it 
1 Many parts of Malaita are actually cognatic with patriliny dominating.
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(Moore 2007:189). Because Malaitans were believed to have been disrespectful 
guests, they had forfeited their right to stay. There were common cultural 
misunderstandings—for example, when Malaitans demanded compensation 
payment for seemingly innocent flirtation with Malaitan girls, for stepping over 
the legs of Malaitan women or for swearing. This fed into ethnic caricatures by 
one group of the other: Malaitans were violent and aggressive; Guales were lazy 
and unproductive (Allen 2007:186). 
In Matthew Allen’s (2007:130) interviews with Guadalcanal militants, it became 
clear that unfair treatment in employment and educational opportunities was 
another of the grievances that justified their violence. Allen found motives 
for Guale militancy to be varied, but to cluster into two groups: ‘development 
equity’ and ‘cultural respect’. 
The conflict and its stages
The Solomon Islands conflict from 1998 to 2003 is at the bottom end of armed 
conflicts in terms of people killed. Robert Muggah (2004:5) of the respected 
Small Arms Survey of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva 
concluded that the conflict resulted in the intentional deaths of 150–200 people 
and 430–60 non-fatal small arms-related injuries. A common underestimate of 
the number killed is 100. This number could have resulted from the work of the 
Missing Persons Committee of mid-1998 on which Archbishop Adrian Smith 
played a prominent role. It named 100 people who were known to be missing 
well before the end of 1998. But there were also large numbers of people known 
to have been killed (and not on this list of 100 missing). And far larger numbers 
of people were probably killed after the work of the Missing Persons Committee 
was complete. In the early stages of the conflict, there was political pressure 
to downplay the number of Malaitans killed in an effort to contain the risk of 
a Malaitan counterattack. So probably the estimate of 200 we have coded for 
this conflict is too low; Archbishop Smith thinks it is less than half a realistic 
estimate. 
This was a conflict that was a source of regional instability precisely in the 
period when the political settlement to the war in neighbouring Bougainville 
was being negotiated. The violence triggered one of the longer international 
peacekeeping missions the world has seen—in its eighth year at the time of 
writing with no exit imminent—as well as one of the most substantial in terms 
of personnel and resources deployed in proportion to the size of the country. 




There were two major stages to the conflict. The first was an indigenous 
uprising initially among young men from the impoverished Weather Coast 
region of Guadalcanal, with the active involvement of political leaders such as 
Guadalcanal Premier, Ezekiel Alebua. This was the insurgency of the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement (IFM), previously called the Guadalcanal Revolutionary 
Army. Its leaders had the objective of driving settlers from Malaita off the island 
of Guadalcanal. Late in 1999, the second phase began with the creation of the 
Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), initially to defend Malaitan interests against the Guale 
rebels—something the government of Bart Ulufa’alu appeared to be incapable of 
doing. In a joint operation with the Malaitan-dominated paramilitary wing of 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police, the MEF effectively staged a coup that resulted 
in the coerced resignation of the incumbent prime minister on 5 June 2000. The 
IFM, with the notable exception of Harold Keke and his followers, and the MEF 
signed a peace treaty in Townsville, Australia, in October 2000. But most arms 
were not surrendered and the two militias splintered into a variety of armed 
criminal groups who indulged in banditry, intimidation and payback against a 
backdrop of growing impunity facilitated by the effective collapse of the police 
force. 
Figure 2.2 MEF commander Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea (centre) and other MEF 
members
Photo: Courtesy of David Hegarty
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The militias bankrupted the state and left citizens in Honiara, the Weather Coast 
and in a small number of other pockets of conflict feeling no more secure from 
violence after the Townsville treaty than they had been before. Led by Australia, 
the Pacific Islands Forum finally yielded to pleas from the prime minister and 
the Parliament of Solomon Islands to send in troops to disarm the marauding 
militias. Peaceful conditions consolidated as soon as the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived. RAMSI quickly evolved into 
an ambitious statebuilding intervention, though hardly one targeted on the 
diagnosed drivers of the conflict. In Chapter 3, we describe step by step the 
unfolding of the fighting.
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3. Descent into armed conflict
Fighting begins
In 1988, three Guadalcanal villagers were reportedly murdered in a payback 
killing by a group of men from Malaita. This led to the submission of a petition 
to the government from ‘the indigenous people of Guadalcanal’. Among other 
things, it called for an end to impunity for the crimes of settlers and for the 
government to look for ‘ways and means to repatriate all non-indigenous 
unemployed illegal squatters’ (Fraenkel 2004a:47). The prime minister at the 
time was Ezekiel Alebua from Guadalcanal. He took no action on the petition. 
For this, he was much criticised by his own Guadalcanal people. By 30 November 
1998, Alebua was the Premier of Guadalcanal, and indigenous grievances had 
built to the point that it was good politics for him to issue a demand for S$2.5 
million compensation for 25 Guadalcanal people murdered by immigrants and 
for the building of Honiara as the national capital on indigenous land.1 The 
Premier’s speech was widely read as threatening violent reprisals if the demands 
were not met. They were not met at the time, so at this point a loose band of 
young Guadalcanal men—the ‘Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army’—began to 
evict and harass Malaitan settlers in rural parts of the island. 
We can interpret the evictions as partly a running out of patience with inaction 
over grievances that Guadalcanal had sought to assert by democratic means 
since 1978. But it was also in 1998 partly a political play of the ethnicity card 
by a premier who was vulnerable over inaction concerning longstanding 
1 John Braithwaite interviewed Ezekiel Alebua in prison in 2009 about why he had not supported the 
Guadalcanal claims in 1988 when he was prime minister. He said, ‘I was not prime minister of Guadalcanal, 
I was prime minister of the Solomon Islands [Harold Keke has scornfully confirmed, including in his trial, 
that this indeed is what Alebua said to the militants]. But maybe I should have responded more. And I had a 
little bit of regret about that but not too much. If I had granted what they requested there would have been 
uproar from the other side. My ministers would have left.’ To the question of whether this meant he would 
have lost the government, he said: ‘Yes I probably would have lost the government.’ He went on to say that 
he was trying to be more responsive and to listen better in 1998. The irony as he sees it is that as a result 
of him doing that, he was blamed for leading and starting the conflict. Because Prime Minister Ulufa’alu in 
1998 was also listening, Ulufa’alu was accused of being on the Guadalcanal side. They both asked Australia 
to become involved to secure the peace at that point. Premier Alebua went with the Prime Minister and met 
with the Australian and New Zealand high commissioners to ask Australia to send peacekeepers. Alebua did 
not think, as the Prime Minister himself did, that this was a campaign to destabilise the Prime Minister by 
the then opposition leader, Solomon Mamaloni. Or at least at the early stages Alebua did not believe it was a 
campaign against the Prime Minister led by his opponents. Mamaloni also worked with Premier Alebua and 
with the Prime Minister to try to settle the conflict and calm militants down. The three of them really worked 
together quite well, as Alebua saw it.
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indigenous grievances—what the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly in 1999 
declared as ‘Demands by the Bona Fide and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’ 
that included among many other demands state government for Guadalcanal 
under a federal system. Clive Moore (2004:104–6, 222) has identified some 
evidence for his conclusion that Premier Alebua could have been the mastermind 
of the violent expulsions and could have funded them, including purchase of 
weapons. Premier Alebua argued in our interview with him that he was just 
trying to stay close to the militants so he could steer them to peace. A context 
for the simmering grievance was a government that was captured much more 
by Malaitan interests than by Guadalcanal interests and that had given in to 
some quite large compensation demands from Malaitans who alleged insult 
and violence by non-Malaitans. The Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army secured 
some quality weapons through a raid on a Russell Islands police armoury. But 
most of their weapons were rehabilitated World War II 303s or homemade guns. 
During the Bougainville crisis, Honiara was home to a large Bougainville refugee 
population and the manufacture of homemade weapons was probably a legacy 
of this period. Guns had never previously been a big issue in Guadalacanal or 
elsewhere in the Solomons. As well as more than 100 people killed in this first 
phase of the fighting in 1998 and 1999, a number of Malaitan women were raped 
(Amnesty International 2004; Moore 2004:112). The IFM was a loose coalition of 
militant groups focused on different local grievances—some on the Gold Ridge 
mine, some on the large Guadalcanal oil-palm plantation,2 some on specific land 
grievances and some were just criminal gangs exploiting the opportunity of 
the collapse of order. By November 1999, about 35 000 people were reported to 
have been displaced from their homes in Guadalcanal as a result of the violence 
(Fraenkel 2004a:55).
The militants seemed surprised, empowered and exhilarated by their early 
successes in driving terrified Malaitans off their lands. The response from the 
state was a strategy of vacillation. The Prime Minister, Bart Ulufa’alu, shifted 
regularly between a hard-edged ‘law and order’ response and his personal belief 
that the ‘tensions’ were a conspiracy on the part of his political opponents. 
The expatriate police commissioner responded aggressively at first with 
counterattacks directed at militants who resisted arrest. Some of his Malaitan 
senior officers at the time alleged that the commissioner’s intent was to kill 
2 Oil-palm was originally established on the Guadalcanal Plains in the 1970s by Solomon Islands Plantation 
Limited (SIPL), a company co-owned by the Solomon Islands Government (18 per cent), the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (80 per cent) and local landowners (2 per cent). As part of the establishment of the 
plantation, some land was compulsorily acquired from the customary landowners, but most was formerly 
alienated land that had been converted to government ownership with perpetual estate title vested in the 
landowners (Fraenkel et al. 2010). SIPL took over vast tracts of land with a workforce that was more than 50 
per cent Malaitan (Karle 2004:39). 
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the Guadalcanal militant leaders one by one.3 Given the Malaitan-dominated 
character of the police, ruthless policing tactics were at great risk of being seen 
from the Guadalcanal side as ethnic politics by state means. Certain politicians 
felt a more Melanesian approach based on a great deal of dialogue and then 
offers of compensation was a better way to go. The effect of this contest was 
that the militants first experienced force, then a melting away of that force, 
which they attributed to their own strength, then offers of dialogue and 
compensation, which they interpreted as evidence of weakness of the state. 
The sequence of force, then dialogue, then vacillating back to more force when 
dialogue was shunned was the opposite strategy to responsive regulation. 
Responsive regulation counsels holding off on all use of force while dialogue is 
attempted again and again. Yet responsive regulatory dialogue implicitly signals 
a willingness to escalate to whatever degree of force is ultimately needed to 
protect citizens. Instead of projecting this posture of firm but fair listening, 
the state projected vacillation between vindictiveness and talk of capitulation. 
One reason for this is that it was difficult for the government to identify a clear 
militant organisation and leadership structure to negotiate with—the same 
problem the Indonesian state often confronted with its ethnic and religious 
conflicts of this period (Braithwaite et al. 2010a).
Failed early peacemaking efforts
Before the largest evictions of Malaitans began, on 23 May 1999, a government-
organised traditional kastom feast was held with an exchange of traditional 
gifts to seek to reconcile representatives of the two ethnic groups, though none 
of the militants attended (Moore 2004:110). This set a pattern for most of the 
subsequent reconciliation initiatives right up to the time of our fieldwork in 
2009; the key players were mostly politicians, chiefs and religious leaders, with 
the leading militants not being reconciled. 
The next effort at brokering peace was more successful, however, in engaging 
the Guadalcanal militants. The Commonwealth, following a request from the 
Solomons Government, invited in 1987 Fijian coup leader, General Sitiveni 
Rabuka, as a special peacemaking envoy joined by another Commonwealth 
envoy, Ade Adefuye from Nigeria. They brokered the 28 June 1999 Honiara 
Peace Accord, in which all sides renounced violence, large compensation 
3 An assassination policy had support from some members of the elite. John Braithwaite’s notes from an 
interview with one prominent business leader record that he favoured assassinations targeted on the Malaitan 
side as well: ‘He would assassinate Dausebea. He believes Commissioner had right idea on this. Compared 
Dausebea to Idi Amin or Hitler. Just have to go. He thinks RAMSI is too soft and would do better by country 
to kill those who would come back to haunt the country.’ Mediator General Rabuka spoke on the record (‘If 
what embarrasses me teaches the world that’s fine’) when we interviewed him in Fiji; he agreed with targeted 
killings of the militant leaders by the police to give Solomon Islands a better future. 
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payments were made to the people of Guadalcanal to respond to the militants’ 
compensation claims and considerable compensation was also paid to develop 
Malaita, assisting Malaitans driven back to their island. The hope was that this 
might motivate the Malaitan refugees to stay in Malaita. Displaced families 
were given S$1000 a head. The money went to the provincial authorities for 
distribution, with the justice and integrity of this distribution becoming a new 
source of grievance in both Malaita and Guadalcanal. The rest of the nation, 
in turn, was deeply unimpressed with violence extorting a deal in which the 
largest and most powerful islands received large payments, in effect funded 
by the rest of the country. This was compounded by subsequent payments 
from the national government in May 2000 for chiefs who had been sworn at 
or insulted in both Malaita and Guadalcanal, though Premier Alebua seems to 
have purloined a good bit of the Guadalcanal chiefs’ compensation and MEF 
leaders seem to have pocketed most of that intended for Malaitan chiefs (Moore 
2004:135). While the IFM leaders attended the two days of peace talks convened 
by Rabuka and imbibed the spirit of the June 1999 Honiara Peace Accord, they 
did not sign it and continued to evict Malaitans after it. 
A follow-up Panatina Agreement, on 12 August 1999, upheld the Honiara 
Accord after a shoot-out with the police in which three IFM members were 
killed. Panatina called on militants to give up their arms and on the police to 
moderate their violence, shifting back to community policing. The IFM saw the 
police as thuggish and Malaitan dominated. At the time of the coup, some 75 
per cent of the police were Malaitan and only 3 per cent were from Guadalcanal 
(with most of the latter assigned to other provinces at the time of the coup) 
(Amnesty International 2000:7–8). Again, the Guadalcanal militants did not 
sign the Panatina Agreement. Church leaders were enrolled to run weapons-
surrender centres, but few were surrendered. A succession of two foreign police 
commissioners came and went, powerless to manage the disorder within their 
force and without. 
The first regional peace conferences occurred in August 1999 concerning mainly 
Malaitan evictions from Western Province. The Marau region of Guadalcanal 
was another unusually complex regional peacemaking process that proceeded 
much more slowly than the main Guadalcanal–Malaita process. 
In October 1999, an unarmed Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group of 
20 arrived from Fiji and Vanuatu to monitor the surrender of weapons—with 
limited impact. By January 2000, some Guadalcanal militants were beginning 
to disarm. But on 17 January, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) captured 34 mainly 
high-powered weapons, a grenade launcher and ammunition from the main 
Auki Police Station on Malaita (Moore 2004:124)—almost certainly with the 
knowledge and tacit approval of police commanders. Surrendering their arms 
then seemed imprudent to the Guadalcanal militia leaders. 
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In May 2000, General Rabuka was back mediating a peace meeting of 100 
delegates in Buala (Isabel Province). But militia leaders from the MEF and the 
IFM did not attend in the end, unimpressed that their organisations had been 
banned by the government and by the government’s decision not to grant them 
amnesties as a condition of their participation. This banning seems another 
early mistake of the government in that it drove the militants underground, 
beyond the embrace of dialogue. 
The coup
Prime Minister Ulufa’alu wrote to Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, in 
April 2000 asking for the intervention of Australian and multinational security 
forces. The request was denied. There was a rumour in subsequent weeks that 
Ulufa’alu then asked for Cuban mercenaries to prop up his government. Some 
people we interviewed saw this as a final trigger for the coup. But the main 
motivation was the determination of certain Malaitan leaders to resist further 
evictions from Guadalcanal (in particular, to protect Malaitans who dominated 
the national capital), extract larger compensation payments for insults they 
believed they had suffered and frustration at the failure of the Guadalcanal 
militants to surrender their arms pursuant to the Honiara and Panatina accords. 
In addition to widespread Malaitan frustration at the failure of the government 
to deliver security, there were powerful elements in the business community 
who wanted to unseat a reformist government. And there was a lot of resistance 
to the Ulufa’alu government from vested interests across the Public Service and 
the Parliament who had shared in the spoils of the patronage system of Solomon 
Mamaloni.
Successful lawyer and former finance minister Andrew Nori allegedly helped 
bankroll the coup and was the ‘spokesman’ for the MEF. He announced on 5 
June 2000 that the MEF had captured the main police armoury in the capital at 4 
am. Solomon Islands does not have an army, so the armoury of the paramilitary 
wing of the police was the most potent in the nation. Weapons were collected 
from other police stations and prisons, giving the MEF control of almost all the 
high-powered weapons in the country by the time the Prime Minister and the 
Governor-General woke that morning to find they were under a form of house 
arrest (Moore 2004:4). Three Australian-funded patrol boats were also seized, 
as was the state electronic media monopoly, the Solomon Islands Broadcasting 
Corporation, and the government Telekom Centre. A substantial proportion of 
the police joined the joint operation, with both neutral police who stood for the 
rule of law and Guale police who supported the IFM fleeing the capital or being 
stripped of their weapons and marginalised. Nori styled himself as a ‘mediator’ 
and opened up negotiations with heads of state and with the Australian and 
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New Zealand high commissioners on behalf of the MEF. As with the Fiji coup 
just a few weeks earlier, here the regional powers were persuaded not to go in. 
This was in accordance with a longstanding strategic preference of Australia and 
New Zealand for military non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring 
states—a policy that was displaced with a more muscular philosophy in 2003.
Nori was a clever lawyer who had a realistic fear of an international intervention 
that might see him rot in prison for leading the coup. So he insisted this was 
not a coup; de facto it was a coup, but de jure Nori was perhaps right. On Nori’s 
account, it was a joint operation of the police and the MEF under his guidance 
to restore security to the capital, Honiara. Nori said he had no intention to 
install himself or anyone else as prime minister. The legislative and judicial 
branches of governance were still intact. All he was doing was demanding the 
resignation of the Prime Minister. Even though these demands were at times 
made at the point of the gun, the Prime Minister did not tender his resignation 
until 14 June. By this time, six members of his government had been persuaded, 
some with threats, to desert their prime minister. Amid much corruption and 
coercion, Opposition Leader, Manasseh Sogavare, became prime minister on 30 
June 2000.
Nori asked for his interview to be on the record so that it could attribute his 
perspective on these events to him by name (contrary to our normal approach 
of guaranteeing anonymity). He said in his interview that the MEF was a 
spontaneous movement of mostly young men whose families had been evicted 
from their land. Far from recruiting them, the MEF came to him and sought 
to recruit him to declare a coup and be installed as prime minister. He said he 
declined this invitation and opted instead to be a mediator who sat down with 
the high commissioners of Australia, New Zealand and other nations to find an 
internationally acceptable way of getting around the house arrest of the Prime 
Minister to discover a parliamentary means for changing the government.4 
He claimed there was general agreement by the international players that the 
MEF should be persuaded by Nori to allow the Prime Minister to contest a 
parliamentary vote for his leadership. Nori said that the MEF  wanted him to be 
prime minister, did not want Charles Dausebea, who was being touted by many 
Malaitans, and was not especially keen on Sogavare. 
Other MEF leaders insisted that they did not go to Nori asking him to lead; 
rather Nori went to them offering to represent them in negotiations—an 
offer they accepted. Nori had been a senior minister in the former Mamaloni 
government. Most MEF leaders see the root cause of the tension more in terms 
4 One prominent government official involved in negotiations with Nori during this period said: ‘Nori 
was very clever. He would always steer the meetings, then go outside the meetings and say he was just the 
spokesman. He was always the cleverest person in the room.’
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of an elite political conspiracy than in terms of land. While they tend to agree 
on this, they have very different views on who was the powerbroker at the 
root of the conflict; some say it was Mamaloni wanting to unseat Ulufa’alu, 
others say it was Alebua, others say it was Nori’s pursuit of a dream to lead. 
One saw elements of political culpability in all three. Some informants believe 
Nori, like Alex Bartlett, was being used by the Opposition Leader, Solomon 
Mamaloni, initially to destabilise the government. But the MEF militants were 
a power unto themselves and only rather partially under the control of Nori or 
any Mamaloni-Nori-Bartlett axis, if that is what it was. It could be that when 
Mamaloni unexpectedly died in 2000, there was a political vacuum devoid of an 
alternative and Nori filled that vacuum in the critical period. 
In the end, the MEF leaders felt stability would require a prime minister who 
was neither Malaitan nor Guale. That ruled out Nori. Sir Allan Kemakeza was 
one prominent non-Malaitan who was not liked by some MEF leaders. Manasseh 
Sogavare from Choiseul Province became the compromise choice in the event 
in 2000. Sogavare struggled to hold a majority together after he dismissed 
Kemakeza as deputy prime minister. This happened after evidence emerged that 
Kemakeza had paid huge compensation to himself as minister responsible for 
reconciliation and compensation payments. Kemakeza regrouped and bought 
the votes of Members of Parliament to have himself elected prime minister, 
following the national election of December 2001, replacing Sogavare. Solomon 
Islands government formation is not based on automatic assumption of power 
of the leader of the party with most members in the Parliament, or of the leader 
who can form a coalition of parties with the most members. Instead, MPs trade 
their individual vote, often for cash, in open ballots of members for the prime 
ministership, without great reference to any party allegiances they might have 
(Steeves’ [1996] notion of ‘unbounded politics’, which we will discuss further). 
This system allows the kind of instability that saw Kemakeza replace Sogavare 
in 2001. A further destabilising feature of this system is that it is so opaque; it is 
impossible for anyone not right inside the process to predict a likely outcome.5
What other interviews confirm to be absolutely correct is that Nori did not 
recruit the MEF; he harnessed them to a bold political project. Our interviews 
with the most prominent militant leaders such as Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea and 
Alex Bartlett also do not suggest that they worked hard to recruit a militia. The 
on-the-record account of the most prominent MEF commander, Jimmy Rasta, 
makes this point. Once Rasta took a public stand in favour of resistance, fighters 
spontaneously flooded to him without any recruitment drive on his part. 
Malaitan young men were ripe by 2000 for a militarised response to defend and 
protect their people; there were so many who no longer fitted into the world 
5 We saw this with the subsequent riots fuelled by surprise and anger at the election of Snyder Rini as prime 
minister in 2006. 
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of the modern village and felt excluded from opportunities in town (Hegarty et 
al. 2004b:11). Rasta simply provided the most important focal point they could 
rally around. This was a Melanesian leadership model of a big-man and his 
followers. Each of the many militia groups in both of the main entities (IFM and 
MEF) revolved around individual leaders and followers (often from the same 
area and sharing the same language).
Figure 3.1 MEF fighter, with ‘Freedom for All’ on his weapon
Photo: Courtesy of David Hegarty
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The IFM found itself outgunned and outmanoeuvred by the audacity of the 
coup. Honiara had become almost completely a Malaitan enclave controlled by 
the MEF. The IFM fought back on behalf of the indigenous people of the island 
through some skirmishes with MEF forces. Nori urged restraint on hotheads 
within the MEF ranks who might have used their superior firepower to more 
aggressively go after the IFM. He and Henry Tobani (an IFM spokesman) 
organised a conference on the Australian Navy’s HMAS Tobruk to discuss a 
cease-fire between the IFM and MEF, but the MEF refused to attend because not 
all IFM leaders were attending. A meeting was held chaired by church leaders 
on the Tobruk on 23 June with the premiers of Malaita and Guadalcanal, who 
did attend, calling on the militants to cease fire. 
Churches and women leaders ameliorate 
escalation
The Anglican Melanesian Brothers (Carter 2006) and the Red Cross played 
significant roles as mediators when skirmishes broke out. For a year before the 
coup, women had organised themselves as peacemakers into a Reconciliation 
and Peace Committee and a Honiara Women for Peace group (Leslie 2002; 
Pollard 2000). The ‘Malaita Women for Peace were the first to go to the MEF 
bunkers arguing for peace’ (former Malaitan premier, 2006). Honiara had a 
besieged character, with MEF bunkers surrounding the town, facing outwards 
to defend against IFM attacks; beyond a ‘no-man’s land’ lay IFM bunkers facing 
towards Honiara. The Catholic Daughters of Mary Immaculate Sisters were also 
very active. At the height of the coup, as illustrated on this book’s cover, these 
women’s groups took food to militants on both sides. ‘Stories emerged of men 
from both sides in the conflict leaving their bunkers and meeting together with 
the brave women, hugging and crying, honestly showing fear of the conflict 
in which they were enmeshed’ (Moore 2004:15). As leading regional women’s 
activist (and Solomon Islander) Afu Billy put it, the contribution of women was 
especially important at the height of the conflict in demanding that their own 
young men stop fighting, as we saw in Bougainville: ‘If it wasn’t for the women 
of Solomon Islands the armed conflict wouldn’t have ended. They went beyond 
their own safety and security to go out there to the camps to talk to their warring 
boys to stop fighting’ (Oxfam 2003:17). In an even more direct parallel with 
Bougainville, a provincial premier said that much later women had a ‘very big 
effect’ in the peace talks that led to the Townsville Peace Agreement by telling 
their stories of how women were the worst affected by the tension. In contrast 
with Bougainville, however, here women were excluded from the process of 
actually crafting the peace agreement in Townsville (Corrin 2008:187).
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As in Bougainville, in the Solomons, when the fighting finally did stop, women 
were quickly marginalised in peacebuilding decision making. Their contribution 
was also quickly excluded from a memory of how peace was accomplished, 
which was dominated by the RAMSI public relations machine. Australian 
memory gives central place to the top two RAMSI leaders—Nick Warner and 
Ben McDevitt—in persuading Harold Keke to surrender to them, even though 
local mediators had already persuaded Keke to do this before the RAMSI leaders 
landed, and one of these local mediators was with them when the final surrender 
was transacted. It gives no place at all in the view of Melanesian Brothers whom 
we interviewed to Melanesian Sisters (Sister Rosa’s Christian Care Centre sisters), 
who in the process of nursing Keke’s brother, Joe Sangu, persuaded him to lead 
his followers to join the peace. 
We are jumping ahead of our narrative here as we seek to make the point that not 
just at this early stage of the conflict, but at every stage, it might have spiralled 
into something much worse without the restraining influences of church leaders 
and women leaders, and the efforts of many ordinary Solomon Islands villagers 
in general. The story of the intervention is one written by the interveners. The 
stories of local players remain largely unheard.
Economic collapse
Most foreign nationals were evacuated on Australian and New Zealand military 
ships and aircraft immediately after the 2000 coup. All the major export 
industries had also shut down by then; many hundreds of jobs had been lost at 
the Gold Ridge Mine; the Solomon Taiyo fish cannery closed at a cost of 2200 jobs 
(3000 at its peak); and Solomon Islands Plantations Limited closed at a cost of 
1800 jobs (2500 at its peak) (Government of Solomon Islands 2002:63). Tourism 
and logging6 collapsed to almost zero in export income (a silver lining in fact). 
International assistance to Solomon Islands fell from US$75 million in 1998 to 
US$28 million in 2001 (Plunkett 2003:43). The secretariats of many international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also closed their doors. This could 
have been an overreaction. It certainly had a number of negative effects on 
prospects for peace. The evacuation of most expatriates was demoralising 
for many Solomon Islanders, who naturally felt abandoned. In Honiara, the 
evacuation was referred to as ‘the chicken run’ and T-shirts appeared bearing 
that inscription. It accelerated the utter collapse of the waged economy, though 
the informal economy remained resilient in villages, where most people lived. 
Locals lost their jobs both in businesses and as community workers and in other 
roles working for NGOs all over the country. Real gross domestic product (GDP) 
6 Logging had started to collapse in 1997 due to the Asian financial crisis.
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dropped 14 per cent in 2000 (18 per cent in GDP per capita) and another 9 per 
cent the next year (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004:5). Following 
a further fall in 2002, the Australian Prime Minister pointed out that in six 
years, per capita GDP had halved in the Solomons (Howard 2003:2). 
The contraction increased the supply of unemployed urban youth who were 
angry and in the market for a rumble. Two-thirds of the nation’s teachers 
found themselves on unpaid leave during the conflict (Moore 2004:14). This 
further increased the supply of young people on the streets with time on their 
hands. Solomon Islands has a formidable ‘youth bulge’, with a median age for 
the population of nineteen (Dinnen 2008a:60). The expatriate evacuation ‘also 
removed the stabilising international presence that had held both militant 
groups back from all-out attack’ (Moore 2004:11).
One businessman said that two prominent MEF leaders in Honiara during their 
period of control of the city cooperated in a hard-cop–soft-cop routine. One 
would shake down a businessman then the other would arrive to offer the 
business protection. With other businessmen, they would reverse roles.7
While the IFM militancy of 1998 and 1999 caused great harm for those displaced, 
GDP in fact grew slightly in these two years. It was the three years (2000–02) 
when the MEF controlled the capital and milked its economic institutions that 
economic collapse and default on interest payments on its bonds occurred. And 
as soon as control of Honiara business and government by the militants and 
their cronies ended with the arrival of RAMSI, growth returned to more than 
5 per cent, for 2003 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004:5) and the 
next three years, to 6.1 per cent in 2006 and 10.3 per cent in 2007, falling back 
to only 8.2 per cent with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. Much 
of this was a result of the resumption of unsustainable logging enabled by the 
restoration of security; logging accounts for 70 per cent of export earnings 
(Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:149). There was also a surge in post-conflict 
construction and in foreign aid pumping up GDP.
7 A prominent Chinese business leader suggested the MEF did not loot the country as effectively as it could 
have. It mostly shook down wealthy people and businesses for small amounts of cash, television sets, cars and 
the like. They ‘could have made millions, hundreds of millions instead of thousands by doing a deal with’ 
foreign logging interests to offer them armed protection to go into places such as Ringi Cove and cut all the 
timber there. Even though the MEF controlled most of the modern weapons in the country, it could be asked 
whether such an offer would have been credible given that MEF control did not extend to the areas where 
most logs were to be found. 
Pillars	and	Shadows
34
Figure 3.2 An IFM checkpoint stops a vehicle on the outskirts of Honiara, 
mid-2000
Photo: Ben Bohane 
Grievances unresolved
On 11 June 2000, a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group arrived that 
included the foreign ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Botswana. Nothing 
concrete towards peaceful resolution was accomplished. The next day, the 
general state of disorder allowed conflict to spread to Western Province. Early 
June had seen a sign appear in the market of the Western Province capital, Gizo, 
advising the 200 Malaitans living there to leave within 21 days. Anti-Malaitan 
feeling was widespread in the west, as in many provinces.8 Forty men associated 
with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) arrived from Bougainville 
armed with M-16s on 12 June in support of locals who had provided their ethnic 
brethren in the BRA so much assistance during their war. It seems the BRA was 
invited in by provincial leaders to guarantee security. Without a police force, 
these leaders feared harassment by the MEF. Before arriving in Gizo, the BRA 
fighters looted a police armoury on the nearby island of Choiseul. Senior BRA 
commanders Ishmael Toroama and Thomas Tari were persuaded to go to Gizo 
8 There had been clashes between Malaitans and the people of Rennell and Bellona in 1989 and between 
Malaitans and people from Temotu in 1996 (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:197). 
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and convinced the BRA men to return to Bougainville without further incident. 
During what became known as ‘the Tension’, there were numerous incidents of 
violence associated with the BRA crossing into Western Province. 
Like the IFM, the MEF was a loose coalition of separate militant groups—some 
motivated by grievance over the eviction of Malaitans and other insults, others 
footloose young men motivated by the pursuit of excitement, others criminals 
more concerned to inflict injustice than to correct it. Theoretically, camp 
commanders took orders from the MEF Supreme Council, but they acted as local 
gang leaders. There was an interesting symbiosis between the MEF with more 
political objectives and militants with more criminal objectives. The former taxed 
robbers ‘as they passed through roadblocks with their loot’ (Moore 2004:140). 
Most of the MEF leaders had been displaced from their homes on Guadalcanal. 
But we must be careful about simply saying that grievance over the expulsions 
was the most important motive for joining the MEF. Among Malaitans there 
was a surprising degree of acceptance of a right of the people of Guadalcanal 
to evict them as guests on their land even if land had been purchased on terms 
recognised by colonial or post-colonial land law or under customary law. 
There was a shared acceptance of the principle—even by an MEF lawyer such 
as Andrew Nori, who made a living from state law, and certainly by Jimmy 
Rasta—that guests on traditional land could be asked to leave. What Nori and 
Rasta resented was the way it was done—with violence and without assistance 
for repatriation back to Malaita and appropriate compensation for what had 
been paid for what was left behind.9
Nori spoke with anger at the way Prime Minister Ulufa’alu told 1000 Malaitans 
who marched on Parliament in December 1999 that it was their decision to come 
to Guadalcanal, not the government’s; it was not the government who chased 
them out and the government had neither the responsibility nor the funds to 
compensate them. That dismissiveness engendered anger. Nori says it was that 
response from the Prime Minister that resolved Malaitans to respond militarily. 
JB: ‘What was the ultimate objective of the MEF?’
Andrew Nori: ‘To get paid.’
9 Both ‘sides’ shared a common cultural understanding about the importance of land and identity, as 
well as a common resentment of ‘government’ (meaning generically all governments) for ineffectiveness and 
corruption. Indeed, they were probably more angry towards ‘government’ than towards each other. The 





Some more inclusive peace negotiations were held on the Australian Navy 
ship Tobruk in July 2000. Militant leaders from both the IFM and the MEF sat 
down with representatives of the government, the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association, NGOs, women’s organisations, the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Chinese and Gilbertese communities (Moore 2004:143). But key IFM commanders 
Harold Keke, his brother, Joseph Sangu, and nephew, George Gray, did not 
attend. The MEF expressed great concern about the absence of their signatures 
on the IFM cease-fire proposal. Things fell apart when other IFM leaders said 
they could not sign because Keke would not sign the cease-fire. Keke in mid-
2000 became the decisive spoiler of the peace. Fraenkel (2004a:96) says that the 
bloodiest engagements of the IFM–MEF conflict occurred in early July 2000. 
Nori alleges that Kemakeza then paid Keke and others large sums of money to 
buy their signatures. Nori also said (something others confirmed) that as late 
as 28 May 2002 Kemakeza asked the MEF not to give up their weapons until 
Keke did. Then a purchased cease-fire agreement was signed. This was a shaky 
foundation for negotiating the terms of an enduring peace agreement, which 
consequently stalled. Nevertheless, on 2 August, the MEF let women from 
Guadalcanal in to the Honiara markets for the first time. While this was a large 
gesture of progress, no disarmament occurred during August and considerable 
violence and looting continued. 
An even more inclusive National Peace Conference was conducted on the 
New Zealand Navy ship Te Kaha, organised by the Civil Society Network, 
with 150 participants, on 25–27 August 2000. Militant leaders were, however, 
intentionally excluded, which resulted in its communiqué being ignored. The 
conference validated the grievances of both sides and called for a National Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and amnesties, among other things. Further talks 
occurred on the Te Kaha during September. Keke continued to play the spoiler 
role in September, hijacking a Solomon Islands Airlines aircraft and demanding 
a ransom to hand it over with its pilot. One thing agreed in September was 
the holding of the meeting to settle a Townsville Peace Agreement. The MEF 
insisted the Townsville meeting exclude the civil society groups; the MEF was 
concerned about losing its control of the agenda based on its military superiority. 
This ended the one period of integrated engagement of both militants and civil 
society in the peace process of July–September 2000. It led to a brief moment in 
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Townsville when reconciliation for Solomon Islands was dominated by militants 
and their political accomplices, particularly Andrew Nori. This was followed by 
years up to the election of Jimmy Rasta to parliament in 2010 where militants 
were again excluded from peacemaking and treated simply as common criminals.
Nori led the MEF negotiating team; the IFM team was led by scholar Tarcisius 
Tara Kabutaulaka with assistance from Bougainville peace negotiations veteran 
and Brisbane lawyer Leo White. Some 143 people attended—approximately 
equal numbers of MEF/Joint Force, IFM and government delegates. Keke did not 
show—nor did delegates from the Marau region of Guadalcanal, who conducted 
a separate and more protracted peace process on the unique complexities of 
their local conflict. Australia imposed a decidedly un-Melanesian deadline of 
three days for the talks to be completed. 
The Townsville agreement asked the Parliament to pass an Amnesty Act once 
all weapons and ammunition had been surrendered in 30 days under the 
supervision of an International Peace Monitoring Team and indigenous Peace 
Monitoring Council (PMC). In the event, the Amnesty Act was passed long before 
most weapons were handed in.1 Only 800, mostly homemade weapons were 
surrendered within the 30-day deadline (Dinnen 2002:292). Other important 
issues such as the pursuit of greater ethnic equality in the composition of the 
security forces were agreed. Donor funds would be used to compensate all who 
had lost property and militants would receive a payment for demobilising and 
returning unarmed to their villages. Many returned and collected a payment, 
then went back to Honiara and collected a second and third time. A flaw of the 
Townsville agreement is that it assumed Solomon Islands government capacity 
to implement its provisions; the government had little such capacity and was 
compromised in its relationship with the MEF side in particular. Part of the 
agreement that created a monster was absorbing large numbers of militants onto 
the police payroll as ‘special constables’ or ‘police reserves’. There were 2000 
of them, mostly ex-MEF, by the end of 2001. They further criminalised the 
security sector. At Townsville, the understanding had been that only 200 ex-
combatants from the MEF and IFM would be demobilised as special constables 
(UNDP 2004:25). 
The Townsville agreement was greeted by scenes of jubilation in Honiara as 
combatants from both sides left their bunkers and walked across the lines to 
hug their enemies and chew betel-nut together. The euphoria did not last long. 
Some of the new spirit of cooperation was in organised crime; some former 
1 There were in fact two Amnesty Acts. The Amnesty Act (2000) was passed on 18 December 2000 and 
assented to on 19 February 2001 (<http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/num_act/aa2000111/>; <http://www.
paclii.org/sb/legis/num_act/aa2000111/>). The Amnesty Act (2001), covering the Marau Peace Agreement, 




Guadalcanal militants took to growing marijuana; some former members of the 
police Joint Operation began to trade weapons and ammunition to them for the 
marijuana. Many militants gamed repatriation to their villages, returning home 
for a short period, collecting their repatriation payment and then returning to 
their militia groups. As in earlier peace negotiations, here there was concern, 
especially from conflict-affected Western Province, that the Townsville 
settlement was one between Guadalcanal and Malaita to have the rest of the 
country pay extortionate compensation for the damage they had inflicted on 
each other. Civil society groups, among others, saw it as a flawed document—‘a 
militants’ charter’ (Fraenkel 2004a:101)—rushed and ridden with loopholes and 
premised on unrealistic assumptions as to the integrity and capabilities of the 
Solomon Islands Government. 
The International Peace Monitoring Team
Australian diplomat and scholar David Hegarty (2003) was the first head of 
the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) of 14 New Zealanders and 35 
Australians, who were unarmed police, military and civil servants, with smaller 
representation from Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Tonga and other Pacific island states. 
By July 2002, 2043 weapons and 2.86 tonnes of explosives had been handed in 
to be held in IPMT containers—mostly World War II and homemade weapons—
with only a small proportion of the high-powered weapons surrendered (Fraenkel 
2004a:102, 142). While this was very partial success, it was more than modest. 
The real significance of the IPMT was in supporting confidence building. The 
Peace Monitoring Council organised a ‘Walkabout for Peace’ in March 2002 in 
which 10 000 people are estimated to have marched. Some MEF insisted on 
returning some weapons to the police rather than to the peace monitors, which 
was seen as tantamount to returning weapons to the control of their own side, 
as weapons continued to ‘disappear’ from police armouries. Nevertheless, at the 
hot-spot monitoring posts that the Peace Monitoring Council established, the 
council worked with the Melanesian Brothers and Sisters and other religious 
organisations to persuade villages to become weapon free.
Increasingly during the time of the IPMT, Harold Keke came to be seen as 
the big problem for the peace. He became increasingly mentally unstable 
and continued to be murderous, ultimately facing 24 murder charges (Allen 
2007:237). Keke and those who joined him in refusing to sign the Townsville 
Peace Agreement split from the IFM to form the Guadalcanal Liberation Front 
(GLF). Even joint operations between the remnants of the IFM, the MEF and the 
police failed to kill or capture Keke and increased his defiant resistance to peace, 
as well as adding significantly to the suffering of Weather Coast communities 
(Kenilorea and Moore 2008:390). In his rugged Weather Coast homeland, he 
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seemed impregnable. Seven Melanesian Brothers who went to the Weather 
Coast as peacemakers were kidnapped and all were eventually murdered by 
Keke and his men (Carter 2006). The division that opened up between a large 
group of Weather Coast militants under Keke and IFM militants mostly from the 
rest of Guadalcanal was one of a number of divisions that rendered the conflict 
increasingly complex. There were also divisions within groups from the same 
area, often within the same families and kinship groups—some longstanding 
(predating the conflict), some new. There was also division between MEF 
fighters from the north and those from the south of Malaita and even conflict 
played out between different factions of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
(BRA) in Western Province. 
Figure 4.1 Harold Keke (centre, front) with Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) 
fighters, Mbiti village, Weather Coast, July 2003, a month before his surrender
Photo: Ben Bohane
Keke had been arrested soon after his involvement in the raid on the Yandina 
armoury in December 1998. When Premier Alebua and a Catholic priest posted 
bail, Keke absconded to the Weather Coast and ratcheted up the conflict across 
Guadalcanal from that base in his home district. Absconding with these 
serious charges hanging over him, he had little to lose except his sanity, which 
progressively slipped from him. Some informants we interviewed rated the 
court’s decision to grant bail to Keke one of the most tragic errors that escalated 
the conflict. While the IPMT and PMC laid a valuable foundation for peace, 
they were not viewed as successful because in their time the worst spoilers, 
notably Keke, became even more determined spoilers of the peace, and success 
in weapons surrender was very partial. 
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The IPMT departed in June 2002. In January 2003, the work of the PMC, which 
had provided the indigenous leadership for the peace process in civil society 
and an architecture of monitoring posts (Hegarty et al. 2004a)2 was handed over 
to a National Peace Council led by Paul Tovua. 
The work of the National Peace Council 
Like the Peace Monitoring Council, the National Peace Council (NPC 2006) has 
not received the credit it deserves for contributing to the peace process. While 
the accomplishments of the NPC were also partial, RAMSI was inclined to take 
full credit for work that was overwhelmingly done by the NPC. Collecting 
weapons was a good example of this credit taking in RAMSI media statements, 
when 55 per cent were handed in to the NPC or to the Melanesian Brothers 
acting on its behalf and then passed to RAMSI (NPC 2004:15). One member 
of the NPC, the highly respected Sir Alfred Soaki, the retired first indigenous 
police commissioner of the nation, was assassinated while working for the 
council. Another councillor was lucky to escape with his life in the same attack.
It was a backward step for the Sogavare government to shut the NPC down in 
2006 instead of building on its work and on the infrastructure of indigenous 
monitoring posts it had developed on the foundational efforts of the PMC. The 
government at the time was no fan of the leadership of the NPC and did not 
like the way it provided a platform for leaders who were not supporters of the 
government. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID, 
the lead NPC funder) provided technical assistance to the government for the 
production of reports that were hatchet jobs on the work of the NPC. One 
widespread criticism we heard in 2006 from senior people in both the government 
and RAMSI, sourced from these reports, was that the NPC did not even have a 
strategic plan. Indeed, it had a particularly sophisticated, self-critical strategic 
plan that was transparent about the limitations of what had been achieved in 
the peace process, visionary about what could be achieved and practical about 
steps for achieving this. It had been developed at a participatory one-week 
retreat (NPC 2004). When John Braithwaite pointed out this particular error in 
the hatchet job that was being done on the NPC at very senior levels of RAMSI 
and the government, there was no interest in correcting the error in a report 
that had not been finalised and no interest in taking up an offer to organise for 
a copy of the strategic plan to be delivered. The claim that the NPC should be 
dismantled because it had not even developed a strategic plan continued to be 
the currency of its execution. 
2 The PMC was itself actually a continuation of the Ceasefire Monitoring Council of community leaders set up to 
monitor the 1999 Ceasefire Agreement between the Guadalcanal Liberation Front, the MEF and the government.
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The greatest tragedy of the dismantling of the NPC was that it had dispersed 
networks on the ground, in the villages, encouraging traditional leaders to 
mediate conflicts (including all-important land disputes) locally, to support 
the local rebuilding of the legitimacy of the Solomon Islands police, to watch 
for weapons, to provide an early warning of rekindling hot-spots and to 
involve schoolteachers and churches in peace education and assisting children 
recovering from trauma. In other words, a strength of the NPC was that it was 
participatory, indigenously led and under the thumb of neither the government 
nor RAMSI. Those from Honiara and Australia who killed it off had an agenda of 
more centralised control of, and spin about, the peace process from the capital. 
Worse than that, the dismantling of the NPC was done hastily in a way that 
created risks for the peace. One of the successful programs of the NPC, building 
on the work of the PMC, was the ‘Weapons Free Village Campaign’. When the 
council certified a village as weapons free after passing through an audit process, 
it would receive a large sign from the council certifying that it was weapons 
free. This was important not only in allowing villagers to signify their pride in 
having created their own local peace. In many cases, two communities that were 
in conflict would agree together to go through the Weapons Free Village program, 
so that each community could give the other assurance that they were safe from 
them. When the budget was suddenly cut off in 2006 for production of the 
signs certifying the weapons-free status, there were communities complaining 
that they had played their part in meeting the requirements of certification, but 
because they had received no sign, neighbouring communities that distrusted 
them were alleging they had received no sign from the government because 
they had cheated on weapons disposal. 
Central to the philosophy of the NPC was a praxis of unity through diversity:
Kastom law leaders are beginning to:
• Sit down together to search for the common principles underlying all the 
kastoms of Solomon Islands
• Provide skilful and appropriate support for parents to pass on common 
norms to all Solomon Island children. (NPC 2006) 
The NPC facilitated youth peace rallies to nurture youth leadership in the peace. 
The NPC worked with local organisations to resurrect the practice of all children 
and adults working one day a month on civic clean-up. Part of the council’s 
school education priorities in terms of land disputes as a root cause of conflict 
were that ‘All children know their genealogy’ and ‘All children know the land 
laws of the Solomon Islands’ (NPC 2004:Appendix 4). National networking to 
support midwives to in turn better support new parents and encourage them 
to take responsibility for peace education for their new child was a support 
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strategy attuned to the evidence from criminology on the importance of social 
support for parents and small children for reducing violence (Cullen 1994). 
This work included teaching families non-violent methods of resolving conflict 
within families. Probably the most important work of the council was simply 
facilitating reconciliations such as that described in Box 4.1. 
Box 4.1 ‘Reconciliation makes good relationship even without the culprit of 
perpetrators of crime’
Story of Ronald Gugui, recorded by Dykes Angiki
This	is	a	story	relating	to	an	incident	which	took	place	in	2002	on	Guadalcanal.
A	family,	a	Malaitan	husband	and	a	Guadalcanal	wife,	were	driving	back	from	












reconciliation.	 For	 though	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 the	 fatal	 shooting	 incident	 had	
never	 been	 found	 or	 identified,	 reconciliation	was	 still	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	
restore	and	maintain	good	relationships	between	the	relatives	and	communities	
of	the	Malaita	husband	and	his	Guadalcanal	wife.	
Source: NPC (2004:36). 
Out of the dialogues conducted by the NPC at the village level came a different 
analysis of the sources of governance failure from that prevalent in Honiara and 
Canberra. This analysis saw the problem as
• an independence in 1978 ‘based on educated leaders without strong support 
from villages’ 
• the ‘Government centred in Honiara’ 
• ‘Economic development centred in Guadalcanal’ 
• ‘Ministry of Justice and Royal Solomon Islands Police failing to enforce 
decisions of traditional leaders’ 
• ‘Chiefs and traditional leaders with responsibility for resolving land disputes 
having no place in emerging constitution of Solomon Islands’ (NPC 2004:27). 
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In addition, this analysis saw a culture of centralised corruption in Honiara 
producing a culture of decentralised monetarisation of compensation in 
response, so that local actors could secure their share of the peace payout.
In the wide-ranging consultations of the recent Parliamentary Inquiry (2009) 
into RAMSI across the archipelago, the peacebuilding debate finally returned 
in a productive way to these NPC concerns. It was not only civil society actors 
from many islands who were responsible for this, it was also some of the most 
thoughtful and respected members of the Honiara elite. The Chief Justice, Sir 
Albert Palmer, in his testimony, ‘acknowledged the lack of legislation recognising 
the role played by community chiefs’ (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:196). Several 
former prime ministers asserted that a peacebuilding priority was reversion 
of the erosion of the authority and support for the traditional justice system.3 
More broadly, the then Prime Minister, Dr Derek Sikua, said:
When we adopted our form of government upon independence what 
we have done is putting our worthy customs and traditions outside 
government. We have put our laws, our traditions, our customs, our 
practices outside of government and we put a government in that doesn’t 
link in very nicely to our worthy customs and traditions and practices, 
so there is no connection. (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009: 195) 
The 2009 Parliamentary Inquiry hearings into RAMSI deeply engaged civil 
society again by being beamed from the islands where sittings occurred to 
the nation’s television sets. Most specifically, much testimony saw a failure to 
support dispute-resolution mechanisms that might reconcile customary and 
formal land laws as a root cause of the conflict. The ‘rule of law’ as a core pillar 
of the state was seen as part of the problem:
Much of the origin of the tension was based on outsiders, especially but 
not only Malaitans, who followed the ‘rule of law’, that is the written 
‘western-based’ laws of Solomon Islands. They paid money for pieces of 
land to people of Guadalcanal and then claimed that they were owners 
in perpetuity according to ‘western’ customs and laws. The people of 
3 The report also emphasised that the People’s Surveys in 2007 and 2008 found, respectively, 93 per cent 
and 84 per cent of respondents favoured resolving disputes ‘entirely within their own community through 
the chief, customary law, or through the Church’ (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:174). Picking this up, lawyer 
Andrew Nori testified: ‘if we are talking about improving the capacity, capacity building of our justice 
administration system, of our law enforcement system, we should be building the capacity of those people 
who are dealing with 90 per cent of the disputes and grievances in Solomon Islands, and they are down in 
the villages, the chiefs and our church leaders. In other words, in that area we need to persuade RAMSI and 
ourselves to allocate more resources to the rural mass where the volume of disputes are great and where the 
population is located and where there is a need to ensure that leaders in the churches and in the chiefly tribes 
are placed in a position to manage disputes at a community level’ (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:174). 
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Guadalcanal, following Melanesian laws, said ‘NO’, this is still our land 
and we now want it returned, so you have to leave. (Julian Treadaway 
quoted in Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:196)
The NPC had a more networked vision of how to unify the nation as an 
alternative to the view that a nation would simply follow from the creation of a 
state. Its strategy was to:
Strengthen and increase the number of national bodies and groups that 
unite the Solomon Islands
• National business associations
• National sports associations
• National professional associations
• National youth associations
• National church associations
• Church women’s groups
• Mother’s Union
• CDOCAS
• National Council of Women. (NPC 2004:Appendix 8)
Dance, stories in Pidgin and music were also seen as forming a shared heritage 
that different ethnic groups participated in together. The Solomon Islands 
Broadcasting Corporation was seen as having an important national role here and 
also in broadcasting ‘Story Bilong Solomons’ and three-monthly NPC reports. 
Compensation
The Solomon Islands case fits the common pattern of conflict initially driven 
more by grievance than greed being captured by opportunistic leaders who 
saw opportunities for personal enrichment. Dinnen (2002:285) sees this as 
an ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ with elements in common with that 
phenomenon in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999). We saw criminalisation of 
the conflict: exploiting local monopolies of force to extort or just loot from 
businesses, to steal cars, stage armed robberies, occupy commercially attractive 
land and demand tax remissions. Another form of opportunism was demanding 
compensation payments, mostly from the government. In many other cases, 
perpetrators demanded compensation from the very victims they attacked—
attacked with the intention of eliciting offensive behaviour in response that 
could justify a demand for compensation. Donors, particularly the Government 
of Taiwan, which bankrolled government compensation funds, were also 
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attacked with the intention of setting up a justification for compensation 
claims against them. As Satish Chand (2002:158) points out, in circumstances of 
grievance being harnessed to personal greed, the availability of compensation 
funding can exacerbate the conflict. In the Solomons case, it not only did 
this by creating an economic incentive for gaming compensation demands, 
compensation also made things worse by bringing the integrity of customary 
reconciliation into disrepute, making meaningful reconciliation harder for 
the future. It also underwrote profoundly counterproductive philosophies of 
peacemaking such as Prime Minister Sogavare’s ‘justice before peace’, discussed 
in the next paragraph.
There were many ways in which the events of June 2000 were not a conventional 
coup. One was that we can conceive the agenda of the MEF leadership less as 
running the state and more as using a temporary monopoly of force to demand 
financial compensation from the state for the loss of Malaitan lives and property. 
Security for Malaitans and positioning of men such as Andrew Nori, Alex 
Bartlett and Jimmy Rasta as kingmakers within a shadow state of sorts (Reno 
1998, 2000)4 were also part of the agenda. A paramount reason for the fall 
of the Ulufa’alu government was the Prime Minister’s refusal to agree to the 
compensation payments demanded by evicted Malaitans. Hence, the Sogavare 
government of 2000–01 implemented a ‘justice before peace’ philosophy that 
it defended in terms of Melanesian kastom, in which justice meant financial 
compensation for both sides. This resonated with Guadalcanal Premier Alebua’s 
earlier (1999) philosophy/demand of ‘compensation before reconciliation’ 
(Fraenkel 2004a:52). In the event, the militia leaders of both sides were allowed 
to capture the compensation payments, with most ordinary victims missing 
out. Jon Fraenkel’s research does a fine job of documenting the detail of the 
development over two decades before the crisis of a politics of responding to 
genuine grievance against some ethnic other by extorting cash compensation 
from the state (as opposed to the ethnic other) and justifying this through 
kastom. The Ulufa’alu government made compensation payments of this kind as 
well, but it sought to reverse the trend towards meeting such demands as they 
became ever more fiscally unsustainable. And that is the main reason it fell. 
Politicians who advocate cash compensation payments by the state can be sincere 
in believing that this is a Melanesian way of running the state. But of course 
traditional Melanesian societies did not pay compensation through the state; 
mostly it was paid collectively to the offended lineage of kin from the offending 
lineage. They also did not traditionally pay with money issued by the state’s 
central bank. They paid with traditional shell money and in pigs primarily, but 
often other kinds of gifts such as root crops were also provided. Throughout 
Melanesian societies, there are many words that represent different kinds of 
4 The applicability of the idea of the shadow state here is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.
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compensation. David Akin (1999) in his ethnographic work among the Kwaio 
of Malaita found the primary meaning of goods transferred in compensation 
was restoration of dignity and recognition of status. The restitution manifests 
recognition that offence has been given and seeks to repair that harm. That is, 
it is not compensation that pretends to be monetarily proportionate, as in the 
pretensions of Western law, to the losses actually suffered. Indeed, traditional 
payments after warfare on Malaita mostly seem to be unaffected by the number 
lost on each side (Fraenkel 2004a:110) (as opposed to much of Highlands New 
Guinea, where traditional fighting tends to continue until there is a moment 
of rough balance between lives lost on the two sides). Just as for the Kwaio, in 
many Melanesian societies, payment symbolises mainly restoration of dignity 
and status; the payments made symbolise how precious is the spilt blood of 
those who have been killed and injured. It does not put a monetary value on 
human life in the way Western law and economics do. Indeed that would be an 
insult to Melanesian sensibilities. This is not to deny that offers of traditional 
payment are often rejected in pre-reconciliation negotiations as so insufficient 
as to be an insult. Yet an unusually poor family might offer an extremely modest 
payment that would be accepted as appropriate recognition of the harm done 
because it would be seen that this payment is a big sacrifice for such a poor 
family. Therein lies the risk with grafting this form of kastom into the state. 
Because the state is seen as having the deepest of pockets, even payments that 
would be interpreted as massive in traditional lineage-to-lineage compensation 
can be interpreted as insultingly low when proffered by the state. In Solomon 
Islands, feverish attempts by politicians who wanted to avoid the fate that befell 
Ulufa’alu actually bankrupted the state. 
A list of compensation payments that were made by the Ministry of National 
Unity, Reconciliation and Peace between October 2000 and May 2001 was 
leaked. There were 269 payments, costing S$18.8 million. Some were in effect 
bribes to militants to join the peace, such as a ‘disarmament allowance’ of S$123 
840 to IFM commander Andrew Te’e (Moore 2004:163). An investigation by 
the Acting Auditor-General found that half the claims for compensation that 
had been paid were fraudulent (Fraenkel 2004a:122). There were considerable 
problems of kickbacks to civil servants and politicians to have compensation 
payments approved. In the 12 months from August 2000, the government also 
granted S$140 million in duty remissions—much of it to MEF commanders 
who had gone into business or acted for businesses (Moore 2004:168). MEF 
commander Jimmy Rasta, for example, ran a bottle shop and received S$280 000 
remission on spirit and beverage imports. Logging companies and certain leading 
Chinese businessmen were also major beneficiaries. Sir Allan Kemakeza was the 
minister who was sacked for the corrupt administration of the compensation 
payments and Snyder Rini was the finance minister responsible for the corrupt 
administration of duty remissions. After the 2001 election, these leaders became 
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prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively. In 2006, Rini, with 
vote-buying support from Chinese business leaders coordinated by Sir Thomas 
Chan, was elected prime minister by the Parliament—a result that led to the 
2006 riots at the Parliament and the razing of Chinatown. 
When it became clear that Ulufa’alu was right—that the state could not afford to 
keep up the pace of the compensation payments without becoming insolvent—
the Sogavare government turned to the Republic of Taiwan, to which it 
continued to grant diplomatic recognition while gesturing at a threatened shift 
of recognition to Beijing, for at least S$20 million in assistance. Most of the 
Taiwanese cash was for compensation payments. 
Figure 4.2 IFM commander Andrew Te’e in June 2000 with his fighters at a 
checkpoint on the road into Honiara
Photo: Ben Bohane
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5. Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands
In September 2002, Prime Minister Kemakeza made two requests from his 
embattled and unpopular government to the United Nations for international 
assistance to stop the violence that persisted. The United Nations sent an inter-
agency mission to investigate (Ponzio 2005:176), but by early 2003 it was clear 
that a consequence of the Solomons’ diplomatic recognition of Taiwan would 
be that China would veto any Security Council resolution to step up assistance. 
Australia had not invited the United Nations to participate in the Townsville 
peace talks. At every stage from then on, the United Nations played a more 
marginal role than is normally the case with an international peace operation—
even the previous regional one in Bougainville. Nevertheless, particularly the 
UNDP, but also UNICEF and a number of other UN agencies played important 
roles in post-conflict development and support for reconciliation.
Australia had declined multiple invitations to support international 
peacekeeping since 1998 to restore order in the Solomons. The 11 September 
2001 attacks in New York, the 2002 Bali bombing and the ‘war on terror’ 
began to change Prime Minister Howard’s thinking towards his region. He 
decided to become more activist in stabilising the ‘arc of instability’ around 
Australia and drew praise from the US Bush administration for this proactive 
approach. This new Australian interventionism was a sudden shift ‘from a 
particularist and developmental lens to a global and security lens in viewing 
Pacific developments’ (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008:16). The Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI) (Wainwright 2003:28) produced an influential paper that 
suggested Solomon Islands was at greatest risk of state failure in the region and 
was a potential haven for terrorist groups. The paper contained ‘five references 
to possible terrorism and twelve references to a “failed state”’ (Anderson 
2008:6). Among other things, the ASPI paper set the initial tone for a ‘muscular’ 
law-enforcement approach to peacebuilding in Solomon Islands that was not 
even a Western community policing approach, let alone the more devolved kiap 
model of government by patrol that combined policing with other government 
functions (Gordon 1983), which once worked well in Melanesia, delivering a 
more dispersed community policing presence into rural areas than occurs today 
(Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009):
The central requirement is for active, sustained and muscular policing. 
The force that undertakes the task will need to be well resourced and 
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effectively led. It will need to impose a policy of zero tolerance for 
violence and intimidation, and be prepared to use significant force, 
including lethal force, to do so. (Wainwright 2003:41)
Some 6300 Solomon Islanders were arrested, many on multiple charges, in the 
first three years of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 
This was way more than 1 per cent of the population, and a much greater 
percentage of the population in Honiara, where the arrests were concentrated 
(Carroll and Hameiri 2007:421). There were many cases of defendants spending 
two, three or more than four years in prison on remand then being acquitted 
(Averre 2008:2).1 Some RAMSI officers we interviewed saw it as a de facto 
policy in the early years of the intervention to charge leading militants with 
something reasonably plausible to get them locked up on remand while they 
more carefully sought to build evidence against them. When Prime Minister 
Howard announced the intervention, he referred to the risk of the Solomons 
becoming a safe haven for ‘transnational criminals and even terrorists’. It 
seemed implausible to people who knew the Solomons well that it could be a 
hospitable safe haven for transnational criminals or terrorists. Howard dismissed 
in his interview with us any influence of ‘war on terror’ thinking in his actual 
decision to go in. He believed RAMSI was politically popular with the Australian 
people and his media people did promote the terror angle at times in seeking 
to generate interest in the electorate. Many who supported the intervention as 
a good thing for the people of the Solomons went along with a story that also 
allowed Howard to impress members of the Bush administration—for example, 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, with how he was cleaning up his regional 
badlands. 
Our interview with then Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, 
who had launched the ASPI report, suggested that the sharp policy reversal 
to intervene with international peacekeepers in the Solomons—against the 
advice of his department and the Australian Public Service more widely—was 
a result of his conversation with Prime Minister Howard about Prime Minister 
Kemakeza’s request for help. This conversation revealed that Howard’s thinking 
was similar to Downer’s. They decided to go in with a spirit of statebuilding 
until the job was done, without any exit timetable. Our interview notes say 
1 In 2006, Solomon Islands boasted the second-highest remand population, as a proportion of the total prison 
population, in the Pacific region (International Centre for Prison Studies, cited in Averre 2006). Just less than 
50 per cent of prisoners were on remand—second only to Timor-Leste, where 70 per cent of prisoners were 
on remand. According to the then Public Solicitor, Ken Averre, writing in 2006 (p. 16): ‘The number of cases 
in the criminal justice system is without parallel and the infrastructure and personnel are simply not there 
to deal with it.’ In relation to the length of pre-trial detention, the US-based Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor, in its annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Solomon Islands (published in 
March 2006), reported lengthy pre-trial detention as a ‘human rights problem’ and explicitly linked this state 




that his department’s view was that ‘you would have to completely redesign the 
place’ to be effective and, because that would be very expensive and take a long 
time, it was unwise. Downer took this seriously, but concluded ‘let’s do that 
then even if it takes more than a decade. Howard agreed [according to Downer] 
“Let’s reengineer it”.’ Howard told Kemakeza that the intervention would be ‘all 
or nothing’; his government would have to agree to in-line expatriate personnel 
in the police and the Finance Ministry with full access to all financial records. 
The New Zealand Foreign Minister, Phil Goff, likewise convinced his prime 
minister and cabinet to support what became RAMSI. Goff, like Downer, had 
‘nightmares of a Pacific version of Rwanda on their doorstep’ (Moore 2004:206). 
The support of the Pacific Islands Forum and bipartisan support from the 
Solomon Islands Parliament were conditions of the intervention. These were 
unanimously delivered in July 2003. Some 1700 of the 2200 RAMSI personnel 
who landed in July 2003 were Australian, but there were small contingents 
from all 10 Pacific Island Forum states. Prime Minister Kemakeza announced 
a new, 21-day amnesty for handing in guns (31 July 2003 to 21 August 2003), 
after which 10-year prison sentences would be imposed on militants with 
weapons. Firearms flooded in immediately; 2500 weapons that included large 
numbers of high-powered weapons and light machine guns and 300 000 rounds 
of ammunition were surrendered. This allowed RAMSI to proliferate public 
spectacles of weapons destruction soon after they landed. After RAMSI had 
been in place for a year, this had risen to 3713 weapons—about 700 of them 
high-powered—which, when combined with the earlier surrenders, suggests 
a higher level of armament of militants than was the case in Bougainville. At 
least 300 of the weapons stolen from police armouries were never returned; 
how many were sold and exported and how many were buried are not known. 
RAMSI intelligence fears many are buried and pose a future threat.
The capture of Harold Keke
The size of the intervention was much more than was needed. RAMSI Special 
Coordinator Nick Warner has said this was an explicit policy of ‘shock and 
awe’. It was a language of intervention that would impress Condoleezza Rice as 
much as Melanesian militants at a time when Australia was planning withdrawal 
of the troops it had committed to the initial invasion of Iraq. The landing on 
Guadalcanal under the gaze of the regional and international media was 
transacted with spectacle—helicopters dropping troops in visible locations, 
landing barges crashing onto the beach loaded with troops when the landing 
could have been more efficiently transacted at the wharf, and so on. It worked 
in immediately transforming the climate of security, so much so that one senior 
PNG military officer who was there felt their job would have been easier had 
Pillars	and	Shadows
52
something similar been done on Malaita at the same time as the Honiara landing. 
At the least, he thinks the navy vessels should have sailed around Malaita first 
with helicopters buzzing off them onto the island.2
Figure 5.1 RAMSI soldiers and a Solomon Islands police officer exchange 
information as they patrol their different ways in the Central Market in Honiara
Photo: Courtesy of Defence Magazine
RAMSI replaced the rule of the gun with the rule of law very quickly. 
Immediately, there was a new feeling that ‘you could be arrested again when 
you broke the law. Chiefs would not talk to boys [during the Tension]. They 
were afraid to open their mouths. It was rule of the gun. RAMSI’s arrival gave 
chiefs and elders courage to speak up’ (Malaitan premier). 
It can be argued that most of the best work of RAMSI was done as an 
announcement effect even before it landed. Most of the weapons that were 
handed in were deposited with the National Peace Council before RAMSI 
arrived. There were cases of stolen cars returned furtively to their owners’ 
driveways before the RAMSI landing. The corrupt Snyder Rini was removed as 
Minister for Finance and eight departmental heads were sacked in early August 
before the in-line finance staff from the treasuries and finance departments of 
Australia and New Zealand followed in the wake of the peacekeepers. Rini, who 
became finance minister again in Prime Minister Sikua’s government from 2007, 




and many of these officers, were to make a comeback within a few years. All 
warlords, including Harold Keke, made up their minds that they would urge 
their fighters to surrender their weapons and renounce violence before RAMSI 
landed. One Member of Parliament, Yokio Sato, and a former member, Kamilo 
Teke, had been gradually persuading Keke to the point where he was willing to 
surrender (Kenilorea and Moore 2008:427). We have seen that Keke was the key 
spoiler who instilled fear and fomented a security dilemma well beyond his base 
on the Weather Coast. His holding out was the main justification provided by 
ex-MEF for retaining their weapons.
RAMSI’s first priority was to disarm and arrest Keke. RAMSI police commander 
Ben McDevitt wrote to Keke on 25 July 2003 offering to guarantee Keke’s safety 
in custody in return for surrendering weapons and submitting to justice. 
Keke replied in writing that he wanted peace and was willing to surrender ‘as 
long as the first priority is to disarm the militants in Honiara and get rid of 
corrupt politicians’ (Fraenkel 2004a:168). Keke’s Guadalcanal Liberation Front 
had declared a unilateral cease-fire three weeks before McDevitt’s letter, on 5 
July 2003 (Plunkett 2003:12). A no-nonsense message was sent in a letter to all 
militants from Warner and McDevitt:
In our talks with militia leaders, we have made it very clear that we are 
not here to negotiate or make deals…It is in your interest to hand in 
all guns. Anyone found with a gun after midnight 21 August will be 
breaking the law and will face up to 10 years in prison and a S$25,000 
fine…We are able to deal with any situation and track down illegal 
weapons. We will not be stopped by threats or intimidation. (Fraenkel 
2004a:168)
As in Bougainville, in Solomon Islands, the rumour was spread that RAMSI had 
technology that could see buried guns from the air. While our interviews with 
the key players make it very clear that McDevitt and Warner were not bluffing, 
had Keke decided to hide out in his remote Weather Coast, it would have been 
extremely difficult to capture him and likely that he would have killed many 
of those pursuing him into the mountains before they killed him. Moreover, 
he was a mentally unstable man who had convinced others of his mystical 
indestructibility. So he could well have also persuaded himself of that fiction. 
There was a fear that Keke was beyond being appealed to in terms of either his 
grievances or his greed. 
In regards to the activities of Harold Keke and his men on the Weather 
Coast, transcripts, judgements and other documents associated with 
the Tension Trials paint a picture of unbridled criminality: extortion, 
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theft, kidnapping, arson, torture and murder.3 Keke’s reign of terror 
was characterised by a dark, grim, and self-serving dynamic of criminal 
gratification, bordering on criminal insanity, which clearly had little, if 
nothing, to do with the causes which he and some of his men claimed to 
be fighting for. (Allen 2007:131)
Keke was initially charged only with skipping bail in March 1999 and believed 
he was returning to a hearing in Honiara that would give him an opportunity to 
address the people on the bona fide grievances of the people of Guadalcanal. To 
some extent, he did that in the trial in which he was convicted of the murder of 
cabinet minister Father Geve.
Figure 5.2 RAMSI leaders Ben McDevitt (right foreground) and Nick Warner 
negotiate the surrender of Harold Keke (left) in 2003 at a meeting in which 
he admits to murdering six Melanesian Brothers
Photo: AAP/AFP 
By Christmas of the year of the landing most of the militant leaders were under 
arrest, including Joe Sangu, Harold Keke, Stanley ‘Satan’ Kaoni and Andrew 
Te’e on the IFM side and Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea on the MEF side as well as all 
the leaders of the Joint Operation within the police. At the time Moore (2004:18) 
was writing, he was able to say ‘the entire supreme council of the MEF is now 
in prison or facing charges’. By May 2006, it was reported that a remarkable 
3 And one might add rape and sexual assault, which were frequently reported on both sides. Peochakuri 
village on the Weather Coast has reported that 15 per cent of its women and girls were raped by ex-militants 
that included Harold Keke (Allen 2007:248). 
5.	Regional	Assistance	Mission	to	Solomon	Islands
55
160 former police officers had been arrested (Butler 2006:4) and ultimately more 
than 400 lost their jobs. Notwithstanding the amnesty signed at Townsville, 
in its first two years, RAMSI made 611 arrests on ‘very serious charges’; these 
seemed mostly to comply with the letter of the poorly drafted Amnesty Acts 
of 2000 and 2001, but often not their spirit. Total RAMSI arrests even by 1 
November 2003 had reached 1340, including 25 police officers. 
In mid-2006, Allen (2007:38) concluded that on the Guadalcanal side alone, 
there were 47 Guadalcanal ex-militants still in custody at Rove prison. Only one 
cabinet minister was put behind bars in 2003: Daniel Fa’afunua was arrested 
for assaulting his wife and then assaulting the New Zealand policewoman 
who responded to the complaint. The next year (2004), MEF leader, Minister 
for Agriculture and Livestock and former foreign minister, Alex Bartlett, was 
imprisoned for demanding money with menace and other offences in 2000. 
Fortunately, the overloaded Honiara courts were among the more resilient 
institutions in Solomon Islands, though it became necessary for RAMSI to invest 
heavily in expatriate lawyers and court administration reform. What was true 
of the Honiara courts was not true of the rest of the country; the working of 
local magistrate’s courts had completely broken down by 2009 when 80 per 
cent of cases sent to a magistrate for a hearing were not happening.4 While 
it is reported that there have been only 55 Tension trials (some with multiple 
defendants) (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:135), actually many militant leaders 
were imprisoned on charges other than Tension killings, including domestic 
violence, robbery, extortion with threats, corruption and embezzlement. 
Andrew Nori was never put behind bars—nor were Kemakeza or Rini, among 
other leaders, to face corruption or embezzlement charges while they remained 
in power. Kemakeza was charged after he left office in 2006 and ultimately 
imprisoned. There seems to have been a conscious RAMSI decision to delay his 
arrest while he was prime minister in the interests of political stability, according 
to statements by a former Solomon Islands director of public prosecutions 
(Dinnen 2007b). Without RAMSI, Kemakeza would not have survived as long 
as he did; without Kemakeza fearing for his life as well as his political future, 
RAMSI would never have been welcomed in and given the free hand to run the 
show (in a way Kemakeza’s successors were unwilling to allow). 
The effect was a pact for three years with ‘a grand council of thieves’ (Plunkett 
2003:37). It was not a totally unprincipled engagement with Kemakeza; it 
delivered peace and stability, and ultimately RAMSI turned on the kleptocrats. 
Another former prime minister, Alebua, was also imprisoned for corruption 
4 In a 2006 interview, one leading Western Province business leader said in an interview in Gizo that 




concerning compensation payments. Until these convictions occurred, there 
was a widespread feeling among ordinary Solomon Islanders that RAMSI was 
letting the ‘big fish’ swim away with their ill-gotten gains. 
Cleaning up the finances
Treasury and finance department officers from Australia and New Zealand who 
moved into hands-on roles in the Ministry of Finance transformed the fiscal 
situation within months of RAMSI arriving.5 Taxation revenue collected in 
December 2003 was 40 per cent higher than for the previous highest month of 
the year and total revenue collections (including customs) for the whole of 2003 
doubled 2002 collections, while 2004 revenue collections were treble those of 
2002 (Batten and Chand 2008:130). The revenue continued to rise sharply up 
to and including 2008, until the global financial crisis belatedly hit in 2009. 
In 2009, senior tax and customs officers said that trust in the tax system had 
increased. Voluntary compliance was up because people no longer felt that tax 
they paid would be stolen by militants and crooked politicians. 
The fiscal recklessness of the past continues to place a heavy burden on the 
present, with the Honiara Club Agreement requiring the Solomon Islands 
Government to devote 10 per cent of all revenue to debt repayment and to take 
no new loans. By 2006, debt fell to 100 per cent of GDP and to 53 per cent by 
2008 (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:144–5).
Replacing the paper customs system with a computerised one made some kinds 
of corruption more difficult: the electronic architecture makes it impossible 
for most officers to make changes within certain fields; it leaves a trace of the 
identity of an officer who changes a number; and it forces non-compliance 
into areas where it is easier for an audit to pick up. Customs revenue has not 
accelerated nearly as rapidly as tax because top-down assaults on the revenue 
from the Minister for Finance are still possible (see also Allen forthcoming). 
Against advice on prevailing international market prices for logs, ministers for 
finance have repeatedly issued instructions to customs to reduce the valuation 
of logs below these prices. Ministerial tax exemptions have been repeatedly 
given to multinational loggers. For the most part, more sophisticated transfer 
pricing is hardly needed. The Customs Act penalty as of 2009 for failing to 
report the export of logs is $S200—about US$30. Allen (forthcoming) shows 
that simple capacity constraints on getting out to inspect logs to check physical 
correspondence with declaration are also a big part of the problem. With 
5 In fact, tax administration capacity building has for some time been transferred from RAMSI to a five-year 




logging a domain beyond the rule of law, other crime has flourished under 
the wing of protected loggers. Sexual abuse of indigenous children by Asian 
logging contractors has been widespread (Herbert 2007). In three interviews 
with senior RAMSI personnel, it was alleged that guns have been shipped in 
and out on logging vessels that enjoy political protection. 
At the big end of town, the largest income earners in the economy also pay almost 
no tax. In the five years to 2009, a total of only S$5 million in tax was collected 
from the multinational logging companies (Inland Revenue interview). This is 
one of many less important aspects of the tax system where non-compliance is 
almost universal. These challenges of turning around the compliance culture can 
be tackled one at a time over a period of years and basically this is happening 
in Solomon Islands thanks to a productive partnership between indigenous and 
in-line expatriate revenue officials. 
The rhetoric of partnership and capacity building was strong in RAMSI. Often 
it was not matched by the reality of in-line officers, who quickly found capacity 
building frustrating and found it easier to ‘do it yourself’ and ‘get on with the 
job’. 
In the early years the government almost stood back and wanted RAMSI 
to do things. It has been difficult to pull back from this. RAMSI’s 
instincts had become that if someone was going to get something done, 
we would be the ones to get it done. (RAMSI officer from AusAID, 2009) 
It is a familiar dilemma that international interventions instead of building 
local capacity actually ‘suck it out’, as Michael Ignatieff (2003:162) puts it, 
by marginalising indigenous actors in their haste to get things done. Fraenkel 
(2004a:173) reports that feathers were ruffled early by a notorious sign on a 
toilet door in the Finance Ministry: ‘RAMSI Personnel Only.’ The Economic 
Reform Unit remained in 2009 an office that was a sea of expatriate faces. The 
confidence to hand over the reins was still wanting after six years. One minister 
was scathing: 
They are kids.6 There’s too many of them. They turn over too fast. Some 
only come for three months. Their minister does not know what they 
are doing, does not know the name of many of them. They are very 
weak on the training of local staff and all these years on there are only 
three of them. They don’t understand the conditions of the country in 
6 While many advisors are young and it can be a problem—for example, with a young police officer of 
limited experience in Australia telling an experienced indigenous police officer how to police his own society 
(McLeod 2009)—many police advisors, like advisors in all pillars, were over-fifty-fives seeking a new challenge. 
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which they are working…the Australian Treasury is using the Economic 
Reform Unit in the Solomon Islands as a training ground for its new 
graduates. (2009 interview) 
One expatriate in that ministry put it this way: ‘The Solomons suffers from lack 
of basic administrative capacity. How to fill out a form to release funds…We 
were policy people and we were not used to capacity building and management. 
We found these things tiresome to be honest.’7
Little recovery in micro-finance
The Solomon Islands Credit Union League received considerable donor assistance 
in the 1990s and much collegial support and capacity building from Australian 
credit unions. Most were located on Guadalcanal and these were all looted by 
militants during the conflict. Most were emptied out then burnt to the ground. 
The treasurer of the largest one was killed. As of late 2003, only 20 of 164 
credit unions formerly operating in the country were still open (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004:82). 
Post-conflict in Solomon Islands, as in Bougainville, the nation was awash 
with pyramid schemes that promised fast money and demolished many 
families’ savings (Kabutaulaka 2004:395). One of them was Noah Musingku’s 
Bougainvillean ‘bank’ that signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
Solomon Islands Cabinet in 2003 to lend it US$2.6 billion! Sadly, in the early 
years of this decade, more Solomon Islanders were ‘saving’ with the pyramid 
schemes than with members of the Solomon Islands Credit Union League. It says 
something about the relentless focus of RAMSI on statebuilding that rebuilding 
micro-finance in civil society was not a priority. In fact, it was a higher priority 
for Australian development assistance pre-conflict than post-conflict! 
Police building
One factor that has made peacebuilding in Solomon Islands easier than in 
Bougainville, Timor-Leste and various Indonesian conflicts such as Aceh and 
Papua is that Solomon Islands does not have a military. So, unlike these other 
conflicts of the region, at least the problems to be managed did not include 
7 Concerns surrounding capacity building and counterparting in the Ministry of Finance were highlighted 
in a Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat social impact assessment conducted in October 2003: ‘A repeating concern 
has been raised about the effectiveness of current counterparting arrangements between RAMSI personnel 
and local DOF [Department of Finance] staff. Local staff members feel excluded and RAMSI personnel are not 
coaching/mentoring or transferring skills to national counterparts’ (Pacific Islands Forum 2004:19).
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elements of the military and the police shooting at each other. At the same time, 
the Solomons case shows that the absence of a military is no guarantee against 
a coup in which the best-armed organisations in the society participate—the 
police in the case of the Solomons, more specifically the Police Field Force 
(paramilitary border police). 
Our interviews with police revealed that divisions within the police between 
those who participated in the coup and those who did not were still a huge 
problem. The Melanesian Brothers conducted a reconciliation service within 
the police in April 2002 (Moore 2004:217). Yet our interviews revealed that this 
was seen as a rather set-piece reconciliation, albeit with some emotion, tears 
and hugging, that touched the hearts of only some police. The reconciliations 
within the Bougainville police between factions who fought on different 
sides in their war secured a much more meaningful, deeper unification of the 
Bougainville police service. The Solomon Islands Police Force was purged of 
most of the Malaitans who played important roles in joining forces with the 
MEF. The resentments of expelled police are still carried in important ways by 
their wantoks still in the police. Police who refused to participate in the 2000 
coup reported to us resentment at being disciplined or ordered around by more 
senior police who did participate (and who remain in the police today). ‘Who 
are you to talk about discipline?’ was the spirit of this feeling. 
As has happened in the Ministry of Finance, in the early years of RAMSI’s 
Participating Police Force (PPF), there was a major problem in the quality of the 
capacity building of foreign police who might have been well trained as police 
officers, but not as trainers. The logic of flawed capacity building in this regard 
could be inexorable. The PPF arrive at a police post in an area that has been 
racked by ethnic conflict to work with the Solomon Islands Police Force. For 
a variety of reasons, which include the good work the PPF does at community 
policing during their patrols, their arrival is associated both as a matter of fact 
and in the minds of locals with a dramatic improvement in security. Solomon 
Islanders heap praise on the PPF for this accomplishment much more than they 
do on the Solomon Islands police who patrol with the PPF (because local police 
are still tainted with blame for the violence and chaos of the Tension). It was 
only human that the PPF and their leaders accepted these accolades. And it is 
to the credit of their leaders that they eventually realised it was a mistake that 
the PPF used its superior public relations machine (compared with that of the 
local police) to take credit for things that should have been shared or even fully 
attributed to the Solomon Islands Police Force. The PPF realised that in the long 
run, RAMSI disappears and becomes irrelevant, while confidence in the local 
police will persist as a foundation that matters for future security. So the PPF 




Figure 5.3 Children pose with posters handed out by an Australian intelligence 
officer that read, ‘100 Days of RAMSI Achievements’, 5 November 2003, 
Malaita
Photo: Acquired through Australian War Memorial official commission, 2003 
The second part of the inexorable logic of flawed capacity building arises from 
the following trap that foreign police advisors who are not experienced trainers 
fall into. They see a mistake that their local police partner makes because they 
have never been trained not to make it. The RAMSI officer explains the mistake 
and shows how to respond to or record an incident in the right way. Weeks 
later, the same situation arises and the same mistake is made. The RAMSI 
officer patiently explains again the right way to do it and why it is important 
to do it this way. On the third occasion when the mistake is made, the RAMSI 
officer simply takes over the handling and recording of the incident, telling 
themselves that it is ‘easier to just do it myself’, especially when the improved 
police efficiency is being appreciated by the community. But then when RAMSI 
withdraws and hands back all the policing to local officers, these officers have 
not learnt to implement the superior policing method. 
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that in the case of RAMSI—as is 
generally the case with police building—the 330 foreign police initially assumed 
primarily operational roles to secure previously unsafe streets backed up by 
military peacekeepers. Police whom we interviewed emphasised that while they 
did most of the front-line work in the early days of RAMSI, militants feared 
and respected the khaki uniforms and ‘long guns’ of the military more than 
they did the blue uniforms of the police. An irony of community policing also 
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arose because the PPF mostly patrolled in cars (especially after the murder of 
Australian Constable Dunning on 22 December 2004). The RAMSI military was 
more popular with locals than its police ‘because they walk the streets and 
talk to people. The PPF, on the other hand, are rarely seen outside of their 
ubiquitous police vehicles’ (Allen 2006:197). 
Figure 5.4 RAMSI military captures the attention of two young Solomon Islanders
Photo: AAP/Lloyd Jones
RAMSI police gradually pulled back from operational roles to capacity building 
(Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007)—a shift that can be hard for police whose only 
past experience has been operational. Moreover, the PPF continued to do the 
highest-profile operational work, such as major investigations, intelligence 
and controlling major outbreaks of disorder, and this was naturally the work 
foreign police sought to do as opposed to the less glamorous grind of capacity 
building in routine policing. There was also a more general problem of trust in 
the Solomon Islands police on the part of RAMSI. They were viewed as a broken 
and corrupted force that had contributed greatly to the Solomons conflict. Given 
that background, many in the PPF regarded local police who were not new 
recruits as potential suspects. This was not a great basis for effective capacity-
development work.
A more fundamental problem continues to be the trust and confidence of the 
Solomons people in their police. People often prefer going to RAMSI police 
with their problems than to the Solomon Islands police and often complain 
that the latter act to enforce the law only when the RAMSI police are present 
(Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:172–3). 
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Lessons for the police from the 2006 riots
The worst moment in the history of the PPF was the riots of April 2006 that 
destroyed most of Chinatown in the capital and injured 36 Australian police, 
one very seriously. It is hard to judge whether the riots are better viewed as 
mostly spontaneous or as highly organised. Violence was fomented by criminal 
elements, among others (Commission of Inquiry 2009), who were likely 
organised by political opponents of the Rini government, which most people 
felt they had voted against. These riot organisers set out to ‘cause such trouble 
so as to force a regime-change’ (Commission of Inquiry 2009:47). This regime 
change was indeed accomplished by the rule of the mob. Police alleged that a 
named Member of Parliament made a statement in mid-2006 to the effect that 
‘if anything goes wrong, proceed with lawlessness’ (Commission of Inquiry 
2007:11). While there was an element of manipulation on the part of certain 
leaders, there was also a lot of spontaneity and opportunism in the riots and 
quite a bit of anti-RAMSI sentiment (Allen 2008, 2009b). There had been 
riots in Honiara before and they all followed the same broad pattern and had 
usually been responded to effectively by police. Viewing the April 2006 riots as 
manipulated by shadowy masterminds helped to cover for the mis-judgments 
and total lack of preparation on the part of the PPF.
The looting and burning of shops in Chinatown after a demonstration of 
some kind, is a known scenario. It has been attempted on many occasions 
in the past and, each time, successfully blocked by Solomon Islands 
disciplinary forces. (Former Royal Solomon Islands Police Assistant 
Commissioner Mike Wheatley, Solomon Star, 26 May 2006:2) 
There was clearly an intelligence failure by both the PPF and the Solomon Islands 
Police Force. Many in the latter organisation are believed to have had wind of the 
impending riots, but passed this intelligence neither to RAMSI nor to their own 
leadership. The intelligence function was no longer working communicatively 
within the Solomon Islands Police Force. This relates to a larger dilemma inherent 
in post-conflict police-building missions. In clearing out the ‘bad apples’, the 
interveners necessarily hollow out the institution, reducing its capacity in the 
short term in order to build it in the longer term. This was the point reached 
in 2006 with a Solomon Islands police force that had limited capacity of its 
own, including intelligence capacity. Allen (2006:199) connects the surprising 
failure of the PPF to hear of plans for a possible riot to an architecture of their 
presence that locked the PPF away in remote, airconditioned bases and patrol 
cars, rotations that were too short to build relationships and limited efforts 
to learn Pidgin. Terrorist-style arrest and search tactics directed at the most 
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disaffected families and communities—the communities where the relevant 
intelligence was to be found—had also put up barriers to sharing secrets with 
the PPF (Allen 2006:199).
While the evidence of organisation for rioting was strong, as Christopher 
Waiwori (2006:7) pointed out, the politically driven organisers of the 2006 
riots were a small group in comparison with the much larger crowd of looters 
who ‘took advantage of the unstable security situation…to help themselves 
to anything they want’. Emulatory rioting broke out in Auki, the provincial 
capital of Malaita, soon after the Honiara riots. These were totally managed by 
the Solomon Islands Police Force and were much more successfully and quickly 
contained than was the case in Honiara, albeit in an unconventional way! 
Supporters of the police (who became a larger group than the rioters) began 
pelting rocks at the rioters, who were pelting rocks at the police. The counter-
rioters were not discouraged by the police and prevailed in supporting the 
police to drive the rioters away from Chinese stores they were planning to loot! 
We were able to attend the trials of some of the ringleaders of the Auki riots in 
the local open-sided magistrate’s court in 2006. It was an impressive example 
of community justice; about 100 people watched (a contrast with the tiny 
attendance at the Tension trials we frequented in Honiara). Offenders apologised 
for their wrongdoing and the magistrate gave quite long sentencing homilies 
about how the rioting was something that should never happen again because it 
‘reversim direction of country’. 
In Honiara, the initial outbreak of violence in the form of stone throwing at 
Australian police and burning of PPF vehicles at the Parliament building after 
the Rini prime ministership was announced was certainly not a copybook riot-
control performance by police with little experience in Australia of managing 
large stone-throwing crowds. The PPF Operations Response Team had only 13 
people trained in riot control and the Solomon Islands police had no riot-control 
capability by April 2006 (Commission of Inquiry 2007:1). There was criticism 
that there was a failure by the police to cut off the bridge connecting the city to 
Chinatown—something former police commanders pointed out had been done 
in past times of unrest. 
These problems point to some dilemmas of post-conflict police building. The 
Commission of Inquiry (2007:6) connected the intelligence failure to the standing 
down of the National Intelligence Unit as part of the project of depoliticising 
a police force that used its intelligence capability in the service of collecting 
dirt on enemies of the government of the day. And it connected the weak riot-
control performance (for example, the use of tear gas in a way that blew back 
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on the police)8 to dismantling the former riot-control capability of the Solomon 
Islands Police Force as part of a complete disarmament of the Solomon Islands 
police in 2003. Without intelligence and capability to project force, police are 
hamstrung in their effectiveness at core policing tasks; yet when these areas 
play a part in a coup and a descent into violent chaos, there can be a need to 
temporarily dismantle them. This dilemma can be bridged only by peacekeepers 
stepping into these functions for a period; between 2003 and 2006, this policing 
gap was not effectively closed. 
Several prominent political figures were charged with intimidation, arson, 
inciting violence and like charges related to organising the riots—including two 
men who were appointed as ministers in the successor Sogavare government, 
Charles Dausabea and Nelson Ne’e, and former minister and MEF leader Alex 
Bartlett. Some defendants argued that RAMSI arranged for school fees and other 
benefits to be paid to witnesses (see Averre 2008);9 some RAMSI informants 
alleged that threats and inducements were made to persuade witnesses to retract 
their evidence. Amid the inappropriate pressure that probably was put on 
8 ‘You tok, tok, tok until you calm crowd, have a peaceful manner and you stop anger. You cannot do this as 
you shoot tear gas at them’ (Former Solomons police officer on Melanesian crowd management). The Speaker 
of the Parliament, Sir Peter Kenilorea, appealed to the PPF not to use tear gas and to allow more dialogue with 
the crowd by people like himself, but was ignored. A delegation from the National Council of Women, led by 
Hilda Kari, a National Peace Councillor, also asked the Australian police officers in charge at the Parliament 
to allow them to speak to and calm the agitated crowd—a role female leaders have traditionally performed at 
times of anger. The PPF decided it was dangerous to allow the women leaders to put themselves at risk in this 
way. But actually, no Solomon Islanders were injured by the mob, including the Solomon Islands police who 
stood at the front without protective equipment. Only the Australian PPF police who stood at the back with 
protective shields and helmets were injured because they were the ones seen as provoking the crowd and only 
PPF number-plated vehicles were destroyed during the unrest (Allen 2006:199). 
9 There is now a legitimate worry that there could be an acceptance by the Australian Federal Police of 
paying cash to witnesses against priority Solomon Islands targets. Justice Mullins of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland, in finding that proceedings in former Solomon Islands attorney-general Julian Moti’s indictment 
for child sex abuse offences (which were dismissed by a Vanuatu court in 1999) should be stayed for abuse 
of process, concluded: ‘I am satisfied that the purpose that the financial support has been given to the 
complainant’s family members in Vanuatu is to ensure that those witnesses and the complainant remain 
willing to give evidence against the applicant. The level of the financial support is of great concern and 
the expectation it has created on the part of the complainant’s family in Vanuatu that the support remains 
ongoing whilst the prosecution continues. What would the complainant’s parents and brother have done to 
support themselves since February 2008, if the AFP had not provided full financial support of them and their 
dependants? It raises questions about the integrity of the administration of the Australian justice system, 
when witnesses who live in a foreign country, where it is alleged an Australian citizen committed acts of child 
sex abuse, expect to be fully supported by the Australian Government, until they give evidence at the trial 
in Australia of the Australian citizen. The conduct of the AFP in taking over the financial support of these 
witnesses who live in Vanuatu is an affront to the public conscience. It squarely raises whether the court can 
countenance the means used to achieve the end of keeping the prosecution of the charges against the applicant 
on foot’ (R v Moti [2009] QSC 407). In addition to large payments to the alleged victim herself, her parents 
and brother living in Vanuatu received payment of more than A$81 000—living expenses that go a long way 
in Vanuatu! Considerable additional payments have been made since then. As this book was going to press, 
the Queensland Court of Appeal overturned Justice Mullins’ stay against prosecution, finding that the judge 
failed to ‘recognise that the questioned payments were not designed to, and did not, procure evidence from 
the prosecution witness; and the failure to pay sufficient regard to the fact that the payments made, while 
beyond existing guidelines, were not illegal’ (R v Moti [2010] QCA 178). 
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witnesses by both sides, all the prosecutions for conspiracy to organise the riots 
failed. In part, the problem here was a wider one of the politicisation of justice 
under RAMSI (Averre 2008; Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007; O’Connor 2007b, 
2009a, 2009b).
The Commission of Inquiry (2009:6–7, 31) into the riots expressed concern 
that ‘there still has been no in-house rigorous (“warts and all”) lessons-learned 
policing evaluation of what happened’. The commission found the RAMSI 
policing function to be underfunded. Yet the ratio of a number of PPF that has 
ranged between 200 and 330 at its peak to about 1000 Solomon Islands police 
is a ratio that could never be dreamed of in a UN peace operation in Africa or 
anywhere else. Yet not everything that happened was negative. Many PPF and 
Solomon Islands police showed admirable restraint. Had an indigenous protestor 
been shot by an Australian police officer, a much more violent dynamic might 
have unfolded. As it was, no-one was killed and not a shot was fired from any 
side.10 April 2006 was a litmus test of whether the disarming of Solomons civil 
society was working; the society passed the test. Indeed, in July 2006, the 
RAMSI chief, James Batley, reported that there had not been a single crime of 
any kind with a gun reported to the police in the previous 12 months (Islands 
Business, July 2006, p. 22). There have been only a few gun crimes in the seven 
years of RAMSI—a remarkable accomplishment for a society whose capital had 
been ruled by the gun. As we go to press in August 2010 a new prime minister, 
Danny Philip, was elected amid the kind of allegations of money changing hands 
that had been made of past elections, but this time without significant violence. 
Police-building exit
Senior PPF officers with experience from the disastrous policing disintegration 
in Timor-Leste that culminated in the 2006 fire-fights recall that when the 
United Nations, and therefore the UN Police Force (UNPOL), decided to leave, 
the international police took everything with them. Overnight, police stations 
that had been equipped with computers, vehicles, GPS, riot-control equipment 
and vehicles suddenly were lucky to be left with the odd chair and desk. In 
contrast, the PPF has developed a sophisticated strategy of graduated exit. 
The first step towards exit we have already described. It involves a shift in 
emphasis from in-line policing to international advisors stepping back to allow 
locals to execute the policing. The second step is an audit of which police 
posts where the PPF are located will be ready first for complete withdrawal of 
advisors. That is, the decision is not when to withdraw all advisors; it is where 
10 ‘Destruction of property, then, is a constant feature of the pre-industrial crowd; but not the destruction 
of human lives’ (Rudé 1981:255). 
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to withdraw advisors first. In the Solomons case, the contexts from which the 
PPF have been completely withdrawn first are islands without serious crime 
problems, where domestic violence is being addressed,11 without major risks 
of re-ignition of ethnic conflict and where traditional reconciliation by elders 
of theft and violence works well. Before withdrawal occurs, an audit of police 
post needs is conducted to assess what equipment the internationals should 
leave behind, or add. After withdrawal, monitoring protocols are followed 
to check that the diagnosis was correct that this was a police post that could 
manage well (or better) without being propped up by outsiders. If the follow-
up auditing indicates that certain problems have spun out of control as a result 
of the withdrawal, a decision may be made to return. If audit reveals the whole 
program of progressive exit to be going well then it may be accelerated. 
One prominent Chinese business leader had an interesting perspective on the 
broader policy framework for thinking about RAMSI’s exit:
What is needed for RAMSI is not an exit strategy but for RAMSI to say 
to Solomon Islanders: ‘What is your strategy to take over? What is your 
vision for your country. You must tell us. We must not tell you.’ It’s 
about the leadership of politicians—the masses follow. 
Returning to lessons of colonial policing
There is currently a debate about whether a contemporary Western model 
of policing is the best one for Solomon Islands. Initially, this was another 
matter on which RAMSI was insufficiently sensitive to the limitations of the 
predominantly Australian policing model it was seeking to transfer to Honiara. 
We say Honiara because, even though a lot of fine policing was done by the PPF 
in more remote locations, the overwhelming majority of both PPF and Solomon 
Islands police have been located in Honiara and the majority of the remaining 
police are located in Auki or Gizo. Eighty-five per cent of the largely Australian-
funded police cars supplied to the Solomon Islands Police Force are located in 
Honiara. Solomons Deputy Police Commissioner Sikua is leading a trial in three 
communities of a part-time community officer scheme using as a consultant a 
Bougainvillean police officer with experience of this kind of scheme. The plan 
is for the first 20 community officers to be in place in mid-2010. This has the 
support of the PPF and seconded New Zealand commissioner Marshall as an 
effort to return policing to the villages.
11 Domestic violence prevalence rates are high by international standards in Solomon Islands (Government 
of Solomon Islands 2002:40) and there is some evidence suggesting they increased during the Tension (AusAID 
2008; Pacific Islands Forum 2004:36).
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Beyond leaders within the Solomon Islands Police Force itself, former prime 
minister and the current Speaker, Sir Peter Kenilorea (Kenilorea and Moore 
2008:155–7), is one leading advocate of a rethink of the current policing model 
as one insufficiently focused on the villages of a village society. In British colonial 
times, Sir Peter served as a district officer. Among his responsibilities in that 
role was supervising the local police (village constables, ples men) (Kabutaulaka 
2008:98; Wolfers 1983) and serving as a travelling lay magistrate under the 
Solomon Islands version of governance by patrol. 
Another leader, Manasseh Sogavare, was cynical about RAMSI’s concentration 
of resources on punishing the crimes of the past during the time when he was 
prime minister:
It is worrying that the strategy so far has been very heavily focused 
on punishing those who have been forced by the environment created 
during the crisis to commit crime. This is a backward look to addressing 
our problems. In fact one is fully justified to ask whether the huge 
investment in this program, that will only financially benefit foreign 
companies that run our prisons, will address the deep rooted problems 
of this country. (Solomon Star 2006)
Elsewhere (Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009), it has been argued that while 
Western models of urban policing could be an apt option for policing cities such 
as Honiara in developing countries, something more akin to colonial models 
of decentralised, indirect policing might better serve the villages of village 
societies. Mahmood Mamdani (1996, 1999) conceives of the typical African state 
as ‘bifurcated’. On the one hand there is a ‘civilised’ urban society spawned by 
a history of direct rule and now practising a form of constitutional democracy. 
But most of the society is in fact a patchwork quilt of societies beyond the reach 
of the Constitution and profoundly ethnicised by a history of indirect rule and 
resentment of the predations of the capital. It could be that the Solomon Islands 
of the late 2000s is an even more bifurcated society than it was pre-RAMSI, 
making a bifurcated policing model even more relevant.12
Many share Sir Peter Kenilorea’s view that if policing had been working 
effectively, the violence would have been calmed early in 1998 and there would 
have been no crisis. This would not have been accomplished by riot police or by 
an armed police field force. On Sir Peter’s analysis, the problems started in rural 
Guadalcanal, not in the city. What failed was rural policing. He believes that in 
the rural colonial plantation economy intolerance and anger between different 
12 For Mamdani, indirect rule through village constables and headmen was part of a fabric of oppressive 
colonial clientalism. It was ‘decentralized despotism’ (Berman 1998:316). But that of course does not preclude 
a post-colonial leader such as Sir Peter Kenilorea harnessing colonial technologies of policing to projects of 
contemporary emancipation from violence and commercial exploitation. 
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ethnic groups from different islands were rife. Village constables, headmen and 
district officers above them became sophisticated at reconciling these tensions, 
and particularly at nipping in the bud any rabble-rousing towards violence. 
That was their job and they had failed at their job if conflict spun out of control 
on their patch. They became skilled at homilies of ‘when in Rome, do as the 
Romans do’ and at admonishing one group to practise more tolerance towards 
another group. Sir Peter’s view was also that colonial village courts were adept 
at assisting the police with give and take on inter-cultural clashes over land and 
other differences. 
The village constable system collapsed soon after the demise of colonialism 
because part of the deal to placate separatists in Western Province was to hand 
over some important responsibilities to the provincial level of government. Rural 
policing was one of these. But because no revenue was transferred to go with the 
responsibility, village constables withered away for the want of allowances or 
any other support from their provincial capital. Ironically, one Western Province 
parliamentarian said that after the police presence in Western Province collapsed 
during the Tension (when there were threats from Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army militants staging armed sorties in and out of the province), ‘a citizen 
community watch was set up…which while it was running was more effective 
than the police had been before or since’. 
Police and logs
Dinnen and Braithwaite (2009) argue that the revolution in Western policing 
started by Sir Robert Peel in establishing the London Metropolitan Police in 
1829 was a good thing for the policing of Western cities. But it was a bad model 
for the policing of rural England and the rural spaces of white settler colonies 
such as Australia. One reason why was that the London Metropolitan Police 
model was of a paramilitary police concentrating on crime (and quelling riots 
and urban disorder).13 The older model of English village constables was not 
militarised, consisted mostly of part-timers and was not myopically focused 
on crime control. The English (and colonial American) village constables, like 
their counterparts on continental Europe, were regulatory generalists. They 
took care of consumer protection regulation, weights and measures regulation, 
early forms of environmental regulation such as pollution of rivers, regulation 
13 It is often argued with some justification that it was the Irish colonial model of policing more than the 
London model that was exported across the British Empire. This was an even more militarised model than 
that of the London Police and more oriented to terrorising dangers to the state and suppressing political 
agitation (Ellison and O’Reilly 2008:398). But it was also a Peelian model in that it was forged during the time 
of three chief secretaries of Ireland: the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel and Sir Henry Goulburn, the 
lifelong friend and deputy of Peel. These three all became parliamentarians who played prominent roles in the 
formation of the London Metropolitan Police (Ellison and O’Reilly 2008:399). 
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of liquor licences, workplace safety laws and all forms of regulation up to and 
including the criminal law’s regulation of theft and violence. One of the sad 
things about the demise of this generalist policing model for rural citizens of the 
West is that when it was replaced by Peelian police focused on crime control, 
no-one took an interest in consumer rip-offs and other regulatory offences that 
afflicted rural people. In Western cities, a knock-on effect of the police becoming 
specialists in crime control was the creation from the mid-nineteenth century of 
further specialist regulatory agencies to deal with other urban problems such 
as factory inspectorates, consumer protection agencies, health inspectorates to 
inspect places that served food, and so on. But these other specialist regulatory 
agencies—all much smaller than the police—had offices only in large cities. 
Their inspectors almost never visited rural villages. In early modern England 
and America, villagers complained about a regulatory abuse to the village 
constable; in late modern England and America, they learned to lump it. 
Our Solomon Islands fieldwork reveals the same sad consequences for village 
people of Peelian policing modernity. Villagers said to us that they complained 
to the police about regulatory abuses by logging companies. The reply of the 
police was that this was not their responsibility; that was a matter for an inspector 
from the Forestry Department. But the Forestry Department inspectors were in 
an office in far-away Honiara. And they had no budget for travel to a distant 
island to respond to a complaint such as our villager made. As with pre-Peelian 
English village policing, in the days of colonial policing, the Solomon Islands 
villager could take a complaint about misuse of her/his land, forests or rivers to 
chiefs, then to the village constable, and if no satisfaction was obtained, then to 
the headman, and if none was obtained there, to a district officer like young Sir 
Peter Kenilorea sitting as a magistrate. That was a world of more practical, on-
the-ground checks and balances against natural resource rip-offs. 
Hence, one of the reasons we see the current Solomon Islands Police Force 
experiment with a dispersed, part-time community officer scheme as a promising 
development is that it holds out some hope of a law enforcement system that 
might return to doing something to respond to villagers’ grievances about abuses 
by loggers. Village constables can receive some basic training on something 
as important to the nation as forestry law; they can provide the evidence to 
withdraw licences from lawless loggers and can arrest unlicensed loggers. 
Saving the tropical forest is not the only desperate need for which this Solomon 
Islands Police Force policy shift might be an apt response. Foreign loggers so 
economically dominate locales where they log that they become a law unto 
themselves. Police intelligence suggests they use being above the law to traffic 
weapons and other illicit goods such as pornography on logging ships. Not 
only do they traffic pornography; they produce it by exploiting indigenous 
children, according to the systematic research of the Church of Melanesia on the 
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large island of Makira, which is believed to reflect a more widespread problem 
(Herbert 2007). It was found that village children were raped, sold into marriage 
and used for pornography on a remarkably wide scale by Malaysian loggers. 
Child prostitution was found in every village visited on Makira. 
Last year I worked at the camp. There were seven Malaysian men there, 
and every one was married to a young girl—13 or 14. They are not 
interested in the older girls—once they are 18. (Solomon Islander former 
logger quoted in Herbert 2007:25) 
This was happening at a place where the nearest police officer was three hours 
away by boat. 
Corruption
When RAMSI issued a pamphlet to explain its mandate, on the list of things 
‘RAMSI has come to help with’, the second item was ‘Corruption: making the 
system more open and honest’ (first on the list was ‘Restoring law and order’ 
and the third priority was ‘Sorting out the government finances’) (Office of the 
Special Coordinator 2004). For RAMSI’s first four years, corruption was in fact 
well down on its list of priorities. A dilemma was that ‘[h]ad all the allegations 
[of corruption] been acted on, there would have been few leaders left to run the 
government’ (Dinnen 2008b:15). We must recognise that Melanesian officials 
and Members of Parliament, ‘like all Melanesians, are enmeshed in networks 
of social and financial obligation, and that this often influences their actions 
as elected officials’ (Morgan 2005:5). There is a lot of corruption in Solomon 
Islands because there is a lot of indigenous demand for it that must be satisfied 
if politicians are to survive in a Melanesian political culture; and there have 
been spikes in the supply of foreign cash for corruption since the logging boom 
started in the 1990s and since the conflict from 1998 created temptations for 
foreign interests, notably Taiwan, to curry favour with embattled leaders by 
helping out with slush funds for development. 
It seems possible to recognise these realities while being openly committed to 
raising the bar on corruption control over time. This could mean that at any point 
of time, the worst few abusers of conflicts of interest would be in the process 
of being tackled. Consequently, the worst abuses would over time become 
progressively less corrupt.14 So the journey of reaching Western-style conflict-
of-interest standards would take many decades, rather than the centuries it took 
14 For a more detailed discussion of how this raising-the-bar strategy involves announcements that from 
certain dates targeted forms of law breaking will no longer be tolerated, see Braithwaite (2005:186–8). Solomon 
Islands Inland Revenue is an example of an agency that has progressively lifted the bar on what forms of tax 
compliance will be turned around next. 
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in the West. Ordinary Solomon Islanders who we spoke with saw the Prime 
Minister at the time of the RAMSI intervention, Sir Allan Kemakeza, Finance 
Minister, Snyder Rini, Premier, Ezekiel Alebua, leading businessman Robert 
Goh, Andrew Nori and some others as ‘big fish’ whom RAMSI was letting off for 
corruption and embezzlement while it targeted enforcement on militants whom 
they saw as ‘used’ by such big-men. In many cases, locals saw those imprisoned 
as guilty of little more than defending their wantoks. 
RAMSI did make locking up militants its priority during its first four years. 
Since 2007, however, much of the prosecutorial focus has shifted and two former 
prime ministers who were central players in the drama of this conflict, Kemakeza 
and Alebua, did go to prison for financial crimes concerning reintegration and 
reconciliation funds. A number of corrupt former and serving cabinet ministers 
were also convicted of various crimes and it is believed at the time of writing that 
further high-profile corruption prosecutions are possible. All the prosecutions 
have been of indigenous officials who served in official government positions; 
there have been none of non-indigenous business leaders in the foreign ‘shadow 
governments’ we will discuss below, who activated the movement towards a 
kleptocratic state they could influence (Moore 2008:65). 
It is noteworthy that only a long-term peace operation such as RAMSI could 
have succeeded in the complex investigations required for locking up powerful 
politicians such as former prime ministers. Had RAMSI left after three years, 
it would have left with the people feeling it had gone aggressively only after 
militants; it would have left a large pile of unfinished investigations into the 
corruption of the ‘big fish’ behind them. Other nations that have tackled 
cultures of loyalty to lineages trumping ethical duties to national institutions 
on the demand side, and foreign resources corruption making the supply side 
easier, have not managed across-the-board transformations in just a few years. 
It follows that commitment to tackle corruption must be indigenous and long 
term. 
These realities also mean that education that instils a sense of obligation to the 
nation among elites whose education is funded by the nation is an important 
ingredient of corruption control (see Fukuyama 2008). Large sections of 
educated elites in many developing countries have managed to cultivate 
multiple identities in which on the one hand they hold to a strict moral code of 
duty to the institution in which they serve the nation and on the other hand 
they find alternative ways of sustaining their fidelity to networks of obligation 
and reciprocity with their lineage or village. A high quality of values dialogue 
within an outstanding indigenous education system is a more important solution 
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to this problem than educating elites in the West. Developing-country elites 
educated in the West can easily dismiss anti-corruption values imbued within 
those Western institutions as relevant only to life in the West.15
The realities of a supply of foreign funds that has fuelled corruption go to the 
potential benefits of denying logging and fishing licences to foreign interests, 
reserving them for more cash-strapped indigenous entrepreneurs. This policy 
option will be discussed further below. There are in fact many strands to the web 
of controls that can be put in place to prevent corruption—from engaging civil 
society through organisations such as Transparency International and the anti-
corruption pledges promoted during the 2006 election by local church-backed 
NGO Winds of Change to the state anti-corruption institutions discussed in the 
next paragraphs. To RAMSI’s credit, today it is promoting a multidimensional 
approach to corruption control where each strand in the fabric of control is 
liable to snap, while the whole fabric develops some potential resilience over 
time. The difficulty is whether an anti-corruption fabric woven on a foreign 
loom will unravel when the short history of foreign presence ends.
Until the 1990s, discussion of corruption in Solomon Islands focused on 
politicians and civil servants using public funds to favour their wantoks. In the 
1990s, elite corruption tied to the governance of a shadow economy of logging, 
tax and customs evasion, licences and contracts for big investments such as 
casinos and bribery of politicians to elect the prime minister16 progressively 
transformed the corruption debate. Some contemporary commentary can be 
myopically preoccupied with this ‘big fish’ side of the problem. Our argument 
is that control strategies must attend to both demand and supply-side realities. 
Since independence, elections have become progressively more corrupt (Aqorau 
2008:264). Civil servants in departments such as Forestry, Environment and 
Conservation17 gradually became part of a corruption machine—by no means all 
of them; some struggle bravely against the culture. Like fish, these departments 
rotted from the head down—from the minister down. Fisheries was another 
department that rotted from the head down at the behest of foreign fishing 
interests who captured political leaders and the civil servants who served them, 
getting licences on favourable terms, underreporting catches and paying little 
revenue on the nation’s second-largest export (after logs). 
When civil servants who were honest or uninvolved in corruption (beyond 
doing the odd favour for wantoks) left or were pushed, they were replaced by 
15 Also see below the discussion of Morgan Brigg’s (2009) interesting thinking on wantokism as a potential 
resource for fighting corruption by securing checks and balances in a Melanesian way. 
16 In the 2006 elections only five politicians signed the Winds of Change pledge that they would not accept 
bribes in relation to the vote for prime minister and it is believed bribes of S$20 000–60 000 were paid to 
persuade members to change sides in the vote for the prime ministership (Alasia 2008:128–9). 
17 Another part of the wilful politics of neutering its regulatory effectiveness was that its regulatory 
function was starved of resources for monitoring and enforcement (Allen forthcoming; Bennett 2000:253). 
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loyalists to corrupt civil servants who in turn were loyal to corrupt politicians. 
A culture of corruption having been created from the top down by generations 
of corrupt ministers, it then became difficult for an honest minister to assume 
power and control a culture of corruption that permeated a department. Perhaps 
the most important forms of corruption in terms of millions of dollars in the past 
decade have been by ministers for finance issuing remissions of customs duties 
or reducing the determined value of log exports for customs assessment (see 
Allen forthcoming). Allocation of prime Honiara land to commercial interests 
has been another area of formidable corruption. 
The Public Service Commission is an institution that once had an important 
role in corruption prevention, setting professional standards and discipline 
for civil servants, and especially education for integrity and efficiency (along 
with the public service training school, which was closed in the 1980s). By 
the time of RAMSI’s arrival, the Public Service Commission was colluding in 
corrupt government (Roughan 2004). The Leadership Code Commission has 
been responsible since 1986 for investigating corruption and other forms of 
official misconduct by politicians. In practice, it became an institution tamed by 
corrupt politicians long before it had a chance to mature into an effective anti-
corruption institution. A deeply defective statute is one of many problems that 
beset it (Wood Report 2005). It is a body whose chairman says it is responsive 
to complaints, yet we found during 2006 that no-one ever answered the phone! 
The only way to get attention was to physically arrive at their office—hard to 
do for a villager remote from the capital. The Chairman of the Leadership Code 
Commission could not tell the Commission of Inquiry (2009:42, 43) into the 
2006 Honiara riots ‘how many leaders had been dealt with over the past three 
years’—not even the most basic information on how many cases his commission 
had investigated. It also could not produce for the Commission of Inquiry any 
annual report to Parliament.18
One year after independence (1979),19 the Auditor-General had a professional 
staff of 23 auditors and accountants; by 2004, it had only one professional 
staff member (Roughan 2004:19). In that year, the Ombudsman had only two 
investigators, neither with specialist ombudsman investigative training, and 
also went three years in a row without producing an annual report (Roughan 
2004:24; see also Rawlings 2006). Even after considerable rebuilding of the 
Ombudsman’s office, in 2008, fewer than 2 per cent of respondents to the 
18 John Wood commented here: ‘Not that it is an excuse, but there is no provision in their legislation for 
them to do so!’
19 The Auditor-General, the Leadership Code Commission and the Ombudsman were all accountability 
institutions established under the 1978 independence Constitution. 
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People’s Survey mentioned the Ombudsman in response to the question of ‘who 
should be informed if a Solomon Islands Police Force officer is not doing their 
job properly?’ (up to three responses could be given) (McMurray 2008:51).
Since 2005, the Auditor-General’s office has greatly increased its capacity 
and integrity. It has caught up on the backlog of uncompleted reports left by 
its quiescent predecessors. It produced 10 biting special audits in 2005 and 
2006 exposing S$433 million in corrupt or fraudulent disbursements by the 
government (Office of the Auditor-General 2007:4). Unfortunately, in 2009, 
those reports were being received by a Public Accounts Committee of the 
Parliament chaired by a member sentenced to 22 months’ prison for his actions 
when finance minister of corruptly approving a custom duties exemption for 
his wife. An appeal court overturned his conviction on the grounds that, as 
a minister, he was not an ‘officer’ in the terms of the Penal Code’s provisions 
prohibiting official corruption in the Public Service. For the moment, reports 
of the Auditor-General exposing corruption in government are going nowhere 
after they are tabled in the Parliament. 
The Solomon Islands media, ‘while free, has been highly docile in its coverage 
and treatment of the corruption problem’ because of its ‘close relations with the 
establishment’ (Roughan 2004:11). While there was considerable intimidation 
of the media between 1998 and 2003 by militants aligned with corrupt political 
leaders, the main problem has always been one of self-censorship. Nevertheless, 
the media is one of the essential strands in a web of controls against corruption 
that is in more resilient shape than in many developing countries and this 
resilience comes from indigenous journalists. The idea of a web of controls 
against corruption is that when state strands of the web snap, civil society 
strands such as the media and anti-corruption NGOs will step into the gap by 
exposing, and proposing repairs to, the rent in the fabric. In the difficult history 
of unravelling and repairing anti-corruption fabric, progress and regress are 
ever-present possibilities. Leaders committed to a multidimensional long-term 
struggle to raise the bar are what count; nihilists who believe corruption can 




Figure 5.5 The three pillars of RAMSI’s whole-of-government approach 
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Machinery of government: RAMSI’s priority for 
statebuilding
RAMSI has three pillars: ‘law and justice’, ‘economic governance and growth’ 
and ‘machinery of government’ (see Figure 5.5). We have discussed the work of 
the first two pillars in the preceding sections, but only some of the dimensions 
of the machinery of government work. Much of the machinery of government 
pillar of RAMSI was about strengthening the accountability institutions 
that were vital to corruption control: the Ombudsman, the Leadership Code 
Commission and the Office of the Auditor-General. But there were also elements 
of the pillar concerned with electoral assistance, strengthening Parliament and 
parliamentary committees (undertaken through the UNDP) and strengthening 
provincial governance (which was in fact very focused on Honiara and 
Guadalcanal). But the biggest aspect of the machinery of government pillar 
was ‘public service repair and reform’, which covered areas as diverse as 
staff development, information technology support, refurbishment of offices, 
corporate planning, annual reporting, cabinet processes, government housing 
and recruitment. The machinery of government pillar completed RAMSI’s 
whole-of-government approach (Patrick and Brown 2007; Wielders 2008:139). 
Execution within each pillar was by a hybrid of expatriates working in-line 
within departments until it was felt that an indigenous counterpart was trained 
to do the job. At that point—which varied from department to department and 
job to job—the expatriate moved from an in-line position to being an advisor 
(and sometimes back again, as we saw with the police). Coordination among the 
pillars has been a rocky road. Yet coordination is a strength of RAMSI compared 
with other peace operations. The three leaders of the RAMSI pillars meet weekly 
under the Chairmanship of the Special Coordinator, a senior Australian diplomat, 
and at times go out into the community together to work with civil society to 
diagnose problems holistically and seek holistic solutions.20 International peace 
operations before RAMSI tended to be thought of as having a peacekeeping phase 
in which the priority was security, followed by a post-conflict reconstruction 
phase that occurred mostly after peacekeepers had departed. RAMSI integrated 
these from the outset.
20 There are also consultative mechanisms that brought RAMSI, the Solomon Islands Government 
and the Pacific Islands Forum together regularly in Honiara; these newer mechanisms were a response to 
longstanding complaints about Australian dominance of the mission. See the discussion of the Enhanced 




Whole-of-government versus whole-of-society 
strategies 
Integration with an armed peace operation dramatically changed the Australian-
led development strategy for the Solomons. Before RAMSI, the AusAID country 
strategy had been that since the government was not functioning well because of 
corruption and rule of the gun, it was best for donors to work through civil society 
with a bottom-up development model rather than through the state: ‘If you can’t 
work with the government, then work beside the government’ (AusAID official, 
2006). Indeed, most international donors had that strategy—Taiwan being an 
important exception. The hope of this strategy was that a strengthened civil 
society would gradually make demands on the government for a more effective 
democracy; and meanwhile donors would get on with development at village 
level through civil society. While it was a credible strategy in the circumstances 
pre-RAMSI, the new analysis at the time of planning the intervention in early 
2003 became that rapid progress would become possible only with an armed 
intervention that made the streets safe and then moved on to tackle corruption. 
That was a credible strategy, too, even though it was strong on the detail of how 
to create safety (and achieved it quickly) and weak on detail of how to tackle 
corruption (and had barely begun to tackle this in 2009). 
With RAMSI assuming the monopoly on the use of force, it became the  quintessence 
of government under the new strategy. Its in-line staff in  government positions 
only slowly stepped back from being a parallel government to the elected one. 
So the new strategy was not only muscular in terms of the security pillar, it 
was also muscular in re-engineering the ‘machinery of government’. Such in-
line muscularity in rebuilding the state was possible only because RAMSI had 
assumed the core legitimacy associated with the monopoly over the use of force 
and guaranteeing the safety of citizens, not least of a prime minister who feared 
assassination. The three-pillared whole-of-government approach also changed 
the AusAID model of intervention from government by contract (managing 
contractors and paying by results) to return to a model of direct command and 
control in which AusAID staff and Australian and New Zealand public servants 
seconded to Solomon Islands government departments, rather than contractors, 
were in key meetings with Solomon Islands officials. This was better for whole-
of-government coordination. But it also created a ‘crowded stage’ (Kabutaulaka 
2006) that sometimes pushed off indigenous actors; or, as Ignatieff (2003:162) put 
it, ‘sucked out’ capacity rather than built it. Contractors resumed importance 
in other ways as RAMSI aged and a small cadre of contractors remained the 
only ones who had experience of the Solomons over many years, as the public 
servants left after one or two brief secondments.
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The AusAID management model also moved from Canberra-centred management 
to in-country management, though Canberra bureaucracies varied in their 
willingness to devolve. For the most part, the real power was with the three 
leaders of the RAMSI pillars who were coordinating in Honiara and not with 
the folk they theoretically answered to in three Canberra departments. Such a 
bold shift from a bottom-up model that had been regarded internationally as 
quite sophisticated to a top-down whole-of-government model attracted some 
international acclaim in statebuilding circles. 
A criticism of the shift could be that it involved too much of a rejection of 
the former civil society model as ‘not working’. The ‘Winds of Change’, to use 
the name of one of the local movements demanding a non-corrupt democracy, 
were blowing, albeit feebly compared with the wounds of change inflicted by 
militias. The old civil society strategy required patience and might better have 
been viewed as something AusAID would encourage to bubble along in the 
background. This would have meant that instead of shifting from a civil society 
strategy to a whole-of-government strategy (Hameiri 2009b), RAMSI would have 
seen itself as shifting to a whole-of-society strategy that in 2003 slanted spending 
priority to the security sector first, then to economic ministries’ reform, 
then to other institutions of the state, then back to bottom-up development 
that prioritised village society. Instead, there was a sense that statebuilding 
had transcended support for villages and the participatory empowerment of 
village citizens. The police constable, for example, was not to be thought of as 
an important part of the village-level development leadership; he or she was 
part of a whole-of-government team that was fixing problems of urban-centred 
government. 
We are perhaps not being totally fair to AusAID in the previous paragraph, 
as the Community Sector Program that it funded pre-RAMSI (when it was 
called the Community Peace and Restoration Fund) continued to be bilaterally 
funded post-RAMSI, albeit as a poor sister of the intervention. Because village-
level development was so neglected under RAMSI, one Western Province 
parliamentarian was concerned that ‘rural people are losing confidence’. 
People were discouraged when the promise of earlier work such as the 1997–99 
UNDP Participatory Planning Program was dropped. That program developed 
village-level needs assessments in an impressively collaborative way; during 
the Tension, it was cut without ever doing anything to follow through with 
implementation of the plans. 
It might be said that RAMSI arrived with a set of templates for rebuilding 
the state and this priority was steadfast. Participatory bottom-up alternatives 
that came, for example, from the work of the National Peace Council that 
RAMSI discredited, were viewed as distractions from implementing the statist 
templates. One debate that RAMSI and the donor community more generally 
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sought to choke off was over federalism. There was widespread post-conflict 
popularity among political leaders from most provinces for replacing the 
centralised political system with a federal model (Allen and Dinnen 2010), albeit 
with considerable resistance from Malaitan elites. There are reasons to be wary 
of federalism as a quick fix to excessive centralism. Where part of the problem 
to be fixed is that centralism has enabled waste by national elites, provincial 
governments can proliferate opportunities for waste and corruption by new 
provincial elites who monopolise power to the exclusion of village needs just as 
much as the old national elites. The Parliamentary Inquiry (2009:218–19) into 
RAMSI took up both the advocacy of federalism and opposition to it by quoting 
Andrew Nori:
Mr Andrew Nori, former Member of Parliament…argued that the desire 
for federalism is based on an assumption that Solomon Islands’ current 
economic, social and political problems are constitutional problems. This, 
however, is inaccurate because what the people normally complain about 
is poor every day services. Mr Nori subsequently blamed politicians 
for this misplaced assumption. He argued that when people complain 
about poor services, politicians take these complaints and translate 
them into constitutional problems, the solution to which is supposedly 
constitutional reform in the form of federalism. He explained…
In a small nation like Solomon Islands, with due respect, I believe a 
well run national government, well resourced with good linkage and a 
sound delivery system to our people, can serve the interest of Solomon 
Islanders, because political structures only serve politicians. It is 
economic structures and commercial structures that benefit people in 
rural areas. (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:218–19) 
Yet a debate over decentralisation was one the Solomons had to have in the 
aftermath of the conflict. It is a debate that could indeed have led to the 
conclusion that village levels of governance more than provincial levels are the 
priority for enhanced support. On the other hand, it could have led to bolder 
locally initiated constitutional architectures that could not be predicted in 
advance of having the debate (Allen and Dinnen 2010). Building to standard 
templates imported from the West is statebuilding on shaky foundations, which, 
as in this case, can reflect international more than local priorities. RAMSI has 
kept the lid on debates for constitutional reform that enjoy strong currents of 
local support. For many years, a review of federalism has been stuck in the 
Constitutional Reform Unit in the Prime Minister’s Office, with little sign of 
engaging the community with its work.
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6. Reconciliation and reintegration
Many of the Solomon Islanders and RAMSI members we interviewed did not 
see reconciliation as part of RAMSI’s job, particularly in its first few years. 
Rather this was seen as something Solomon Islanders must demand, initiate 
and lead. On the other hand, some informants, including Andrew Nori, Jimmy 
Rasta and former IFM leaders, felt RAMSI had crowded reconciliation off the 
policy agenda. The arrival of RAMSI was seen as putting the policy focus on 
everything but reconciliation, especially law and order (Allen and Dinnen 2010). 
MEF spokesman Andrew Nori told John Braithwaite that ‘you can’t reconcile by 
demand’. But a combination of RAMSI not demanding it, crowding it off the 
policy agenda with other important matters of statebuilding and Melanesian 
patience about getting around to reconciliation meant that reconciliation 
languished for years with little attention. Reconciliation is certainly a notable 
absence from the whole-of-government approach in Figure 5.5. We have seen 
that closure of the National Peace Council was a setback for reconciliation; the 
council’s network of 80 mediators, mainly in Guadalcanal and Malaita, was 
slowly but progressively bringing conflicting parties back together in a spirit of 
forgiveness by sharing their stories. 
A final obstacle to reconciliation was the philosophy that many parties to the 
conflict adopted—including RAMSI, the MEF, Premier Alebua and prime 
ministers Sogavare and Kemakeza—that justice should precede reconciliation, 
or compensation should precede reconciliation. Contrast this with Bougainville. 
There would certainly be negotiation of what payments (traditional or in kina) 
would be made before the scheduling of the formal reconciliation meeting. But 
in Bougainville this was viewed simply as a step towards the important thing, 
which was the reconciliation. Usually gifts were given in a spirit of symbolising 
how precious was the spilt blood, rather than in a spirit of compensation. There 
was rarely in Bougainville a philosophy of compensation before reconciliation. 
Nori indicated to John Braithwaite how fundamental this difference was by 
saying if he took John’s pen from him, John then hit him, and Andrew hit 
John back, they could reconcile. But the reconciliation could not occur without 
Andrew giving John his pen back first. What he saw as following from this 
was there could be no reconciliation until land taken from Malaitans was 
compensated. He claimed that expelled Malaitans were compensated only for 
their lost property (livestock, houses), not for land they had paid for. He thought 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be a good idea when interviewed 
in 2006, but only if truth led to repair and then to reconciliation. In any case, he 
did not see a national commission as the most important form of reconciliation. 
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He had seen many examples of both sides praying together in church as groups 
of individuals and viewed this as much more important. Ultimately, Nori felt 
reconciliation must deal with ‘real harms against real individuals’ as opposed 
to ‘unreal group harms against “Guadalcanal” or “Malaitans”’. For this reason, 
he favoured a government repository of individual complaints—‘this was taken 
from or done to me’—as a foundation for real reconciliation. 
There were many bottom-up reconciliations led by women. For example, a group 
of Guadalcanal women visited Malaita for a reconciliation ceremony at the Takwa 
Catholic Parish in September 2003 (Kabutaulaka 2004:396). Earlier still in the 
struggle for peace, Women for Peace regularly plied the airwaves of the Solomon 
Islands Broadcasting Corporation with pleas for reconciliation nationally, and 
locally used churches as peace platforms (Corrin 2008:188; Pollard 2000). Women 
became important in the training in restorative justice methods delivered by 
Solomon Islanders employed by international aid NGO World Vision (see Box 
6.1). World Vision trained hundreds on the Weather Coast in restorative justice 
methods and established Bougainville-style Peace and Good Order Committees 
in eight villages there. These committees have led many family-to-family and 
village-to-village reconciliations over killings, arson and theft. These committees 
have also energised some EU micro-project initiatives through establishing village 
plans for development that involve tackling the micro-projects. 
Box 6.1 Two Weather Coast peacebuilding stories from World Vision files
My	name	is	Jacquelyn	Tova	and	I	am	a	Mother’s	Union	member	of	Haliatu	Anglican	
Church.	I	am	very	interested	in	this	Peace	Building	Training	as	it	gives	me	more	
idea	 on	 how	 to	 talk	with	 other	 people.	 Also,	 I	 see	 it	 as	 a	 chance	 to	 increase	
my	knowledge	and	moreover	 the	knowledge	of	other	women	who	are	not	well	
educated.	 I	see	this	training	fit	to	our	culture	and	so	 it	 is	simple	to	understand.	





















Much of the church reconciliation was also led by men, with the Melanesian 
Brothers particularly important, as we have seen. The Solomon Islands Christian 
Association was the network that lobbied most persistently for a policy emphasis 
on reconciliation, specifically for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The commission proposal first emerged in the Civil Society Peace Conference 
Communiqué in 2000. Civil society programs that had an impact also always had 
a lot of church involvement, even being led by pastors. An example was the 
restorative justice training and reconciliation work between Malaita and the 
Weather Coast led by an indigenous pastor working for World Vision. The first 
phase of that work involved the training in restorative justice largely organised 
through churches in conflict areas. The second stage brought church leaders 
from the two areas together for more than a week of shared training, sharing of 
stories, apology, reconciliation and forgiveness. Then in June 2009, 30 Malaitan 
chiefs sailed to Marau for a reconciliation meeting with 30 chiefs from across the 
Weather Coast for the third stage of the project. The final stage—yet to occur at 
the time of writing—involves the militants who did the killing coming together 
to reconcile. For many programs, it has been getting onto this final stage of 
actually engaging the ex-militants to reconcile directly with one another that 
has proven too difficult. 
By far the most important site where meaningful reconciliation has occurred 
between militants from both sides has been Rove prison. This was not initiated 
by the prison administration,1 but substantially by the prisoners themselves. 
On one famous occasion, a Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) prisoner was 
mistakenly put on the MEF side of Rove prison. When the police rushed to the 
prison to correct the mistake, he was found with his arm around Jimmy Rasta, 
with whom he had reconciled. Prison Fellowship International’s Sycamore 
Tree Program (a Christian restorative justice approach) has been taken up by 
the Bible Way Church’s ministry to the prison. It is led by a released former 
militant, Elton Kenasi. Welfare officers and the pastor at Rove prison got behind 
Sycamore Tree and the ex-combatants who lead its work. The Bible Way 
Church also runs a halfway house where militants from all sides have stayed, 
often for many months, often with their families, after release from prison until 
they are ready to build a new life. Families who have travelled from afar for 
reconciliations at the prison also stay at the halfway house. The church also 
1 Hopefully, the thought given to rehabilitation in the prison is not well captured by AusAID’s (2007:18) 
Solomon Islands Transitional Country Strategy—Performance Framework. Its ‘Transitional strategy 
outcome’ 1.4 is ‘Rehabilitative programs established to reduce recidivism’. The ‘[s]ources for reviewing [that] 
transitional strategy outcome’ are the ‘[n]umber of probation orders made and implemented’. Outcome 1.4.2 
is ‘[c]ontinued monitoring of the extent to which probation is used as an alternative to custodial sentencing’ 
and the associated source for reviewing this outcome circles back to ‘[r]ehabilitative programs established 
and used’! Not only is the strategy circular; ‘probation’ and ‘rehabilitation programs’ are limited options and 
outcomes in the circle in terms of their specificity and innovation. It reads as a fit to some sort of international 
template that bears no relationship to the ideas about rehabilitation that circulate in the local context. 
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does community mediation in former conflict areas, especially on Malaita. They 
have a philosophy of keeping the government out of their reconciliation work 
as they feel when the government gets involved it brings in victim demands for 
compensation from the government. The Bible Way reconciliation is very much 
about a personal religious journey to bring Jesus into the militant’s life. For this 
reason, it has not engaged the 10 or so prisoners who have converted to an anti-
Western Islam while in Rove prison. Many of these are ex-combatants. Note the 
irony that a RAMSI sent to guard against non-existent Muslim fundamentalists 
in Solomon Islands villages miraculously managed to create some in the prison 
it built. 
The Bible Way reconciliation work has had little donor support. Much of the 
funding has come from former militants who participated in the program while 
inside and, as of 2009, were supporting it from outside. Leaders of the church 
and prison staff told us that Jimmy Rasta had provided formidable funding to 
transport families (by boat from Malaita, for example) to join reconciliations 
inside the prison and for other needs of the program. Jimmy’s wife, Vika Koto, we 
were told, always cooks and brings the food for the reconciliations; she served 
two years in prison herself on remand awaiting a murder trial in which she was 
acquitted. We were struck that in our conversations with the Rasta family, they 
did not mention this generosity; it was others, including their former enemies, 
who reported their generosity. Rasta did, however, tell us that all 43 employees 
in his brick-making, plant hire and roadwork business are ex-combatants. He 
claimed the business existed for the purpose of serving their reintegration, 
rather than his accumulation of wealth. Rasta won a landslide victory to enter 
Parliament in 2010 and became a minister in the new government alongside 
another former prisoner from the Tension, ex-policeman Manasseh Maelanga, 
who became Deputy Prime Minister. Alex Bartlett is another militant leader 
who has donated many thousands of dollars worth of support to the work of the 
Bible Way Church with prisoners. 
One reconciliation, between former prime minister Alebua and Ronnie Cawa, 
was discussed in a Sycamore Tree Program meeting at Rove prison. We also 
discussed it in a long interview with Alebua and a very brief one with Cawa. 
It was seen as a difficult reconciliation involving a number of stages. Cawa and 
Harold Keke are widely seen as the least reconciled individuals in Rove prison 
and the most volatile and violent; the worst incidents of violence between 
militants inside the prison have actually been between these two. Cawa was 
Keke’s right-hand man who did much of his killing. Alebua, who was Premier 
of Guadalcanal at the time, was shot in the head, losing an eye, and through 
the elbow. He says he forgave all those who were responsible for doing that to 
him while he was in prison. Because of restrictions by the prison authorities 
on the number of relatives who could attend the reconciliation in the prison 
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between Alebua and Cawa, Alebua said: ‘There is peace in my heart after the 
reconciliation, but not peace in the heart of my tribe.’ Like everyone else who 
had tried to reconcile with Harold Keke, his attempts would fall apart when 
Keke would lapse into imagining he was a different person. Alebua claims—as 
did other senior players on the Guadalcanal side—that he prayed with the many 
MEF militants in Rove prison and reconciled with them all. 
Figure 6.1 Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea (second from right, in sunglasses) with 
ex-combatants who work in his brick-making, plant hire and roadwork 
business
Photo: John Braithwaite
Jimmy Rasta, Alex Bartlett, Andrew Te’e and Joe Sangu are other militant leaders 
who have been touched by the Sycamore Tree Program. Prison staff report 
amazement at observing the ex-combatants living together in a small prison for 
years and never observing unpleasant interactions, let alone violence, between 
the MEF and IFM inmates. Interestingly, Alebua liked being in prison very 
much. Rove to him was like ‘a monastery’ where he could ‘develop his spiritual 
side’ with time for contemplation without the constant pressure a big-man faces 
of demands from wantoks for help with this or that. Reconciliation with his 
enemies had been a big part of that monastic experience. But in a letter Ezekiel 
Alebua showed us in prison that he had written from there to the Minister for 
Peace, Unity and Reconciliation on 4 July 2008, he warned this is not enough:
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Reconciliation will never achieve any changes if we hold ceremonies 
merely for the sake of fulfilling a spiritual or a traditional norm. To 
simply express an apology and recompensate [sic] for wrongs inflicted 
won’t be enough. There must be changes in our strategies and approach 
to political, economic and social developments.  
The new Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
debate
Until 2006, a widespread feeling among Solomons leaders was that theirs was 
a small nation where everyone in the elite knew everyone else, so a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission might open up new conflicts that would be 
hard to manage. A common feeling was that while such a commission would 
be a good thing, the nation was not ready for it, not yet mature enough in 
its spirit of apology and forgiveness to learn from the past. From 2006, that 
changed, with both the Sogavare and the Sikua governments moving to a policy 
of support for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Solomon Islands 
Christian Association (SICA) lobbied for it from 2000. Oxfam was a supporter 
of the churches in the campaign. But the Kemakeza government of 2001–06 
feared truth and in these years RAMSI preferred prison to reconciliation, seeing 
reconciliation as something the people of Solomon Islands needed to sort out 
themselves.2 SICA claims that an Australian high commissioner had in the past 
dismissed their analogy with South Africa by asserting that South Africa might 
have needed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission because it did not have 
a functioning multi-ethnic judiciary, whereas the Solomons had that. For its 
part, the Kemakeza government told SICA a commission might ‘open up a can 
of worms’. Because of the history of dishonouring the spirit of the amnesty 
in the Townsville Peace Agreement, combatant leaders such as Jimmy Rasta, 
Alex Bartlett and Andrew Te’e were in 2009 openly hostile to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, though 2010 reports indicated some softening of 
opposition from some militant leaders. They feared what they said would be 
2 There is no direct partnership between RAMSI and the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and 
Peace. The ministry does not come under any of the RAMSI pillars. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, 
Joy Kere, has argued that there would be great benefit from logistical support from RAMSI for the ministry’s 
work and ‘[t]hat meaningful reconciliation and law and order [should] be considered as conditions for RAMSI’s 
phase down’. In her evidence to the Parliamentary Inquiry (2009:204) into RAMSI, Kere said: ‘If RAMSI’s 
role is to assist in the long term stability of Solomon Islands then some effort and assistance is required to 
enable the Solomon Islands Government and its people to address and reconcile grievances in a manner that 
is meaningful to Solomon Islanders. As we are all aware, if grievances are not addressed appropriately and 




used against them in further prosecutions. The visit of Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu from South Africa in May 2009 began a process of turning around those 
fears. 
The Solomon Islands context for mounting a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is very different from any previous commission. In the seven years 
since the conflict ended, the number of arrests and incarcerations per capita, 
more so per conflict death, exceeds that in any case of post-conflict justice the 
authors know of. The big question for Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
in other nations has been: which will be the cases for which we will use the 
truth established to launch prosecutions and where will we allow amnesty? 
The Solomons already has an amnesty law (see Chapter 4, Footnote 1), albeit 
one whose spirit, as articulated in speeches in the Parliament that enacted it, 
has hardly been honoured. RAMSI, the Solomon Islands Police Force and the 
DPP no longer had great interest in launching new Tension cases at the time 
of our 2009 fieldwork, and a declining interest in cleaning out the old ones. 
As of June 2009, the DPP had a list of 13 pending Tension cases involving 30 
defendants still to be tried. But some of these defendants were militants such 
as Harold Keke, who were already in prison or had already been convicted on 
other charges. In September 2010, within days of Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea being 
appointed Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources, it was announced he 
would stand trial for attempted murder in November 2010. Along with Patterson 
Saeni, already in prison on a life sentence, Rasta is charged with firing shots at 
a senior police executive’s home in 2002.
In a context in which most of the post-conflict justice work is done, the key 
policy question is no longer ‘how willing are we to trade away justice to get to 
the truth and to reconciliation?’ More of the emphasis can be on the nation-
building opportunity that truth about the past and reconciliation for the future 
can deliver in a post-conflict environment. South Africa is the best-known 
example of seizing that nation-building opportunity thanks to the grace of 
leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, who were able to rewrite 
the national story of South Africa as a coming together of peoples—black, white 
and coloured—who were all victims of an institution called apartheid. Abraham 
Lincoln had likewise been able to re-narrate what it meant to be an American 
160 years ago at the end of that country’s Civil War: black or white, North or 
South, to be an American was to be a victim of slavery as an institution; an 
American is a person who is part of a national struggle to transcend the terrible 
legacy of slavery (Meister 1999). The truth and reconciliation process in Solomon 
Islands provides an opportunity for citizens to tell their stories and to hear 
those of others, to discover what it means to be a Solomon Islander. It provides 
an important vehicle for linking people in different parts of the archipelago 
through shared storytelling and the understanding and empathy this is likely 
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to generate. These local stories could, in turn, contribute to a national narrative 
that will attempt to make sense of the conflict years and identify what is needed 
to ensure the same mistakes are not repeated. The process of storytelling began 
with the first hearings in March 2010 ‘featuring a procession by school children 
and victims’ and an opening by the chair ‘saying the hearings would disperse 
shame but also that the perpetrators would have a chance to regain their 
humanity’ (Harris Rimmer 2010:7).
Jimmy Rasta says he wants a ‘Forgiveness Bill’; Alex Bartlett wants a ‘Pardon 
Bill’. The Sikua government’s National Policy Statement included to ‘[t]able a 
Pardon/Forgiveness Bill in Parliament for enactment’ (Parliamentary Inquiry 
2009:200). On his election in August 2010, the incoming Prime Minister, Danny 
Philip, announced he would introduce a Forgiveness Bill to cover all ex-militants. 
Like most leaders of the Tension, Rasta and Bartlett have already served prison 
sentences. It is an option for the Solomon Islands Government to apologise to 
militants through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for failing to honour 
the spirit of the amnesty agreement it signed in Townsville in 2000, to commit 
to an end to all new Tension trials and for the Governor-General to pardon all 
of those currently in prison who are rehabilitated and stand ready to apologise 
for their wrongdoing. Possibly only two of them would likely be a danger to the 
community and these happen to be the two most serious offenders. A Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission report recommendation in 2011 for a Forgiveness 
Bill would doubtless not be passed by the Parliament before 2012. By then, the 
ex-combatants remaining in prison would have been there a long time. Almost 
all have been model prisoners. Most had no prior criminal record of any kind 
and come from loving families that stand ready to support them on release. From 
inside prison, they have shown leadership to the rest of the nation in how to 
bring the killers from the two sides together in reconciliation. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission could acknowledge this leadership. Most of these 
ex-combatants are profoundly committed to non-violence as a result of their 
reconciliation experience with Sycamore Tree; most are respected, energetic 
leaders from communities that need more hard-working leaders. When Rasta 
was in prison, he organised a work group to fix the many examples of defective 
plumbing and drainage in the prison, to repair decaying buildings and paint 
them. A joint ex-IFM–MEF work team in the prison when we visited in 2009 
was completely rebuilding and refurbishing the prison chapel, crafting fine 
pews for their services. 
Rove prison is overcrowded, so there is a case that the nation would be well 
served by emptying out combatants who have paid their dues when so many 
other killers and masterminds of violence have gone free, when many more 
serious criminals than those locked up were released in return for testifying 
against those on the RAMSI target list. Of course, the argument against Rasta’s 
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‘Forgiveness Bill’ is that it would do injustice and compromise the rule of law. 
But it also does violence to the rule of law to offer immunity to more serious 
criminals who testify against less serious ones because the latter happened to 
hold an office in the MEF command structure. It also does violence to the rule 
of law to turn a blind eye to the corruption of multinational logging companies 
and the ministers they paid as root causes of the Tension. It also does violence 
to the rule of law to fail to prosecute RAMSI officers who offered financial 
inducements to witnesses to testify against those on their target list. If it is an 
acceptable deviation from the rule of law to legislate for these RAMSI officers 
to enjoy immunity from prosecution in respect of any crimes they commit in 
responding to the conflict (Hameiri 2009b:566), why is it unacceptable to grant 
such immunity to former militants? A counter to the rule-of-law objection to 
a Rasta Forgiveness Bill is therefore that there was selective injustice in who 
served time in prison. 
One interesting question is whether this debate might change if Andrew Nori 
were to be prosecuted. Nori is a wealthy man who secured impunity while so 
many of the poor men he influenced went to prison. Many Solomon Islanders 
wish to see him in jail. But perhaps even the launching of a Nori prosecution 
would not change the debate now, as Nori has been a loser, not a winner from the 
Tension. He has lost his professional and personal reputation and his family has 
suffered tragically as a result of the choices he made to stand with the militants. 
If he is ready to apologise in a deep and genuine way, perhaps the nation might 
now be ready to forgive him through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Jimmy Rasta believes that without a Forgiveness Bill, the Gold Ridge mine will 
never be allowed to reopen safely because locals around the mine feel such a deep 
sense of injustice over the selective incarceration of their relatives. Some of them 
are keen to exact payback for this against the mine.3 Rasta argues that emptying 
out the prisons of ex-militants would ‘let RAMSI deal with corruption. Arrest 
all corrupt leaders and put them behind bars.’ John Braithwaite replied that it 
seemed inconsistent to want a Forgiveness Bill for the Tension trials but then to 
want to fill the jails with corrupt leaders. No, he retorted, jails are expensive for 
a poor nation and must be reserved to help solve the nation’s current problems, 
and no current problem is a bigger threat to the nation’s future than corruption. 
Punishing crimes of a previous period of history is a luxury, an injustice the 
nation can no longer afford, in Rasta’s view, as long as impunity remains for 
the crimes of logging that, more importantly than causing the last conflict, will 
cause the next one. He sees his Forgiveness Bill as bounded in time to crimes of 
the distant past, freeing up criminal enforcement for crimes that will endanger 
the nation’s future.
3 Rasta worked at Gold Ridge before the Tension.
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Another truth a commission could reveal is the location of perhaps 300 weapons 
stolen from police armouries that remain unaccounted for. That is a truth 
that the Rastas and the Bartletts who are calling for a Forgiveness Bill are in 
the strongest position to draw out. Another who could contribute greatly to 
answering that question is the man who is number one on RAMSI’s fugitive list, 
Edmund Sae, the former police armourer accused of assassinating his former 
police commissioner. No-one would have more to gain from a Forgiveness Bill 
than Sae and, if he could promise to account for the missing weapons as part 
of the price for his pardon, that would be a truth that would greatly increase 
prospects for future peace. 
Figure 6.2 Community spectacle to consummate weapons disposal
Photo: Courtesy of David Hegarty
At the time of our 2009 fieldwork, Father Sam Ata had recently been appointed as 
chairman and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was recruiting only 30 
staff. This of course will not be sufficient for the kind of historical analysis that 
was done by the Timor-Leste Truth and Reception Commission and the South 
African commission on the root causes of the conflict. These staff resources would 
also not be sufficient for the investigative work to turn over all the rocks on who 
were the key perpetrators and corruptors behind the conflict. The legislative 
model for the commission is influenced by Sierra Leone—another country 
whose commission was thinly funded. The timeline for the Solomon Islands 
commission is just one year, with an option for extension through a second 
year. It will not be able to award compensation or grant amnesties. Testimony 
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of witnesses before the commission will not be able to be used against them in 
subsequent prosecutions. According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Act 2008, statements before the commission, as well as its findings and any 
other facts or information disclosed in relation to its work, cannot be used as 
evidence in any proceedings before a court of law. This provision has attracted 
criticism from human rights groups, notably Amnesty International (2009), on 
the grounds that it provides impunity to wrongdoers. The International Centre 
for Transitional Justice and the UNDP have been assisting the commission with 
advisors. But as one of them said, a difference from the Timor-Leste commission 
is that here most of the work will not be done by Australian advisors; it will be 
completed by Solomon Islander staff. 
As in Bougainville, in the Solomons, genuine Melanesian reconciliation cannot 
be done in two years—the proposed maximum life of the Solomon Islands Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. It will also not be done mainly at the national 
level. It will take decades of step-by-step local reconciliation work in villages 
and in churches. For problems whose roots are rural, long-term reconciliation 
work connected to bottom-up development that can deliver ‘justice as a better 
future’ (Shearing and Johnson 2005) is the reconciliation work that matters 
most. But just as the National Peace Council was, and World Vision is, pushing 
that slow process forward, so might the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
do that in 2010 and beyond. 
Refugee reintegration
One thing that has made reconciliation difficult is that most of the refugees 
fled rural Guadalcanal and most of them never returned to their former homes. 
If they returned from Malaita at all, it was mostly to the poverty of squatter 
settlements around Honiara. Malaitans who fled Western Province mostly did 
return and enjoy warm relationships with locals today. Public provision of 
payments for refugees to resettle increased anger because so many missed out as 
a consequence of militant leaders and politicians embezzling the money. NGOs 
such as Caritas and World Vision assisted with trauma counselling that was 
delivered through churches. 
One of the important dilemmas of peacekeeping revealed by the Solomons 
experience was the effect on traumatised communities of continued armed 
patrols once the streets had been made safe. The importance of especially 
military peacekeepers’ display of weapons in motivating militants to surrender 
theirs in mid-2003 was repeatedly emphasised in our interviews. In subsequent 
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years, however, there was considerable local questioning of whether a move to 
the Bougainville policy of both police and military peacekeepers being unarmed 
was a better policy:
[M]any women and children are still traumatised by the mere sight of 
firearms because the ethnic tension is still fresh in their minds. Another 
impact is that carriage of firearms openly in public has the potential to 
give the wrong impression that Solomon Islands can only have peace 
and stability through armed law enforcement. It is in the long term 
interests of Solomon Islanders that they regain their confidence in the 
police and the judiciary carrying out their functions without the use 
of firearms. On this basis, therefore, Rev Riti suggested that perhaps 
RAMSI should…slowly phase out the practice. (Parliamentary Inquiry 
2009:179) 
Many Malaitans evicted from rural Guadalcanal and from jobs at Gold Ridge 
and the oil-palm plantations returned to squatter settlements on the outskirts 
of Honiara such as Burns Creek, which have become hot-spots of youth crime 
and alcohol abuse. The Honiara City Council does not wish to encourage this 
squatting by non-ratepayers, so services are exceptionally poor there. At 
least 2000 and possibly 5000 people are believed to live at Burns Creek in an 
area relying on just two water taps. One foreign ambassador lamented that 
her country would like to help these displaced people, but the Honiara City 
Council, the Guadalcanal Provincial Government and the national government 
did not ‘want us putting in running water’. There are a number of squatter 
settlements dominated by refugees from the violence of more than a decade ago 
that are almost as poorly serviced and as afflicted by violence and alcohol as 
Burns Creek. Most of the population of Honiara post-conflict are squatters. 
Combatant reintegration
The attempt to reintegrate former combatants into the police as special 
constables was a disaster that cloaked many criminals as police, opening up 
a whole new world of criminal opportunities for them. This failure and the 
widespread embezzlement of reintegration funds for combatants created an 
environment at the time of RAMSI’s arrival of resistance to any more government 
handouts to militants. So the Solomon Islands case did not see the widespread 
investment in support for ex-combatants to start up businesses that was seen in 
other regional conflicts in Bougainville, Aceh and elsewhere. More than 1000 
special constables were dismissed and demobilised under a UNDP combatant 
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reintegration program that included reconciliation ceremonies in the villages 
of the demobilised special constables followed by weapons surrender (UNDP 
2005). 
In the analysis of a former Malaitan premier, the reintegration assistance that 
did flow to combatants who handed in their weapons flowed too early. Militants 
wasted much of it on alcohol and wild living instead of investing it in income 
generation for their family’s future. It was poorly used—first, because ex-
combatants needed trauma counselling and assistance with reintegration with 
their families and villages as the starting priority. Second, the former premier 
argued, the rule of law needed to be re-established before it would be safe 
for ex-combatants to invest reintegration payments in businesses that had a 
chance of surviving. The interesting timing argument of the premier here is 
that combatants should not receive cash when they hand their guns in. Instead 
they should receive an IOU that promises a reintegration payment after they are 
reconciled and resettled in their community and after the business environment 
re-stabilises to one in which business start-ups can flourish. 
This chapter shows reintegration occurring from the bottom up rather than 
the top down. Churches and villages provided the most striking examples. 
The important reconciliations that occurred in prison were also of the bottom-
up type. Refugee and combatant reintegration has been mismanaged and 
misappropriated by national and provincial governments. Top-down command 
and control became a priority with the arrival of RAMSI, but not reconciliation 
and reintegration. In most places, refugees wanting to return to their homes have 
not received support to do so, and when they returned to squatter settlements 
instead, many basic services there were wilfully denied to them. While the top-
down policy priorities did not help, divided local communities and churches 
often did manage to weave the fabric of their societies back together. 
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7. What layers of identity were 
involved in the conflict?
Identity multiplexity
Our colleague Ron May is fond of saying that ethnicity is a ‘notoriously slippery 
concept in Melanesia’. Both Guadalcanal and Malaita comprise numerous 
linguistic and tribal groups, and there are few physical differences between the 
peoples of the two islands—far fewer than between Bougainvilleans and PNG 
Highlanders, for example. Moreover, island-wide identities such as ‘Malaitan’ 
and ‘Guale’ are relatively recent phenomena, doubtless reinforced by recent 
conflict, with their origins in the colonial and early contact periods. For most 
people in the Solomons, and indeed across Melanesia, primary identities and 
loyalties continue to reside with what can be variously described as kin groups, 
clans and tribes. 
For these reasons, it is useful to visualise ethnicity in Solomon Islands in terms 
of Anthony Smith’s (1991:24) ‘concentric circles of allegiance’. For example, a 
young man’s primary loyalty is usually to his clan on, say, northern Malaita. 
Under certain conditions, however, such as those that prevailed during the 
ethnic tension, that loyalty becomes refocused on the wider circle of ‘Malaita’ 
and its ‘leaders’. Solomon Islanders can navigate between these wider and 
narrower circles of identity with considerable dexterity and alacrity. The 
fluidity and mutability of ethnic identity in Solomon Islands render it prone 
to manipulation. There are always those who seek to manipulate identity 
discourses purely for personal, political and economic ambition, and this was 
certainly evident during the conflict in Solomon Islands.
Among the multiplexity of identities that matter in the Solomons conflict, we 
will consider in turn kinship and island identities, big-man identities, youth 
identities such as Masta Liu and multiplex Chinese identities. We then consider 
the paradoxes of wantokism as obstacle and resource in national identity 
formation and national reconciliation. 
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Resistance as a font of identity
Allen (2007:90), following Bennett (1987), argues that colonial patterns of 
economic development created regional haves and have-nots. The people of 
Malaita and the Weather Coast, Allen continues, fell into the have-not category. 
They sold their labour to the blackbirders, then to the Solomons plantation 
economy away from their homes, then to the Honiara urban economy and on 
to the adjacent north-eastern plains after World War II, to compensate for their 
extremely limited opportunities at home. In the case of Malaitans, this has 
forged a sense of themselves as a people who have made the most of government 
neglect of their island to work their way up the class structure of Solomon 
Islands society. 
Furthermore, Allen argues that identity was forged out of resistance to external 
sources of power—to traders and blackbirders, to the church, the colonial 
administration and the post-colonial state. On both the Weather Coast and 
Malaita, fidelity to kastom law as opposed to government law was a font of this 
identity of resistance. In colonial times, there were social movements such as 
the Maasina Rule Movement, of which Andrew Nori’s father was one of the two 
founders, which helped forge a pan-Malaitan identity of resistance to colonial 
rule. On the Weather Coast, the Moro Movement mobilised a return to kastom 
across southern Guadalcanal against the church as well as the state. The IFM 
enrolled and re-energised the Moro Movement to its militant projects. When he 
was alive, Chief Moro kept his distance from the IFM, which adopted the ideas 
and practices of Moro selectively and only by some.
Figure 7.1 Isatabu Freedom Movement guerrilla, a son of Chief Moro, 
whose Moro Movement renounces modern ways, with foliage as 
camouflage, patrols with a homemade rifle in 2000 to protect a Moro 
Movement village on the Weather Coast 
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Figure 7.2 IFM fighters who are members of the Moro Movement, renouncing 
modern clothing, at a waterfall on a break from patrolling the Weather Coast, 2000
Photos: Ben Bohane
Big-men and identity
While hereditary male chiefs are not uncommon in Solomon Islands and female 
leadership, especially through the church, is also important, the dominant form 
of leadership identity is a big-man identity.1 An effective big-man could widen 
the scope of identity by linking lineages that inherit different areas of land into 
a communal alliance. Big-man identities infuse contemporary parliamentary 
1 The dominant form of political organisation in pre-contact times was the big-man system, though 
chiefly systems also existed, and in some places hereditary title and achieved status were ‘intertwined 
or complementary’ (Keesing 1985:237). In some areas, including much of Malaita, a clear distinction was 
maintained between three different types of leaders (discussed in Keesing 1985). There were the ‘classic’ big-
men whose success lay in their ability to organise and mobilise resources, particularly pigs and root crops, in 
order to generate and distribute wealth. There were warrior-leaders, chosen for their strength, aggressiveness 
and skill in warfare. These men were also expert at raising and leading raiding parties, usually in response 
to a request from a big-man or from the relatives of a slain man for whom vengeance was sought. Keesing 
(1985:237) argues that ‘Big Men have held centre stage in the period of ethnographic observation partly 
because men whose prominence was achieved in warfare and feuding have been forcibly removed from the 
stage by pacification’. The third type of leader was the priest, who was responsible for maintaining relations 
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leadership; Solomon Islands is one of the eight nations in the world that has no 
female representative in the national Parliament at the time of writing—a pattern 
of under-representation that is almost as extreme in other branches of national 
and local governance (Corrin 2008). Corrin (2008:172–3) argues that there is 
considerable continuity between this contemporary under-representation 
and pre-colonial governance in which women were generally excluded from 
leadership roles—reinforced by colonial governance that sanctioned indirect 
rule through headmen, to the exclusion of female leaders.2 Big-manship is 
earned by leadership ability, but also through the gift economy of providing 
feasts and giving away wealth of other kinds to wantoks. Under both colonial 
and post-colonial government, an important part of the leadership that earned 
big-man status was in mediating the relationship between the state and local 
communities.
Translation of such big-manship into the parliamentary institution has 
produced a corrupt and unstable form of parliamentary governance. In the 32 
years since independence, there have been 15 governments (Allen and Dinnen 
2010). Non-emergence of strong political parties is one of a number of other 
factors in the parliamentary instability that Jeffery Steeves (1996) has described 
as ‘unbounded politics’. Approximately half the Members of Parliament lose 
their seat at most elections, thereby accentuating the urgency to accumulate 
and redistribute within this relatively small window of opportunity. Often 
losers become losers because they have failed to be generous enough delivering 
personal wealth to those who voted for them the previous time. This means 
politicians serve their wantoks more than the nation. 
It has also had the consequence that politicians who accept bribes from wealthy 
interests such as loggers and foreign fishing fleets have been better able to 
survive by passing on a proportion of these payments to those who vote for 
them. A result is that the politics of development is personalised, simultaneously 
undermining bureaucratic delivery systems. Ultimately, the problem is driven 
between a kin group and its ancestors. In parts of western Solomons, such as in the Marovo Lagoon area, there 
were named leadership roles for women, but these appear to have disappeared entirely as a consequence of the 
colonial authorities’ privileging of men in local leadership positions (that is, as headmen).
2 McDougall (2003:78), however, ponders whether institutional structures that have worked poorly for 
women and for men would work much better with more women included: ‘A better approach might take 
women’s organizations as models to be emulated in new efforts to draw diverse people together for collective 
action and common purposes.’ McDougall found on the island of Ranongga that local women’s church 
networks had bottom-up strengths in enabling collaborative action—strengths that were lacking in both local 
male social organisation and male-dominated civil society networks in the capital (to which women’s groups 
were being coopted). In her vision, village-level women’s collaborations could be the building blocks of more 
attuned and less aggressive governance. An interesting aspect of this on Ranongga was the use of art—the 
way mature women engaged their adolescent or adult children in the performance of parodies of young men 
who disappointed them by migrating to town, supposedly for education or work, but instead indulged in 
a ‘rascal’ or ‘foreign’ lifestyle of drinking, smoking or violence. The male lifestyle they disapproved of was 
communicated to new generations of young men by culturally attuned clowning using empty beer cans and 
Rambo attire as props. 
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both by politicians demanding ever-larger discretionary funds and by citizens 
of Solomon Islands who drive this political culture. Citizens demand patronage 
from their elected representatives—often their own kinsmen—in return for 
their electoral support and in accordance with Melanesian social norms of 
obligation and reciprocity.
Masta Liu
The post-colonial period has also seen the emergence of what Jourdan (1995a) 
describes as the ‘cultural phenomenon’ of the Masta Liu, a pejorative term used 
to refer to the young unemployed men who frequent the streets of Honiara. The 
Masta Liu are very much the product of increasing socioeconomic differentiation, 
particularly in the urban context (Frazer 1985; Keesing 1992:174, 1994). Their 
unemployment stems from both low levels of educational attainment and the 
dearth of employment opportunities. Very few students complete secondary 
school. Students sit exams at the end of primary school, at the end of form 
three and at the end of form five. At each stage, large numbers of students are 
‘pushed out’ of the system, often because their parents cannot afford the fees. 
In 1992, only 2000 of the 8000 students who completed primary school went 
on to secondary school; and only 25 per cent of those who sat the form three 
exam were admitted into form four (Jourdan 1995a:221). Furthermore, during 
the mid-1990s, the education system was producing 1000–1500 secondary 
school graduates a year, while the number of new jobs, in addition to vacancies 
produced by retiring workers, was only 700 a year (Fraenkel 2004a:184).
Many, but by no means all, Masta Liu engage in petty criminal acts such as 
theft and extortion. Such acts are motivated not only by economic deprivation 
and poverty, but also by cultural factors. With regard to deprivation, Jourdan 
(1995a: 213) finds that hunger is a commonplace occurrence for Masta Liu and 
that petty theft is at its highest at the end of the month when the money has 
run out and their ‘preoccupation with food becomes an obsession’. With regard 
to the cultural factors motivating delinquent behaviour in town, for Malaitans, 
particularly the Kwaio, the influence of dead ancestors encourages young men to 
engage in a range of ‘spoiling’ behaviours from pig theft to murder (Fifi’i 1989; 
Keesing 1992:175–8, 1994).3 There is also an element of what Akin (1999:60) 
describes as the ‘reshaping of kastom’ to suit the urban environment in ways 
3 These behaviours are not limited to the Kwaio or to Malaitan pagans. According to Stritecky (2001:71): ‘I 
had conversations about young men’s spoiling behaviours with Christians in Catholic, COC [Christian Outreach 
Centre], SSEC [South Sea Evangelical Church], and SDA [Seventh-Day Adventist] churches, all of whom claim 
that many young men in town still cultivate ties with deceased male kin, who in turn prompt the young men 
to steal, drink alcohol, fight and rape women.’
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that diminish the control and authority of elders. The prime example of this 
is the emergence of urbanised forms of compensation demands described by 
Jourdan (1995a:219; also see Akin 1999:51).
Scholars of the relationships between masculinity and violence in Melanesia 
have pointed to the importance of foreign, as well as local, influences on the 
behaviour of young men. Images gleaned from television, videos and pictures 
have contributed to ‘the “Ramboisation” of young Melanesian men’ (Jolly 
2000:317). Across Melanesia, from Papua New Guinea to Vanuatu, young 
men ‘affect militaristic styles of dress and behaviour that they think convey 
an aggressive, confident menacing look’ (Macintyre 2002:9). Macintyre 
(2002:10) also observes that the behaviour of militants during the Solomons 
conflict was strongly reminiscent of the ways in which PNG policemen behaved 
after returning from ‘tours of duty’ on Bougainville: ‘men…who insisted on 
swaggering (often drunkenly) around the town wearing their battle fatigues 
and Rambo-style bandanas, their weapons swung casually over their shoulders.’ 
Other imported cultural influences informing Masta Liu behaviours include 
drug culture (presently limited to marijuana) and American gang culture 
(transmitted in part via hip-hop and rap music).
Keesing (1985) saw the more traditional Kwaio violence scripts, which these 
foreign scripts were later seen to complement, as decidedly male. He quotes 
women as not thinking this way (for example, Keesing 1985:243), when he says:
Being nabe, ‘placid, peaceful’, is a virtue for a man in some contexts 
(particularly if he is known to have physical strength and resources to 
respond aggressively and chooses forbearance); but to be nabe when 
honour demands aggressiveness and anger is a matter of shame, not 
pride. (Keesing 1985:244) 
Adept peacebuilders in a context such as Solomon Islands need to understand 
in very local ways that there are both peaceful selves and violent selves, and 
associated scripts, which can be brought to the fore depending on whether one’s 
project is peacemaking or violence. It could be that only peacebuilders from 
that island will be fully adept at persuading combatants to put their peaceful 
self forward during reconciliation processes by caressing and cajoling those 




‘New’ and ‘old’ Chinese identity politics
Chinese identity politics has sometimes been neglected in analyses of the 
Solomons conflict, when it is in fact important to understanding these conflicts 
to consider how different Chinese actors see themselves differently one from 
the other. During the 2006 riots, the Chinese were constituted as folk devils 
(Cohen 1972), as evidenced by much anti-Chinese graffiti around the capital 
during our fieldwork in the months after the riots. Even the Commission of 
Inquiry (2009:5) into the riots went close to collective blaming of the victims: 
‘The Chinese community needs to take a hard look at itself. It needs to self-
regulate its behaviour, clean up its image, the facades of its business houses, 
become more public-minded, and less rent-seeking.’ Old Chinese families, 
some of whom were spared in the riots because of the respect they enjoyed in 
Honiara (Moore 2008), separated their identity as ‘old Chinese’ from that of 
‘new Chinese’ who had arrived more recently from China and allegedly behaved 
haughtily towards Solomon Islanders in their stores, did not pay fair wages and 
other alleged petty commercial abuses. New Chinese also persistently corrupt 
immigration laws by bribing immigration officers for visas and passports. Yet 
some of the ‘old Chinese’, as well as Malaysian Chinese who are neither new 
nor old in Honiara, were at the centre of the politics of king making for cash, 
and domination of a shadow economy revolving around logging, casinos, other 
licences and contracts from the government and money laundering.4 Some ‘old 
Chinese’ have been prominent in paying bribes to politicians to induce them 
to vote for no-confidence motions, in organising prostitution (including for 
RAMSI personnel) and other abuses. The grievances of those who were angry at 
the money politics of the election of Snyder Rini as prime minister were directed 
at the domination of certain ‘old Chinese’ of the shadow economy as well as at 
the petty rip-offs of ‘new Chinese’ store owners. 
Identities, reconciliation and transformation
Understandably, RAMSI has found identity issues both too complex and 
too hot to handle. While this was also true to a degree of the Truce and 
Peace Monitoring Groups in Bougainville, one of our conclusions was that 
a strength of peacekeeping in Bougainville was that it targeted leaders on 
different sides of multiplex divides and urged meetings between them under 
the security umbrella of the peacekeepers. Their hope was that once the 
risky business of making the first move was born by the peacekeepers, locals 
4 The idea of a shadow state cashed by the shadow economy was resonant with the crowd who changed 




would take over the diagnosis of the sources of conflict and how they might 
be reconciled and a new unity might be forged across old divides. This 
indeed has happened to a much more impressive degree in Bougainville than 
in the Solomons. 
As complex and beyond the nuance comprehension of outsiders identity 
politics is in Melanesia, one consequence of the big-man phenomenon is 
that one does not have to be utterly culturally adept to be able to identify 
the fact that a divide and a knot of grievances coalesce around certain 
big-men who occupy nearby geographical spaces. What outsiders poorly 
understand is what makes this identity divide tick and where a great variety 
of individuals stand in relation to this divide versus various others who 
have calls on their loyalty. Recognising this seems to have been part of the 
genius of the Bougainville peace process: being assertive enough to be a 
catalyst for reconciliation between targeted big-men, with humility enough 
to then stand back to let locals do all the serious mediation work. Limited 
willingness of RAMSI to do that, though hardly universal, has been one of 
its weaknesses. 
By 2006, one might have expected RAMSI to be pretty sure on its feet in 
knowing who the leaders were. But since the burning of Chinatown, we 
have been unable to identify RAMSI attempts to reconcile Chinese and 
Malaitans, new and old Chinese or countless other crosscutting conflicts 
among indigenous Solomon Islanders.5 In a society of many overlapping 
layers of identity, it is hard to grasp, harder still to predict, which senses of 
grievance, relating to which identities, might have sufficient bite to animate 
violence. Central planning cannot deliver this; only local knowledge can. Yet 
national institutions such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission could 
be crafted to enable pluralised, locally led reconciliation of a variety of hues. 
So this new institution is a source of new hope—just as the National Peace 
Council once was a source of that kind of hope before it was dismantled. 
5 One prominent Chinese business leader said some reconciliations had been undertaken between Chinese 
victims and their victimisers: ‘And Chinese can engage in a Chinese way, which is a comfortable fit with 
local reconciliation. They kill a pig. We give something back in Chinese custom. In Chinese custom we will 
bring friends together from both sides over tea. Can be a meal or meal after. The important thing with both 
indigenous and Chinese ways is that it must come from the heart. In the Chinese way you ask for forgiveness in 
front of this group of friends from both sides. This involves loss of face, which gives it power, [and] therefore 
makes it lasting because it is hard to do and comes from the heart.’ This gentleman suffered trauma from the 
events of 2006 for which he sought treatment from a psychologist. He also said: ‘The Chinese are easy targets. 
They have wealth and do not fight back. Victim[s] of envy. “We are poor so that must be because you are rich.” 
Chinese have a stoic philosophy: let the wind pass. This too shall pass.’
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Wantoks and big-men as part of the problem 
and part of the solution
In Chapter 6, we saw how Jimmy Rasta took care of dozens of his boys post-
conflict by employing them in his legitimate business. We saw how he and his 
wife promoted reconciliation with their former enemies while in prison and 
on release continued to support logistically and financially the Sycamore Tree 
reconciliation program. Jimmy Rasta’s big-manship was part of the problem in 
the onset and escalation of this conflict, but is also part of its solution. Former 
prime minister Alebua was a very different kind of figure from the other side 
to Jimmy Rasta, but this was true of him as well. When we spoke to Alebua for 
a second time, in January 2010, after he had been released from prison, he was 
dedicating himself to reconciliation work. It has been a failing of both RAMSI 
and state elites that they have for the most part stigmatised such men as simply 
pariahs, or even as ‘gangster politicians’, as Ken Averre has put it, rather than 
seeing their stature among the excluded as a resource for good as well as a 
danger.
In a similar vein, Morgan Brigg (2009) has critiqued Francis Fukuyama’s (2008) 
analysis of wantokism as a problem, when it is also a cultural resource for tackling 
governance challenges. Brigg sees wantokism as something insufficiently 
mobilised to foster emergent national identity building. The form of Brigg’s 
argument is that the only kind of national identity that can be meaningfully 
constructed must be formed from the clay of starting identities that involve 
real attachment. One of the promising things about wantokism as a resource 
here is that it has many layers of meaning for Solomon Islanders. In a context 
in which one’s family or clan members are present, family or clan identities will 
be salient; in other contexts, in which speakers of the same dialect are present, 
language could be defining, and island or nationality in other contexts. Wantok 
often refers to those who share kinship ties, 
but also includes, on larger scales, those who share the same language, 
are from the same area, from the same island and the same region of the 
world. So, in a village context, one’s wantoks are direct kin, but as one 
moves further away from local contexts one’s pool of wantoks expands. 
(Brigg 2009:153) 
Brigg makes his point by arguing that in international settings, all Melanesians 
can be referred to as wantoks; wantokism at this level is a resource for constituting 
a Melanesian Spearhead Group of states that is highly unified in comparative 
international relations terms. If this is so, why cannot wantokism be a resource 
along the path to forming national identities, rather than simply an obstacle? 
Some of the strongest national identities are forged in the embrace of difference, 
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as when pakeha (white) New Zealanders perform a haka that distinguishes 
them from Australians and unifies their national identity in the context of a 
rugby test. As we argued earlier, this was Mandela’s appeal to South Africa to 
seize an identity as the nation that transcended apartheid, and Lincoln’s to the 
United States to be the nation that endured an awful struggle to transcend the 
institution of slavery. 
It seems to us that Brigg is right to see that there is no reason why wantokism 
cannot be a cultural resource about difference that, in the hands of deft 
practitioners of Melanesian identity, can constitute unity. Consider the resilience 
of wantokism after colonial controls were lifted as English civil service leaders 
departed. Resurgent wantokism asserted dominations of political big-men 
over once proudly independent civil service departments. This post-colonial 
experience suggests that a post-RAMSI policy of crushing wantokism seems an 
inferior prescription to working with its grain. 
A second part of Morgan Brigg’s analysis is that wantokism is the stuff of a 
Melanesian resolution to Lord Acton’s dictum that ‘power corrupts and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Brigg thinks Melanesians, like South 
American Indian societies (citing the work of Clastres 2007), early realised that 
transcendent central power was a mortal risk for the group. The Western solution 
to this problem was Hobbesian, then republican, to allow the central state to 
grow stronger and pacify ever-widening spaces within its borders; then to set 
up democratic checks and balances on central abuse of power. We elaborate 
somewhat on Brigg’s text here. The Melanesian solution to the same problem 
was to constrain emergent big-men who put together widening coalitions by 
checking their central power with accountability to local kin obligations, local 
area obligations via reputation, sorcery and other culturally resonant regulatory 
mechanisms. As a big-man acquires power by unifying wider networks, all the 
concentric circles of identity (Smith 1991:24) that he has used as a resource in 
that constitution of power have claims on him. He has obligations to share wealth 
he acquires with wantoks within each circle, which is a check and balance on 
him ever becoming supremely wealthy. As a younger man in the process of 
becoming a power broker, he must be open to being pulled back by his elders, 
including women, within each circle. Or at least he is obliged to respectfully 
listen to concerns that wantok chiefs and other elders choose to express. 
This is what constitutes participatory democratic deliberation as a Melanesian 
check with a Melanesian form on central abuse of power. To attempt to throw 
this away in a heroic project of believing that it is possible to replace wantok 
identities with national loyalty could be the worst of both worlds—one in 
which both Western and Melanesian checks and balances are neutered. This 
is analogous to the dangers in Melanesian societies of crushing indigenous 
justice that we have discussed, the danger that neither Western law nor kastom 
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delivers freedom and security for citizens. The better path is the search for 
the hybridities in which formal law and customary law are mutually enabling 
(Forsyth 2009); just as hybrid economic entrepreneurship that simultaneously 
strengthens village economies and national market economies is a particularly 
attractive path to development in societies where local identities are very strong. 
Western deliberative-democracy theorists have of course rediscovered the 
virtues of networked, crosscutting checks and balances in Western contexts 
as a complement to hierarchical checks and balances. More so in a Melanesian 
society it is necessary to ‘think of possibilities arising from networks for 
emergent types of checks and balances rather than mechanical forms that 
operate through hierarchy and administration’ (Brigg 2009:159). Mirroring 
Smith (1991:24), Jenny Job’s (Job and Reinhart 2003) research shows that even 
in a society such as Australia, social capital formation builds like ripples across 
a pond, expanding primarily from primary groups, family and workgroups, 
ultimately to trust in the state—more so than Putnam’s (1993) Western model of 
social capital expanding from intermediate groups such as clubs, societies and 
‘bowling leagues’; though Putnam’s model also has a little explanatory power in 
these data. It does seem a mistake to view, as Fukuyama (2008) does, wantokism 
as a basis for social capital formation that can work only at the local level, as 
opposed to one that can ripple out to more encompassing circles of trust and 
obligation. 
How often in the course of a year does a wise old man of Solomons society such 
as Sir Peter Kenilorea, or indeed a wise, respected middle-aged woman such as 
Joy Kere, take a younger civil service wantok aside and counsel them to honour 
their obligations in the state, to earn the trust the nation has put in them, 
by fulfilling the duties of their office? In this vein, Brigg (2009) argues that 
connections facilitated by wantokism can be linked with checks and balances 
in Melanesian social organisation to regulate corruption. This possibility (and 
emergent reality) becomes more real as ‘several decades of marriage across 
tribal and island groups in modern Solomon Islands has generated a dense 
countrywide web of relationships’ (Brigg 2009:156). Drawing on this web of 
relationships is what can give the networked governance of corruption that we 
discuss elsewhere in this book widespread appeal and relevance that can engage 
growing numbers of citizens. Even when marriage or attending the same school 
creates weak ties compared with lineage ties, as Granovetter (1974) has shown, 
there is a strength in weak ties when weak bridging links mobilise a resolve of 
two strong networks to share a project. Ambitious projects such as strengthening 
core pillars of governance are best achieved in modern conditions by enrolling 
(Latour 1986, 1987) networks of pre-existing strength (Castells 1996). 
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Because big-man accomplishments of power can be accomplished only in a 
network, big-men are inescapably vulnerable to regulation of their excess by that 
network. So, Brigg (2009:157) recounts the social fabric that could underwrite 
his idea of a ‘wantoks against corruption’ campaign:
Some Solomon Islanders tell me that the inclusion of wantoks from 
different ethnic groups within a work or project team provides a useful 
counter to corruption. In other words, wantoks might keep each other in 
check rather than covering for each other when wantokism is mobilised 
for a common goal…Where a closed wantok network can provide a 
way of hiding one’s bad practices, a more open network—such as that 
which would be promoted actively through wantok nationalism—could 
provide mechanisms for transparency and accountability.  
A ‘wantoks against corruption’ campaign opens up prospects of a valued identity 
emerging that strengthens rather than undermines pillars of the core state. 
Fundamentalists of pillars of the core state would say wantokism will always 
be hijacked by the greediest politicians and commercial corruptors of the state. 
Brigg retorts that this is already the case. The question is whether the advocates 
of good governance will continue to sit back and allow the practitioners of 
corrupt governance to monopolise the harnessing of the circles of identity that 
are loosely referred to in this debate as wantokism. 
Identity as a mask
The quantitative literature on armed conflict does not show that ethnic 
fractionalisation is a clear predictor of civil war (Collier 2007; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003). We also do not conclude that the much higher level of identity 
differentiation in Solomon Islands, compared with Western societies we know, 
is a root cause of this conflict. We do conclude that entrepreneurs of conflict 
did mobilise around various concentric identities we have discussed, such as 
Malaitan. We have seen that resistance and armed violence can be constitutive 
of identity because when violence begins, people seek refuge by taking sides 
defined by the entrepreneurs of violence (and therefore of identity). Hence, 
the source of conflict is not difference per se, but the strategic enrolment 
of difference to violent projects. To understand the conflict, it is therefore a 
mistake to see it as an outpouring of an ageless ethnic conflict that has been 
bottled up, waiting for the cork to blow. This is not to deny that there were 
underlying structural grievances in this conflict that were constructed around 
ethnicity. It is to say that our peacebuilding analysis is about focusing on those 
grievances and the deeper structures that produce them. These include deep 
structures of inequality that have fallen particularly harshly on the people of the 
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Weather Coast, for example. Our analyses should not allow identity essentialism 
to mask the diagnosis of real and perceived inequalities, other grievances and 
other underlying factors in the conflict that have, sometimes wilfully, become 
intertwined with identities. 
Second, we have sought to argue in this book that success in mounting warlike 
projects has been based on a manipulation of identity politics and manipulation 
of outcomes such as compensation payments associated with claims based on 
respect for identity. This is one line of analysis that has led us to the conclusion 
that suppression of identities that had been hooked up to violent projects is 
hardly the way to advance peacebuilding projects. Understanding identity 
politics is vital to the peacebuilder because we hypothesise that the way to be 
effective is to be a more skilful entrepreneur of identity politics than the war 
maker. Instead of crushing identities that have been a problem in the conflict, 
the astute peacebuilder finds a path to harness those identities to projects 
of peace. This requires the peacebuilder to be culturally adept, creative and 
nuanced in a way that would be beyond the capacity of almost all foreigners. It 
follows that the crucial identity work of peacebuilding must overwhelmingly 
be crafted by locals. 
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8. Interpreting the conflict in 
summary
Table 8.1 summarises some of the key codes we have made in placing the 
Solomons conflict into the comparative framework of Peacebuilding Compared. 
This chapter covers all but the last two sections of this table—on peacebuilding 
strengths and weaknesses, which are discussed in the next chapter. The plan of 
both chapters is not to work through all the entries in this table, but to draw out 
some themes. In the rough sequence of Table 8.1, this chapter aggregates topics 
in the table into a sequence of themes. 
Table 8.1 Summary of some codes, Solomon Islands; 650 other variables 
are coded
Structural factors at root of conflict
Is this a ‘consensus’ factor 
among analysts or ‘contested 





















































































































































































































What structural factors were at the root of this 
conflict? 
Indignity	and	discrimination
Former prime minister Alebua’s analysis during one interview was that the IFM 
uprising was about frustration because attempts had been made by the people 
of Guadalcanal in 1978 and 1988 to raise their concerns about being overrun on 
their own lands before a desperate last attempt in 1998. He saw the uprising as 
an assertion of dignity by people who had been trodden on and ignored. That 
is one interpretation of the return to wearing traditional bark loincloths by IFM 
warriors to assert a shared Guale identity with a symbolic marker of difference.1 
It was an assertion of the dignity of who Guadalcanal fighters were. In colonial 
times, the people had a problem with outsiders putting themselves above Guales, 
and in recent decades they similarly had a problem with Malaitans doing this. 
They found it disrespectful for Malaitains to change place names on their island 
of Guadalcanal. They looked at a cabinet and a civil service in which a majority 
of those in the top jobs were Malaitans and felt discriminated against. ‘There is 
a promotion network among people from the same ethnic group. It’s who you 
know’ (Guadalcanal political leader). The other side of this is a Malaitan view 
that because they are more economically and bureaucratically successful, their 
children are discriminated against in the education system:
To obtain a place in secondary school a Malaitan child has to pass 
the national examination with very high marks, and placement is 
not guaranteed. This form of discrimination was set up to prevent 
Malaitans—who are the largest ethnic minority in the Solomons—from 
‘dominating’ other groups in the professions and government service. 
(Gegeo 2001:500)
Land	disputation
From the Malaitan side, one root cause might be seen as a failure of land law 
combined with rapid population growth putting pressure on land. In practical 
terms, thousands of Malaitans were driven off land they had paid for, from houses 
they had worked hard to build and farms and businesses they had laboured to 
develop, on Guadalcanal. Theirs was a legitimate grievance, too, which justified 
for them resort to arms—a grievance rooted in the failure of Solomons land law 
to give them certainty of tenure on leased land. An interesting aspect of the 
1 Sometimes this bare-bodied warrior dress was complemented with bits of khaki uniform they could lay 
their hands on and Rambo-style headbands (Carter 2006:42). 
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reconciliations that occurred in Rove prison between IFM and MEF militants 
was that they shared sympathy for each others’ predicament in that they had 
grievances over land matters that ‘fell on the deaf ears of government’. Each 
side genuinely understood the anger of the other at grievances being ignored by 
government, because they deeply felt a sense of being dismissed as well.2
This uncertainty also slowed the recovery of Guadalcanal. The Gold Ridge mine 
has still not moved into production at the time of writing in 2010 because no 
agreement had been secured with landowners on resumption of the lease for 
the mine. For cultural reasons, Solomons democracy since independence has 
consistently favoured retention of a land law under which only indigenous 
owners can hold title to land in perpetuity. Eighty-five per cent of the nation’s 
land is covered by traditional tenure. This need not preclude guarantees 
of secure long-term leases that enable investment to occur by foreigners or 
indigenes from other islands. The UNDP (2004:10) makes the point that ‘narrow 
land-focused initiatives’ can make conflict worse because in conditions in which 
customary non-violent dispute resolution has broken down any change is risky. 
On this analysis, the fundamental problem is not land law per se, but a want of 
dispute-resolution processes that are granted legitimacy by all parties to settle 
land disputes with dispatch and certainty. One interesting response to this on 
Malaita has been a family-tree program in which villagers are assisted to draw 
their family trees back a number of generations. This helps them to reframe the 
claims of those they are in dispute with over land, by seeing their adversaries 
in many cases as ultimately their relatives. Genealogies can also simply clarify 
what is in dispute for the disputants to discuss. AusAID’s Solomon Islands 
Strengthening of Land Administration Project and Community Sector Program 
and the National Peace Council have provided some support for this work.
Even such basic clarifying initiatives are not a good thing in all contexts. The 
problem is not just that Solomons land law can be predictable and knowable 
only at a local (as opposed to a national) level. It is that land is subject to 
crosscutting claims at the local level that are mostly not ownership claims, and 
therefore Western legal virtues such as predictability, knowability to outsiders 
and commensurability are unattainable. Debra McDougall (2005) has written an 
instructive piece on the ‘unintended consequences of clarification’ of land law 
on the island of Ranongga (New Georgia Group). McDougall’s (2005:82) analysis 
begins by conceding that 
2 Allen (2008:189–91) has developed this point: ‘Whilst the Guale ex-militants point to cultural differences 
with Malaitan settlers as one of their grievances, it is the government that is held responsible for creating the 
situation in the first place. Similarly, whilst Malaitans state that the Guale militants went “too far” with the 
use of violence during the land evictions, they also place ultimate responsibility on the government for not 
responding adequately to the Guale uprising and for creating the economic conditions which originally forced 
Malaitans to settle in Honiara and north Guadalcanal.’ ‘In this manner, Guales do not blame Malaitans for 
being there in the first place, and Malaitans do not blame Guales for wanting to evict them. Each side places 
the moral culpability upon the government’ (p. 189).
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[m]any Solomon Islanders of all walks of life would like to use legal 
means to secure customary rights to property and land—sometimes 
because they hope to start projects that will tap into translocal flows 
of cash, but sometimes because they worry that their children and 
grandchildren will have no garden land. 
While they might want to make land rights permanent and secure, they also 
understand that the process of doing so can endanger the value they place on 
an ethical way of living together. On Ranongga, McDougall found that islanders 
would, for example, accept gifts of food from the son of a man during that 
man’s funeral ritual to signify that they as members of a lineage with a claim on 
the land acknowledged that the son could continue to farm the land his father 
had cleared. Some might not accept money, however, lest this signify too much 
about sharing of the land that privileged the son’s usage. Material exchange at 
such rituals consolidates property usage rights, yet the speeches made during 
the rituals explicitly deny those very rights, or at least any exclusionary 
interpretation of them.
For those claiming to own land, cutting off other people in this way is not 
only politically risky—it is also counter to the ethics of landownership. 
In a Ranonggan variation on a pan-Pacific theme, the people of the land 
ought to be loving and generous to those other people who live under 
their care. I was often told that only usurpers fight about land in courts, 
because the real landowners are happy to welcome foreigners and would 
not aggressively assert social hierarchy. (McDougall 2005:83) 
Land disputes in McDougall’s data mostly did not turn on objections over the 
way land was used, but over failure to ask permission of the right people in the 
right way. Hence, it was common for winners in land disputes to then invite the 
loser to engage in the very land usage that the loser had fought for. ‘Rather than 
attempting to exclude others, Ranonggan disputants saw themselves as fighting 
for the right to invite others to share in their property. The right to invite 
others implies the power to cut them off, but I take the difference in emphasis 
as significant’ (McDougall 2005:86). The transfer of goods at ritual moments 
of vindication of certain property uses is not meant to signify alienation of 
property from recipients, but signifies appreciation, regard and kindness at 
moments of formally ratified sharing. ‘When differential property rights are 
articulated via exchange, very little is explicitly stated about who is who and 
who owns what. Such differentiation is accomplished implicitly, through the 
poetics of ritual exchange’ (McDougall 2005:90).
It follows that a problem that Ranonggans have with any codification of 
traditional land law is that codification cannot leave enough room to articulate 
land claims without cutting people off. The double move of verbally denying 
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property rights at the very moment they are ritually affirmed is a foundation 
of Ranonggan peacebuilding via the affirmation of sharing as the basis of unity 
and harmony. In such a ritual context, codification of customary land law can 
be a threat to peace (see also Scott 2000:73–4, 2007). 
In light of these insights, there is virtue in the Ministry of Justice and Legal 
Affairs consulting on a Tribal Land Disputes Resolution Panels Bill. It would 
replace the courts and legal practitioners with local panels of chiefs and leaders 
to resolve land disputes. This is part of a Justice Delivered Locally initiative 
of the ministry (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:176). One way forward is flexibly 
creating space for local land-dispute resolution that can eschew rights to exclude 
in favour of rights to decide how to include foreigners in the sharing of land. 
Such an approach informed by McDougall’s insights might allow land law to be 
something that reinforces nation building rather than endangers it. 
Infrastructure	and	inequality
Uncertain land tenure is just one cause of the poor long-term economic 
performance of Solomon Islands. The 2008 People’s Survey suggests that 72 
per cent of Solomon Islanders still do not have electricity (from either mains 
electricity, solar power or generator) (McMurray 2008:8), and even fewer own a 
telephone (though since 2008 mobile telephony has begun to take off). Seventy-
eight per cent of the population do not have water piped into their house (IMF 
2007:12). Resentments over the scramble between different ethnic groups for 
very limited employment opportunities in the formal economy were a root cause 
of the conflict. A road to the Weather Coast would help them to sell some of what 
they grow, especially as their produce diversifies with the support of local NGOs 
such as Kastom Garden. Investment targeting Malaita and access for ambitious 
Malaitans to Pacific temporary labour migration schemes in Australia and New 
Zealand would take some of the pressure off their migration to Guadalcanal 
(ironically, given the history of blackbirding).
It was the unequal distribution of economic opportunities that drove the 
conflict. A governor of the Central Bank argued that it was significant that the 
conflict was not led by people from the north of Guadalcanal ‘because they 
had economic opportunities’; rather it was led from the Weather Coast where 
poverty was desperate. In fact, all the Guale militant leaders were from the 
Weather Coast (Allen and Dinnen 2010). Grievance over regional poverty came 
out in Harold Keke’s trial when he lamented the lack of health centres and 
hospitals on the Weather Coast as causing unjust suffering.3 On this, it would 
be good to listen to Keke and build some health centres in more cut-off parts of 
the Weather Coast. 
3 Regina v Keke [2005] SBHC 48; HCSI-CRAC 254 of 2004 (18 March 2004). Regina v Harold Keke, Ronnie 




The next structural issue that arises in Table 8.1 goes to the ideas of the shadow 
economy and the shadow state, particularly as manifest through the market for 
logs. There are 2.8 million hectares of forests in Solomon Islands, covering 85 
per cent of the land area, though only one-fifth of these forests are suitable for 
commercial logging (Greenpeace 2008:4). The governments of Prime Minister 
Mamaloni in the 1980s, but particularly between 1994 and 1997, were captured 
by Asian logging interests. Yet Mamaloni and his successors also used the 
multinational loggers; the capture was mutual and mutually beneficial. The 1993 
election saw the defeat of the Mamaloni government by a Francis Billy Hilly-led 
coalition committed to regulation of the logging industry’s trail of destruction. 
A Timber Control Unit was established, local processing encouraged in order 
to phase out whole-log exports and export duties were imposed (Fraenkel 
2004a:40). These were exactly the reforms needed to strengthen the nation’s 
economy and environment then, as now. Within a year, Billy Hilly’s government 
had fallen, allegedly as a result of the logger Marving Brothers bribing five 
ministers to desert the government (Kubutaulaka 1998:145) (see also Bennett 
2000:345 on the alleged role of Robert Goh in passing logger payments to achieve 
the demise of Billy Hilly). Those who crossed the floor to desert him were well 
rewarded and timber exports accelerated sharply (Dauvergne 1998:534). From 
1997, another reformist prime minister, Bart Ulufa’alu, also sought to restore 
integrity to forestry regulation, only to be ousted in the coup of 2000. The 
Ulufa’alu Forestry Bill was passed in 1999, but was never gazetted.
The patron–client relationships between indigenous politicians and Asian 
loggers that were strengthened by the demise of these two reforming prime 
ministers are distinguished from Indonesia’s crony capitalism by the fact that 
Solomons cronies had little interest in the Solomons beyond logs, whereas in 
Indonesia the cronies were also engaged in controlling banks and industrial 
capitalism. There were the same patterns of bribery of politicians to bypass 
regulatory controls, to grant logging concessions and to evade taxes and export 
duties. In Chapter 9, we discuss in more detail whether William Reno’s (1998, 
2000) concept of a shadow state dependent on a shadow economy, developed 
in certain African societies, is apt to describe the Solomons’ shadow economy 
of logs.
Another difference was that President Suharto, like President Ferdinand Marcos 
under his crony capitalism of logs in the Philippines (Dauvergne 1998), was 
the constant centre of power in Indonesia who controlled cronies such as 
his ethnically Chinese logging magnates. During the 1990s, Suharto played 
them off against each other. In Solomon Islands, it was the ethnically Chinese 
logging interests, particularly from Malaysia, who were more constant and the 
politicians more fungible. This should be qualified by saying that there was a 
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small core of Solomons politicians who always positioned themselves above the 
fray during the Tension and other times of crisis; these men, such as Sir Peter 
Kenilorea, were not fungible as political leaders, though of course they were still 
fungible as prime ministers. Melanesian big-man traditions meant a stable party 
system did not evolve in the British parliamentary institutions the Solomons 
inherited. Political big-men who survived by giving out largesse always wanted 
to be on the side that controlled the budget. They were routinely open to the 
highest bidder among foreign commercial interests willing to bribe them. So 
they changed sides regularly and lost office regularly when they lacked a patron 
who would provide cash to dispense to supporters below them. All of the six 
former prime ministers we interviewed said governments, including their own, 
lived in constant fear of defections lured by bribes; in the 1990s, one said that 
believe it or not there were Members of Parliament whose vote could be bought 
for as little as S$1000–2000. When we recounted this to a leading Chinese 
business identity, he said that various prime ministers who complained about 
their MPs allowing money from loggers to influence their loyalty themselves 
took money from loggers. In the most recent vote-buying allegation over a vote 
of no confidence in the prime minister, the former opposition leader was charged 
over an alleged bribe of S$50 000 to a government minister, Severino Nuaiasi, to 
change sides (O’Connor 2007a).
One business leader said that there was less business bribery since RAMSI 
was in town, as RAMSI enforcement concerns made business more cautious. 
Nevertheless, the ‘new Chinese’ who had arrived recently were quite aggressive 
in paying bribes and, for all business people,
you don’t say no to requests. You give as little as possible. For their 
part, politicians are trapped in the political culture. They can’t say no to 
requests for school fees, etc. If businesses do not help enough, politicians 
say, ‘I will mark you when I come to power and harm your company.’ So 
the businessmen are damned if they do, damned if they don’t. 
When unregulated logging boomed in the periods when politicians beholden 
to logging interests took over, the Solomons economy boomed. Cubic metres of 
log production increased more than twentyfold between the early 1960s and 
the early 1990s (Moore 2008:73). It was not a sustainable boom because once 
an area was logged out, the area not only stopped booming as the boom moved 
on to the next island, logged-out areas also left rivers and streams polluted, soil 
for agriculture eroded and ecosystems that supported wildlife for hunting and 
fishing devastated. Future opportunities for sustainable logging and eco-tourism 
were often lost. Many sacred sites were destroyed. The first boom was followed 
by the bust of the Asian financial crisis, which greatly reduced demand from 
Asian loggers. Then when political instability passed a certain threshold, many 
loggers disappeared for a few years after the Asian financial crisis. This evidence 
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of boom and bust matters because international comparative research suggests 
that economic volatility is a source of both violence as warfare (N. Ferguson 
2006) and violence as crime (Fischer 1999:Appendix N). Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 
suggest that the boom enabled by RAMSI security after 2004 was even steeper 
than the Mamaloni boom of the 1990s. This boom before the final bust of forest 





























































































Figure 8.1 Solomon Islands annual timber production, 1963–95 (’000 cu m)
Source: Frazer (1997:47)
Notes: Frazer’s data sources are as follows: Solomon Islands Statistics Office Statistical Bulletins, 9/85, 
15/88, 22/93; Central Bank of Solomon Islands Annual Reports, 1993–95; Solomon Islands Ministry of 


























Figure 8.2 Solomon Islands log production and exports, 1990–2008 (’000 cu m)
Sources: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI) Quarterly Reviews, 15(1)/2003, 16(4)/2004, 17(1)/2005, 
17(2)/2005, 20(1)/2008, 20(3)/2008, 21(1)/2009; Forestry Department Export Database; URS 2006 
(reproduced from Allen forthcoming).
Notes: CBSI log-export data are derived from the Customs Division via the National Statistics Office. 
According to an officer of the Economic Department of CBSI, the National Statistics Office did not 
report log-export data for 1998 and 1999 and has not reported such data since 2004 (D. Kiriau, Personal 
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communication, August 2009). CBSI log-production data are derived from the Forestry Department and 
can include a very small volume of logs that are consumed domestically. The Forestry Department Export 
Database data were reported in URS Sustainable Development (2006:10). Sustainable yield estimates made 
in 1995, 2000 and 2006 are also reported in URS Sustainable Development (2006).

















Figure 8.3 Value of Solomon Islands log exports, 1990–2008 (S$ and US$)
Sources: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI) Quarterly Reviews, 15(1)/2003, 16(4)/2004, 17(4)/2005, 
20(3)/2008, 21(1)/2009 (reproduced from Allen forthcoming).
Logging not only engenders a macroeconomic instability of boom and bust. We 
have also seen that it worsened micro-instabilities of internal and inter-communal 
conflicts over who had the right to profit from selling logging rights. Many local 
people and landowners have been complicit in driving an unsustainable logging 
industry and opening up local divisions and conflicts over logs. 
The lowest of many low points in logging policy was in 2007 when votes were 
being bought for a no-confidence motion in the Parliament. Six million dollars 
in donor funds allocated in the budget for tree replanting was raided to fund an 
announcement that each of the 50 electorates would have a sawmill built with 
the replanting monies. It was said that the approved mill only eventuated in 
the electorates of those who voted the right way. In an era of global warming, 
where Melanesia finds itself custodian of one of the three great remaining areas 
of tropical forest on the planet, Solomon Islands undermines donor confidence 
in its potential for donor support for forestry or carbon offsets with such 
reckless opportunism. Carbon offset cash will flow only to places where the risk 
assessment is strong that replanting undertakings will stick.4 The Solomons is 
not one of those places. 
The Forest Resources and Timber Regulations have some exemplary provisions 
that require any timber company that negotiates with a community to ‘meet with 
4 In current practice it is common, according to one Malaysian Chinese logging investor we interviewed, for 
paperwork to exist indicating that replanting is occurring when it is not. 
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the chosen representatives of the landowners in public’ and that such meetings 
must occur in the presence of the landowners’ legal advisor, representatives 
of the province and of the national government’s Forestry Division (Aqorau 
2008:250). The challenge is to transcend the culture of corruption and inaction 
in forestry regulation to allow such provisions to actually be implemented. 
Greenpeace (2008) produced a fine report, Securing the Future: An alternative 
plan for Solomon Island forests and economy, arguing for a sustainable government 
revenue by reducing boom harvest levels to an estimated ‘sustained yield’ level. 
By shifting to local processing rather than round-log export, by strengthening 
tax and customs compliance, cracking down both on blatant evasion and on 
double invoicing (Dauvergne 1999:537) transfer pricing, sound management of 
logging and replanting could give Solomon Islands a solid core to its economy 
in perpetuity. Just as its fishing stock could be a sustainably managed resource 
that increases in value as the world’s population increases and the global supply 
of fish declines, so tropical timber, sustainably managed, can be an increasingly 
valuable resource as the crisis of climate change deepens. The Greenpeace 
argument is for local community forestry producing sawn timber for export 
gradually supplanting multinational logging corporations.5 This means village-
based portable sawmilling from natural forest. Greenpeace’s report shows 
community eco-forestry is 58 per cent more profitable to landowners and 
governments than round logs for export. Greenpeace (2008:3) recommends an 
immediate moratorium on new logging licences and cancellation of existing 
licences whose holders are breaching their conditions or are not in compliance 
with the law. As Hviding (2003) warns, however, success can be extremely 
elusive for such projects; chiefs who Western environmentalists thought were 
allies can suddenly accept a lucrative deal with Asian logging corporations. 
Sustainability is most likely when green NGOs are led by Solomon Islanders 
‘steeped in the organisational frameworks of indigenous landholding groups’ 
(Hviding 2003:552; see also McDougall 2005). 
An alternative policy analysis is that calls for moratoriums have been ignored 
for too many years now. The best technical estimates are of exhaustion of the 
forests by 2014 (URS Sustainable Development 2006). Hence, one argument is 
that it is best for the government to focus on sustainable plantation models, 
especially village-owned plantations, at this late stage of forestry decline. That 
might deliver a huge national investment in tree replanting. One promising 
model has been the Forest Stewardship Council-certified KFPL Timber plantation 
at Ringi Cove in Western Province. It has a memorandum of understanding 
with each village in the plantation area that guarantees sustainability through 
replanting and a secure flow of royalties income, employment opportunities and 
5 In the 1990s, Dauvergne (1998:529) warned that exports from small Solomons sawmills were often of such 
poor quality that importers re-sawed it, reducing prices. 
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maintenance of infrastructure such as roads, electricity and water in perpetuity. 
At Ringi Cove, the company’s community relations department is effectively the 
government—or at least the level of government above village-level government 
that works and delivers something to citizens. KFPL Timber also provided a 
form of governance that, far from disenfranchising villages, enabled community 
building. As a result, Ringi Cove is one of the most harmonious and flourishing 
places one can visit in the Solomons. KFPL Timber is one of the largest employers 
in the country, with 1000 employees.
Figure 8.4 Children of the Lobi Community sit on a newly cut tree from the 
Greenpeace-supported eco-forestry project in their village, Lobi Community, 
Marovo Lagoon, Solomon Islands, 9 September 2004 
Photo: Greenpeace/Natalie Behring-Chisolm 
Carbon finance incentive payments could assist with funding the enforcement 
institutions needed to make either policy approach work. International pressure 
on the Solomon Islands Government to ensure it did not nobble forestry law 
enforcement could be built from the profound regional threat climate change 
poses to the Pacific. Two kinds of law enforcement capability transformations are 
needed here: one is corruption of politics and the bureaucracy by multinational 
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loggers (see pp. 70–74, 117–18); the other is shifting the focus of policing from 
towns to village constables who have authority to launch enforcement actions 
on breaches of conditions of logging licences (see pp. 68–70). In the past, local 
anti-logging activists have allegedly been murdered after they opposed Asian 
logging corporations (Greenpeace 2008:6). Clearly, there is also a need for police 
to be active in remote villages protecting the local agents of environmental 
change on whom reform depends. 
The Greenpeace vision for sustainable logging in Solomon Islands is instructive 
in terms of the tactical shift from which it has issued. In years past, Greenpeace 
campaigned by targeting specific multinational logging corporations and 
exposing their abuses. Inside the Solomons, this had minimal impact because 
the capture of national elites by logging interests was so widespread. Local 
elites were also getting some dollars in their pockets from the loggers as well as 
some non-elite landowners who became a grassroots constituency in support 
of unsustainable logging.6 Greenpeace realised it had to demonstrate to local 
elites and the ordinary villagers from whom they draw their authority that 
they could all be much better off by running their own community eco-
forestry and that this could be a benefit their grandchildren would continue 
to enjoy. Greenpeace is now developing eco-forestry in 60 communities. The 
Solomon Islands Development Trust and Greenpeace have worked together 
on community eco-forestry since 1995. In contrast with the returns from 
community eco-forestry, trickle-down from the multinational loggers does 
not last, causes internal divisions in the community between haves who were 
bought off and have-nots who missed out and devastates the environment that 
sustains their agriculture, hunting and fishing (WWF 2005:3.5). 
Forest certification has made little progress in the Solomons; all but one of 
the schemes that were getting under way in the late 1990s were shut down 
by the conflict (Wairiu 2004). By far the largest importer of Solomons log 
exports is China, where forest certification has no market visibility or traction. 
The Solomon Islands Forest Industry Association developed a Logging Code 
of Practice in 1996, which achieved little because ‘most loggers do not obey 
compulsory environmental regulations, let alone voluntary ones’ (Dauvergne 
1999:527).
Forestry has overall a gloomy history in the Solomons, with only small numbers 
of bright spots such as the Ringi Cove plantation and scattered community eco-
forestry projects. Nevertheless, in many tropical contexts, regrowth can be fast 
and opportunities for carbon financing are bound to escalate in decades ahead 
6 Allen (2009a) and Dauvergne (1999:535–6) point out that there is some scattered evidence of resistance as 
well, such as women and children forming ‘human shields’ to prevent logging machinery entering their land 
on Makira (Solomon Star, 13 January 2006). 
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in ways we cannot yet foresee. Once it has a credible forestry enforcement 
infrastructure, the Solomons must position itself to grasp these opportunities. 
It is never too late to seize the agenda of improved forestry enforcement even 
if all it accomplishes is to reduce the extent to which reckless extraction of the 
last large trees destroys small trees and ground cover (see Dauvergne 1999). 
Gold	Ridge
A secondary, but nevertheless important, resource conflict that was part of 
the complex of disputes at issue was Gold Ridge, an Australian mine opened 
only in 1998, the year conflict escalated. Guadalcanal people felt aggrieved that 
only a small proportion of the profits from the mine would go to the people of 
Guadalcanal. Locals had exaggerated views of the magnitude of those profits. A 
mine executive told us how a local leader had said to him that the mine was so 
important to the world economy that if the people of Guadalcanal kept the mine 
closed, this would push up the price of gold. They saw the mine as ‘financing an 
increasingly Malaitan dominated government and public sector’ (Carter 2004:2). 
The mine was the primary reason for a new demand in the 1999 version of the 
‘Demands by the Bona Fide and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’. This was for 
50 per cent of all revenue generated from investments on Guadalcanal. 
A new Australian operator, Australian Solomons Gold Limited, took over the 
site in 2005. But at the time of writing it had not been able to reach agreement 
with landowners on terms for reopening. The workforce at the site in mid-2009 
to prepare the mine for opening included no Malaitans. Local women told the 
new operator that they had been pleased at first that the mine would create new 
employment opportunities. But then most women were glad when the conflict 
closed the mine. This was because the mine caused brother to fight brother 
over money and job opportunities.7 There was jealousy when the mine provided 
one village with a school ahead of another village. The women also blamed the 
mine for increasing access to alcohol and resultant domestic violence. Many 
men also do not want the mine to reopen. Among those who do, many have 
the commercially unrealistic view that because the gold is on their land, 100 
per cent of the benefit from exploiting it should go to locals. Conversely, many 
Malaitans in the government believe that too much of the benefit from the 
7 Filer and Macintyre (2006:224) have discussed, on the one hand, the dilemma in Melanesia that ‘mining, 
in spite of the problems it generates, appears to be a sure way that local people can gain employment, business 
opportunities, roads, hospitals and schools—the development that the government has been unable to 
deliver…[so they] construct their interests and attempt to manage their engagement with others to ensure 
they reap the benefits of development’. On the other hand, locals can quickly turn against mining because of 
the form that the ‘resource curse’ takes in Melanesia: 1) in political terms, competition on the national stage for 
resource rents (Banks 2005); 2) in cultural terms, unrealistic hopes and expectations (Guddemi 1997); and 3) in 
environmental terms, destruction of the agriculture/fishing/hunting environment that sustains the majority 
in order to deliver mining benefits to a minority (Filer 1990). 
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mine in 1998 was given to local landowners, who squandered it and wrecked 
the houses, the cars and the electricity lines that Gold Ridge delivered to their 
community. As lessees of the mine land, who then lease it on to the Australian 
operator, the government, or many within it, resist giving a larger share 
of royalties to landowners than the government receives. The mine operator 
expects the government to take responsibility for reconciling the tensions 
that persist around the mine; the government expects the operator to do so. 
Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil shows an alternative path to government, business 
and indigenous society sharing responsibility for creating a better future. 
Figure 8.5 IFM members on 3 November 2003 occupying the Gold Ridge 
mine site displaying weapons they said they had acquired since the 
Townsville Peace Agreement
 
Photo: Angela Wylie, The Age
Guadalcanal	Plains	Palm	Oil	Limited
The only private employer on Guadalcanal bigger than Gold Ridge was the 
foreign-owned oil-palm plantation on the plains 40 minutes from Honiara. The 
majority of its workforce was Malaitan. This was a focus of resentment. All 
these Malaitan workers and their families were driven out in the conflict and 
have not returned. The oil-palm plantation stood alongside Gold Ridge and the 
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city of Honiara itself as a large development that had disintegrative impacts 
in opening up intergenerational and internecine conflicts over money for 
land, rents and royalties, which were nominated by Solomon Islander scholars 
Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (2001) and John Naitoro (2000, 2003) as causes of the 
Guale uprising. 
This business has reopened on the basis of a willingness to negotiate a 
completely different business model with the Guadalcanal landowners. In 2005, 
the Solomon Islands Government called for expressions of interest to rehabilitate 
the ransacked oil-palm business. New Britain Palm Oil Limited (the largest 
PNG producer), in turn owned by Malaysian interests, registered an interest. 
Separately, it took chiefs and women’s leaders from the plantation area on a tour 
of its New Britain plantation to see how it operated and how it collaborated with 
indigenous landowners. They liked what they saw and heard.
Previously, the land had been leased long-term by the government from the 
landowners, with the government in turn leasing it to the palm-oil company. 
The new operator and the landowners agreed to insist that the commercial 
relationship be simplified by cutting out the government. The government was 
persuaded to grant the land back to the landowners who then directly leased it 
for 50 years to the company under new terms that included an option for a 20-
year extension. The agreement was for the company to pay a quarterly rent of 
S$100/ha. Second, a monthly royalty of 10 per cent of the value of fresh fruit is 
paid, after deductions for shipment and storage. Third, landowners have 20 per 
cent equity in the company. Formerly, the royalty was 2 per cent (Fraenkel et 
al. 2010). A preference for hiring from the landowning community of 10 000–15 
000 people, followed by a preference for hiring from elsewhere in Guadalcanal, 
was the third part of the agreement. Many locals have other jobs or do not want 
plantation work, so approximately 30 per cent of the 1800 workers have been 
hired from other islands. None to date has come from Malaita, apart from a few 
who are married to local women. But now with all local demand for jobs on 
the plantation effectively satisfied and with the interest landowners now have 
in helping the business to flourish in the royalties returned to them, there is a 
debate about allowing limited numbers of Malaitans to return to the business. 
They would be highly respected Malaitan families at first with excellent 
plantation skills, to build confidence in gradual reintegration. High workforce 
turnover is a huge problem and a core of workers committed to the industry 
would help with this.
The new operation is based on the nucleus-estate model that has been extremely 
successful in West New Britain. The centralised commercial estate is surrounded 
by out-growers—in this case, landowners producing palm-oil on both registered 
and customary land—who piggyback on the company’s processing facilities, 
infrastructure and technical support. The company has ambitious plans to 
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expand both commercial and out-grower areas. But not all landowners are 
happy, as evidenced by two arson attacks on the company’s office in the past 
five years, allegedly by disgruntled landowners.
The company funds scholarships for landowners’ children to attend university 
and high school as well as vocational training in the workplace. The landowners 
have also decided to invest half their royalty payments mainly to fund 
scholarships; the fund has S$6 million already. The ANZ Bank, which is keen 
to attract funds and support a big, stable peacebuilding business, was paying 
10 per cent interest long term on the trust fund through the 2008–09 global 
financial crisis. The operator sees trustee education on transparency, deliberative 
agreement on how to invest royalties and responsible trusteeship for the future 
of their children as corporate citizenship obligations. 
New Britain Palm Oil Limited has been a leader in establishing an international 
organisation to continuously improve the sustainability of palm-oil production, 
with 260 members representing producers, consumers, the food and chemical 
industries and 12 NGO members: the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(<www.RSPO.org>). The company’s head of research is vice-president of the 
roundtable. It hopes to be one of the first organisations to reach the certification 
standards. The Guadalcanal plantation has not yet achieved that certification. 
The company is committed to carbon-footprint reduction by eschewing 
planting that replaces primary forest or in any area having one or more High 
Conservation Values (a position it has been seeking to persuade the roundtable 
to in collaboration with WWF). They are considering plans to plant tropical 
trees on the perimeters of their plantations. They consult with WWF, the Nature 
Conservancy and Oxfam on their environmental planning.
Youth	bulge
The extreme youthfulness of the Solomon Islands population interacted with 
inter-island migration to Guadalcanal to create a youth bulge on Guadalcanal. 
Young men were separated from the discipline of village authority (including 
on the IFM side, where a core of Weather Coast militants roamed across 
Guadalcanal, and beyond) and separated from the discipline of employment 
after the economy crashed under the weight of the Tension. While there has 
been some semblance of a semi-organised gang phenomenon that has been used 
by politicians post-conflict in places such as Burns Creek and White River on 
the fringes of Honiara, this problem is nowhere near as deep and structured as 
it is in Port Moresby and certain other towns in both Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). 
The militant youth gang problem during the Tension had something in common 
with the Bougainvillean armed Raskols posing as BRA who in fact were semi-
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organised youth crime groups. Another common feature between Solomon 
Islands and Bougainville is that they did not persist as semi-organised criminal 
youth gangs in the way martial arts groups and former militias persisted for 
many years in Timor-Leste, Aceh and other former conflict areas in Indonesia as 
criminal organisations (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). Former militia leaders such as 
Jimmy Rasta, George Gray, Harold Keke and Andrew Te’e for different reasons 
are not organised-crime leaders in Solomon Islands today. There are no large 
heroin, marijuana and other illicit drug markets, illicit gambling or prostitution 
markets that have attracted organised crime groups. The Tension was an era of 
organised crime in extortion, protection rackets and armed robbery. But that 
era of organised crime effectively ended with the arrival of RAMSI. This is a 
fundamental reason why RAMSI is so highly valued by ordinary people. And 
indeed it has been a great contribution of RAMSI that a society that had a virulent 
problem of violent organised criminal gangs does not have this problem today. 
This is not to downplay the significance of the disorganised and semi-organised 
crime we have described as perpetrated by gatherings of disenchanted youth. 
These youth seek a collective solution to their marginalisation by asserting 
the dignity of some layer of identity that is important to them and that they 
perceive as having been disrespected.
What have been the proximate factors in the 
conflict?
We interpret proximate factors in this conflict to be the actions of certain 
politicians who, recognising how deep were the structural factors we have just 
summarised, and how deeply felt were the grievances associated with them, 
sought political advantage by encouraging a politics of ethnic resentment. We 
conclude it to be a contested but credible interpretation that Ezekiel Alebua, 
as Harold Keke alleged, recruited Keke and other Weather Coast militant 
leaders to stir up anger across all of Guadalcanal. This interpretation is 
contested by a number of the Guale militants interviewed by Matthew Allen; 
they played down the role of Alebua and attributed much greater agency 
to themselves. Indeed, Alebua contests this interpretation himself. It could 
be that discontent spun out of control in a way Alebua did not approve of, 
and when it did Alebua worked hard with other leaders to try to calm the 
violence. But at the very beginning, the limited evidence is consistent with 
Alebua encouraging the mobilisation of mobs of young men as a ploy to shore 
up his precarious hold on the premiership of Guadalcanal, partly as a result 
of his earlier failure as prime minister to back the ‘Demands by the Bona Fide 
and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’. We also conclude that the agency of 
many local big-men was a proximate factor. Yet so were many very young 
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men railing against the authority of both their elders and the government, 
mobilising their followers around many more local identities than the master 
Guadalcanal and Malaita identities of the conflict’s height.
Conflict escalated to coup with the mobilisation of the MEF. That mobilisation 
happened largely because leaders such as Jimmy Rasta took a stand, saying 
Malaitans had been too patient waiting for the government to defend them; 
Malaitans must defend themselves. Young men spontaneously rallied to them in 
large numbers once they did that. They mostly joined up to defend their people, 
but prospects of excitement and loot for unemployed youth were probably in 
the mix. That having happened, ambitious men such as Andrew Nori became 
involved as strategists to steer the volatile political force that was the MEF. 
And multinational logging and other business interests became involved by 
bankrolling Members of Parliament who would install a new prime minister to 
replace Bart Ulufa’alu.
A history—including a very recent history—of compensation payouts by the 
state to those who threatened violence based on ethnic grievance possibly made 
both mobilisations more attractive ploys than they otherwise might have been. 
The state vacillated back and forth, at one moment responding to violence 
with a deaf ear and with police violence; at the next moment, responding with 
political dialogue that entailed prospects of compensation. This vacillation was 
not responsive and was not a fair and firm way of dealing with violence. 
What were the key triggering incidents?
The IFM often referred to the murders by Malaitans at Mt Austin as a 
precipitating grievance, but these murders were not a triggering incident 
because the Tension was not something triggered immediately in their 
aftermath. Both sides reported as precipitating incidents particular meetings 
with Prime Minister Ulufa’alu at which he did not seem to them to listen 
or respond empathically to their grievances. But again we cannot code these 
as triggering incidents because militants did not take to arms immediately 
after them. On the other hand, an inflammatory speech delivered by Premier 
Alebua on 30 November 1998 did spawn violence immediately afterwards, so 
this is coded as a triggering incident.
In retrospect, some interpret Premier Alebua posting bail for Harold Keke at 
the beginning of 1999 as a triggering incident because Keke then organised 
an escalation of the violence, and from then on was the largest individual 
obstacle to peace. But this was an escalation only after the conflict was well 
under way. This is therefore coded as a proximate factor in escalation rather 
than as a trigger. 
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Figure 8.6 Harold Keke praying in July 2003 with one of the Melanesian 
Brothers whom he was holding captive on the Weather Coast
Photo: Ben Bohane
Who were the key actors who fuelled the 
conflict?
It follows from the previous section that the key actors in starting the conflict 
were
• Premier Alebua, who influenced his relative Harold Keke and other IFM 
leaders, each of whom did their own enrolling of young militants
• Jimmy Rasta, Alex Bartlett and other MEF leaders and politicians such 
as Andrew Nori, Manasseh Sogavare and Sir Allan Kemakeza, who made 
themselves available to be enrolled by the MEF militants to overthrow Prime 
Minister Ulufa’alu 
• senior Malaitan police who defied the Constitution to stage the coup 
• business interests (mainly in logging) who certain informants rumoured 
bankrolled the parliamentary votes for the overthrow of Ulufa’alu (though it 
is impossible to be certain about these allegations).
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Who were the key peacebuilding actors?
Many of the key war-making actors subsequently became key peacebuilding 
actors. In prison, most of the militant leaders on both sides, along with Ezekiel 
Alebua, became leaders of reconciliation through the Sycamore Tree Program. 
The sincerity of some of these leading war makers turned peacemakers is 
contested, including by one of the leading Chinese powerbrokers of the 
Solomons:
Reconciliation is not coming from the heart from these former militants 
clutching their Bibles. They are not sincere. They will be doing the same 
thing as soon as RAMSI leaves. There is no hope for this generation. We 
have to wait until they grow old and put our hope in a new generation.
It was the militants themselves, along with Andrew Nori and scholar Tarcisius 
Tara Kabutaulaka, who were the key brokers of the (albeit flawed) Townsville 
peace, though the premiers of Guadalcanal and Malaita provinces also played 
their roles, and Sir Peter Kenilorea (2008) was also important. Sir Allan Kemakeza 
played the decisive role in inviting RAMSI in with a strong mandate that allowed 
RAMSI to become a singularly important peacebuilding actor. But it is hard to 
think of Sir Allan as unequivocally a ‘peacemaker’ when he embezzled so much 
of the money intended to support the peace! 
Female and male church leaders were the most consistently important 
peacebuilding actors, with the Melanesian Brothers especially important 
in terms of reconciliatory practice and weapons collection, and the Solomon 
Islands Christian Association was especially important in policy development 
and networking for peace. 
At the height of the power of the crowd in Solomon Islands history, when 
Snyder Rini was displaced as prime minister in April 2006, the two key 
nodes of practical power after Parliament House were the Governor-General’s 
residence and the Honiara Hotel, where its owner, Sir Thomas Chan, pulled 
the strings of the largest parliamentary faction, the one that anointed Rini 
and had supported Kemakeza before him. The second two sites of power were 
approached by the mob, but, unlike Parliament, were not stoned by it—not 
because of the protection of the police or military (national or international), 
but because of the protection of the Melanesian Brothers, who made peace 
with the angry citizens who approached.8 Even earlier, Qantas asked for the 
presence of Melanesian Brothers as a condition for it landing in Honiara during 
the Tension (Carter 2004:6). The Melanesian Brothers also did more effective 




peacemaking than the police or the state in moving between the bunkers of 
both sides during the Tension to prevent more escalation than there might 
otherwise have been. The brothers had four semi-permanent camps between 
the bunkers where the machine guns of the two armies were positioned. The 
brothers themselves in our interviews believed that the most effective thing 
they did was to persuade both sides on many occasions to carry back bodies 
of enemies they had killed to their families. The brothers orchestrated this so 
fighters would meet those families and see the pain, especially of the women, 
as they thanked the fighters for returning their men. The Peace Monitoring 
Council (PMC) collected more weapons than RAMSI and it has been argued 
that most of the PMC weapons collection was actually accomplished by the 
Melanesian Brothers (Carter 2006:74–5). In fact, many church organisations 
played peacemaking roles to prevent the larger catastrophe that might have 
been on Guadalcanal. 
At the height of the Tension, a Civil Society Network emerged that coordinated 
energetic networking for peace from many organisations in civil society. 
Matthew Wale was one of many important leaders in that network. The National 
Council of Women was important for networking women’s organisations into 
peacebuilding—work that continued into 2010 with the conduct of restorative 
justice training, among other initiatives. 
We have argued that the Peace Monitoring Council and its successor, the 
National Peace Council (supported initially by the International Peace 
Monitoring Team), played  undervalued and highly multidimensional roles in 
promoting peace and reconciliation. World Vision and Oxfam played significant 
roles in reconciliation, trauma counselling and redevelopment, as did many 
other international NGOs and the donor community of nations. The Solomon 
Islands Development Trust has been the most important of many important 
local NGOs and has been one of the local NGOs that has worked effectively 
with Greenpeace in confronting the drivers of conflict in the money politics of 
logging. Not all was rosy in the NGO sector, however, and at the height of the 
conflict it was greatly divided against itself.
The United Nations played a much smaller part here than in most international 
peace operations. Nevertheless, the UNDP and other agencies have made some 
important contributions that have come up in our text. Major powers—the 
United States, China, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Japan (the 
former imperial masters)—did not play major roles. Australia and New Zealand 
had the trust of these powers to show regional leadership. 
Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil showed a path for restarting peace through 
development by taking active responsibility with chiefs and the government for 
untangling the land disputation that was holding back economic opportunities. 
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KFPL Timber at Ringi Cove similarly pioneered a strong model of collaborative 
economic development with chiefs based on sustainable management and long-
term land leases.
As usual, there were many others beyond those we have singled out; it takes 
more strategic actors to make peace than to make war. In the Solomons, there 
were many unsung peacemakers. In the next chapter, we consider the strengths 
that these actors at different levels of society had available to them to mobilise, 
and the peacebuilding weaknesses they had to transcend. 
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9. Peacebuilding strengths and 
weaknesses
In this chapter, we move under a set of themes through the strengths and 
weaknesses entries in the final section of Table 8.1. The Solomons’ was a conflict 
that could have become a major war, but was successfully contained. Unlike 
the story of Timor-Leste, in the next Peacebuilding Compared volume, where 
every village in the nation suffered death and devastation, the overwhelming 
majority of the Solomon Islands population stayed out of the conflict and 
concentrated on sustaining their village economies and taking care of the 
vulnerable members of their own villages. In spite of the fact that the country 
is very poor, disintegrated, poorly and corruptly governed and even though 
basics such as refugee and combatant reintegration were exceptionally poorly 
managed, Solomon Islands has experienced the loss of only one peacekeeper, in 
an ambush, and really no other armed conflict deaths since 2003. One reason for 
this has been RAMSI.
RAMSI: safe but sometimes aloof hands
A weakness of the RAMSI intervention was its poor timing. If Australia, New 
Zealand and other South Pacific countries were going to send peacekeepers 
in, it would have been more effective to do so when they were first asked, in 
1998. This would have saved most of the loss of life that subsequently occurred 
and prevented the looting of institutions and the total collapse of the economy 
between 2000 and 2002. 
A strength is that when RAMSI did arrive, it quickly re-established law and order. 
Violence fell immediately and weapons surrender was quick and successful by 
any international comparative standard. This success in re-establishing safety in 
conflict areas seems to be the key to why, in spite of various frequently voiced 
criticisms of RAMSI that we will consider, 90 per cent of Solomon Islanders 
in 2007 and 89 per cent in 2008 continued to support the presence of RAMSI 
(McMurray 2008:10; for a discussion of similar results of earlier surveys, 
see Anderson 2008:7). One worry is that confidence in RAMSI engendered 
dependency on RAMSI that has held back the rebuilding of confidence in 
Solomon Islands institutions. The real test of RAMSI’s success should be less 
confidence in itself than confidence in the institutions it leaves behind. 
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Ninety per cent confidence is perhaps particularly surprising given that, unlike 
the peacekeepers in Bougainville, in the Solomons, ‘some of the early RAMSI 
military personnel transgressed local cultural codes by involvement with 
prostitutes and local women’ (Moore 2004:178). RAMSI personnel attracted 
much more criticism from locals than the Truce and Peace Monitoring Groups 
in Bougainville. Bougainville’s peacekeepers were seen as much closer to the 
local community. The decision to locate most RAMSI staff in a segregated 
compound well out of town and most of the rest in white enclaves in prestigious 
suburbs did not help (compared with the situation in Bougainville, where most 
peacekeepers were spending most of their time in the villages). Out of and about 
town as well, locals saw too little of expatriates walking about with locals at the 
market and too much of them driving with other expatriates in airconditioned 
cars or sitting together in airconditioned restaurants (such as the Lime Lounge, 
with its almost exclusively white clientele, as in the extract from our fieldnotes 
below) (see also Allen 2006):
RAMSI from Australia are an embarrassment when they holiday in Gizo. 
Skinnydipping in front of the main street. Lewd behaviour with girls 
in the swimming pool. They stick together and do not mix with local 
people. They don’t go around and introduce themselves to businesses. 
So how would they find out where homebrew is sold? They suffer 
from ‘Lime Lounge Syndrome’. (Interview with Western Province 
businessman, 2006) 
Fiscal strengthening and economic reform
Another great achievement of RAMSI from 2003 on was stemming the 
haemorrhaging of revenue into the pockets of militants and their business 
cronies. The rapid movement to fiscal balance after 2003 encouraged donors 
to return in a generous fashion—so generous that now donor dependency is 
a problem, with 60 per cent of the national budget coming from that quarter 
(Fukuyama 2008:27). Francis Fukuyama (2008) also sees credible commitment 
on long-term land leases as an obstacle to development. The problem, as he 
sees it, is that both investors and traditional landowners do not trust Solomon 
Islands institutions of land law. The Solomon Islands Government has continued 
to shy away from tackling the land issues at the heart of the conflict. It has 
established a Commission of Inquiry into Land Dealings in Guadalcanal and is 
consulting on a Tribal Land Disputes Resolution Panels Bill, but to date, one 
post-conflict government after another has found land reform too hard. 
Poor-quality commercial institutions generally inhibit investment and deliver 
low returns to those who have invested; these include the cost of corruption 
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and political instability, unreliable and costly utilities, poor and expensive 
transportation, burdensome business procedures and uncertain rule of law, 
particularly insecure contract enforcement (IMF 2007:14). Beyond land law, 
Fukuyama sees wantokism as one of the things that holds back trust in and 
commitment to national institutions. As Brigg (2009) has countered, however, 
wantokism, wisely harnessed, can also be, and already is to some degree, a 
resource for trust building (see Chapter 7). Fukuyama regards national secondary 
schools for the best students from different ethnic groups as something that has 
worked in the past in Melanesia for forging a national identity among students 
who share an educational experience together that is oriented to future national 
leadership. This attracted much interest from Australia when advanced by the 
famous American scholar but not when advanced earlier by the National Peace 
Council (NPC 2004:Appendix 8): ‘Validate the role of boarding schools to bring 
children from different islands together to live together, work together and play 
together.’ 
An exacting challenge for a peace operation such as RAMSI, which aspires to 
great national change and a new national discipline, is its vulnerability to charges 
of hypocrisy. Roughan et al. (2006:2) charge it with demanding austerity while 
‘practicing profligacy’ and remaining ‘opaque’ while preaching ‘transparency’. 
One might add that while urging de-politicisation of the criminal justice system, 
it used that system in a highly politicised fashion on many fronts (Averre 2008; 
Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007). Short peace operations such as in Bougainville 
keep the internationals out of murky waters that induce such resentment. This 
indeed was the diagnosis of a number of Bougainville old hands—that RAMSI 
was at risk of overstaying its welcome. Yet the survey data show that despite a 
formidable list of criticisms that range from the use of tear gas on 18 April 2006 
to RAMSI military and police importing all their food from Australia instead of 
buying fresh fish and fruit from local markets, RAMSI is popular enough for 
citizens to want it to stay.
For all the problems, RAMSI made a wonderfully supportive contribution in 
helping an insolvent nation to solvency, in enabling it to move from a nation 
that could not pay its civil servants to one that could. Simple improvements to 
tax and customs administration and an in-line RAMSI accountant-general who 
immediately put a stop to the release of unauthorised expenditure for corrupt 
public officials were profoundly important contributions to restoring public 
services. These measures quickly ended a period in which there were no clear 
rules of the game of public spending. 
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Justice strengths and weaknesses
The criminal justice system has been both a strength and a weakness post-
conflict. It would be hard to find another peace operation that has secured more 
convictions for conflict cases, and particularly such a high success rate among 
the most senior militants on both sides. While RAMSI was much slower to move 
against the most kleptocratic members of the elite, particularly Prime Minister 
Kemakeza, in the end it sent him, another former prime minister and half a 
dozen former cabinet members to prison. Corruption is being better exposed 
by a reinvigorated Office of the Auditor-General and a multidimensional anti-
corruption policy that has a long way to go, but is making headway. The policy 
is still too timid and too bereft of investigators with the training to mount sting 
operations that result in bribe-paying foreign loggers losing their licences.
By any comparative standard of post-conflict justice, the Tension trials and the 
corruption trials were pretty fair.1 After considering allegations of ethnic bias 
by RAMSI in-line justice officials, the Parliamentary Inquiry (2009:140) into 
RAMSI was not persuaded there was any such ethnic bias. On the debit side, 
there was inevitable selectivity that at times approached the determination of 
another coalition of the willing in Iraq to convict the 52 leaders who had their 
photos on those famous playing cards. Indeed, in 2009, RAMSI had a list of 
the top-10 fugitives that it still sought to capture. Former prime minister and 
Opposition Leader, Manasseh Sogavare, accused RAMSI of ‘pursuing selective 
justice’ in the Tension trials (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:135). Convicted 
militants felt aggrieved at the lack of interest of the police in investigating 
earlier murders of close relatives of theirs. Some in Rove and Tetere prisons said 
they were political prisoners; some had a significant understanding of the laws 
of war and argued they had not breached them—it was not murder to kill an 
enemy soldier in battle. Great though the number of prosecutions was, most of 
the serious crimes of the conflict could not be pursued for want of resources. 
Militants were entitled to feel conned by the amnesty agreement at Townsville. 
The Solomon Islands Parliament was entitled to feel that its will in voting for the 
1 We should not underestimate what an accomplishment this was. Judges were not allowed to sit on conflict 
cases involving their wantoks. A senior Malaitan judge explained that this was necessary because people like 
him thought militants such as Jimmy Rasta had saved Malaitans in Honiara: ‘He was protecting property 
and life including myself…We appreciated what they did, the MEF. We provided them with food free…The 
police were doing nothing to protect us.’ One might say that when this judge gives this as a reason why he 
could not sit on the trial of his wantoks, does it also mean he could not justly try IFM militants? Having sat 
in on one of this judge’s trials and read transcripts of his cases, we think they were mostly fair and resulted 
in just convictions in these difficult post-conflict circumstances where no justice is perfect. We appreciated 
the openness with which both he as a judge and the prosecutors and defence (from the Office of the Public 
Solicitor) who appeared before him were willing to be open with us about the biases and conflicts that were 
inevitable in such a context, and that run through Solomon Islands society in a way one does not find in more 
legally homogenous settings where the ‘rule of law’ is well established. 
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amnesty was disrespected when ‘RAMSI did not consider whether to support 
any amnesty proposal but rather put its resources into trying to make sure that 
any such claims were defeated’ (Averre 2008:10). 
In the trials of Harold Keke for murdering Father Geve and of militants for 
murdering Brother Sado, the court found police failed to accord defendants their 
full constitutional rights when they were arrested (Averre 2008:11). Australian 
lawyer, Gary Scott, publicly alleged blatant legal violations by Australian police 
that frustrated his defence of Jimmy Rasta Lusibaea (Marshall 2004). In the trial 
of MEF leader Alex Bartlett, a defence subpoena forced revelation of a written 
agreement between the Australian Federal Police-funded Solomon Islands Police 
Commissioner, Shane Castles, and two crucial witnesses whereby the witnesses 
received ‘significant financial and other assistance on the condition they kept 
the agreements secret and gave evidence in Court only in accordance with their 
police statements’ (Averre 2008:11; see also O’Connor 2007a).2 Such unlawful 
behaviour in Australia would have had disastrous consequences for the career 
of a police commissioner. 
The most crucial weakness of the justice system, as revealed in the work of the 
National Peace Council and the Parliamentary Inquiry into RAMSI (2009), has 
been the failure to enable and support conflict prevention by chiefs and churches 
at the village level. This was the form of justice that the People’s Surveys showed 
90 per cent of citizens value most highly (see Chapter 4, Footnote 3). 
Weaknesses	of	governance	linkages
RAMSI has focused its governance capacity building very much on Honiara and 
national institutions based there. Yet Scales et al. (2002:7) argue that perhaps 
the more important weaknesses of governance are in the quality and clarity 
of linkages between village government—the level that matters most to most 
citizens—and more encompassing levels of government at the provincial and 
national levels. In a village society, strengthened national institutions that do 
not connect in an effective way to village governance have truncated traction. 
Provincial government capacity is even less than national governmental 
capacity—much less. Provincial government is remote from most villages and 
there is no system of local government. Only a few regions of the nation are linked 
together by councils of chiefs—an institution commonly used in other parts 
of Melanesia for linking villages into more encompassing governance systems. 
2 See, in addition, Chapter 5, Footnote 9 on the substantial payments made by the Australian Federal 
Police to family members of the alleged victim of sexual abuse by former Solomon Islands attorney-general 
Julian Moti. Justice Debbie Mullins of the Supreme Court of Queensland found them ‘an affront to the public 
conscience’ that called the integrity of the administration of justice into question—an interpretation later 
rejected by the Queensland Court of Appeal (R v Moti [2010] QCA 178).
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Churches do perform this function to a degree, at least where denominational 
schisms are not deep. Church building predates colonial statebuilding by 
decades in the Solomons (Joseph and Browne Beu 2008:2). Though as Joseph 
and Browne Beu (2008:1) also point out, in some ways more recent civil society 
institutions—notably, the Solomon Islands Football Federation—have done 
more effective integrative institution building across the length and breadth of 
the nation than has the state. 
Unlinking the power of shadow governments
We have seen that one governance linkage that has worked since the Mamaloni 
governments came to power is between Members of Parliament and a shadow 
government, or competing shadow governments,3 of business leaders with 
investments in logging, hotels, casinos, prostitution and fishing. The arrival 
of RAMSI saw a second shadow government of advisors operating alongside 
the electorally accountable government (Dinnen 2008a:68). The first shadow 
government is mostly ethnically Asian; the second mostly Caucasian. 
As indigenous Solomon Islanders see the linkages of their village governance to 
national and provincial government languish, they sometimes lament the strong 
linkages they can see whereby shadow governments of foreigners at times make 
puppets of those they elect. That interpretation was important to understanding 
the sentiments manifest in the April 2006 riots and to understanding the ethos 
of resistance to foreign domination of the Sogavare government that came to 
power in its aftermath. A third, also ethnically Asian, foreign shadow network 
is constituted by Taiwanese funding, especially of the Rural Constituency 
Development Fund of S$1 million per parliamentarian per annum to spend more 
or less as they wish. In addition, in 2006, Taiwan was alleged to have a ‘secret 
slush fund’, for ‘influence peddling…worth well over $10 million, provided by 
the back door to the Prime Minister’s office’ (Skelton 2006). Taiwan is seen as 
a more benign source of foreign cash by indigenous Solomon Islanders partly 
because it makes much fewer demands on what government policies should 
prevail than the other two types of shadow governments. The one policy demand 
that counts for Taiwan is hard edged, but matters little to the average Solomon 
Islander: continuing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Beyond that, Taiwan 
mostly exercises only soft power. Yet one prominent Chinese powerbroker in 
Solomon Islands posited the Taiwanese funding as the most important reason 
for the nation’s poor economic prospects:
3 For example, in April 2006, one we have seen was ensconced at the Honiara Hotel supporting Syder Rini’s 
candidature for the prime ministership with backers organised by Sir Thomas Chan. And a competing shadow 
government in waiting was camped with their Asian business sponsors at the Iron Bottom Sound Hotel.
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It prevents Solomon Island politics from maturing and learning to stand 
on its own feet. Getting elected to Parliament is like winning a $1 million 
Taiwanese lottery ticket. It’s the only way to milk the cow. It’s different 
from Australia where you can have wealthy men like Kevin Rudd and 
Malcolm Turnbull contesting politics.4
But largesse from all the shadow governments of foreigners interacts with 
first-past-the-post electoral politics and wantokism in a way that effectively 
disenfranchises most citizens—just as it empowers foreign shadows. The foreign 
shadows provide the largesse to politicians; the favoured politicians use it to 
reward those who vote for them (mostly wantoks). First past the post with many 
candidates, each with narrow ethnic power bases, means candidates have only 
to pay off a small proportion of the electorate to win. The rest of the electorate 
gets little back from the government. So you get government of the few, by the 
few, for the few foreign shadows. 
In this section and throughout the book, we have described the workings of 
three types of shadow states5 of foreigners as described in our interviews: first, 
RAMSI as a neo-colonial shadow government; second, competing factions of 
predominantly Asian, predominantly logging, business interests that pool 
funds to bankroll ballots for the prime ministership and votes of no confidence 
in incumbent prime ministers; and third, the generous development funding 
Taiwan puts directly into the hands of MPs. A fourth type of shadow state 
rather closer to William Reno’s (1995) original formulation of the concept in 
Sierra Leone existed between the 2000 coup and the arrival of RAMSI. In this 
period, the unelected shadows were powerbrokers of the MEF, such as Andrew 
Nori and Jimmy Rasta. The idea of the shadow state (Reno 1998, 2000) is not 
that elected governments are puppets of their shadows. Those with formal state 
power use those with shadow economy and warlord power, just as the latter use 
the politicians to deliver their specific interests. In the application of the idea 
of a shadow government (of towns and provinces) by Van Klinken (2007; see 
also Braithwaite et al. 2010a) to explain the onset of armed conflict in certain 
provinces of Indonesia, the most common form of payoff sought by members 
of the shadow government was government contracts. This has been much 
less important to the shadow governments we have described in the Solomons 
compared with favourable treatment for logging, fishing, land and casino deals, 
extravagant and unaccountable compensation and diplomatic leverage. 
4 He then went on to lament why a comparatively wealthy Solomon Islander, former Central Bank governor 
Rick Hou, who in his view would make the most talented prime minister for the nation, would never 
be motivated to play the money politics involved in being prime minister. During the conflict, Hou was 
threatened at the point of a gun by militants demanding money. A year later, in 2010, he was in fact elected 
to the Parliament but not to the ministry.
5 In Reno’s (1995, 2000) formulation, the shadow state is distinguished from the formal state conceived in 
conventional Weberian terms as: 1) secure in a monopoly over the legitimate use of force; 2) an administrative 
order regulated by law; and 3) sovereign in authority within a set of geographical borders. 
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Sinclair Dinnen, in commenting on an earlier draft of this section, queried 
whether we had so many shadow governments in play here and so many 
differences from William Reno’s shadow states in Africa that we must question 
the analytical value of the concept for the Solomons. It could indeed be that as 
Peacebuilding Compared progresses we find that it is more analytically strategic 
to deploy the more generic framework of networked governance (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2003; Castells 1996; Rhodes 1997) that does not connote any particular 
form of exchange between politicians and network partners. Networked 
governance also does not necessarily impute anything dark or shadowy about 
networking between politicians and others. Networked governance analysis 
allows a dissection of specific forms of linkages—some normatively healthy, 
some unhealthy. We have introduced another reason for pondering whether 
networked governance might have been a more productive frame than the 
shadow government frame we have infused into our analysis at times. This is 
that the absence of certain types of linkage is a problem of peacebuilding in 
the Solomons—most importantly, linkages between village governance and 
more encompassing levels of government. On the other hand, all four of the 
types of shadow government we posit in this section do have their sinister 
side. Between them they have ‘sucked out’ (Ignatieff 2003:162) and corrupted 
much indigenous capacity, making the capacity that is available rather more 
at the service of powerful foreign and criminal interests than at the service of 
powerless villagers and the institutions that should sustain them. 
William Reno’s conceptualisation of a shadow state connects to a much older 
literature in economics on the shadow economy. The Solomons certainly became 
one of those societies in which very little of the economy, including the big 
international trade items of logs and fish, was recorded in the formal economy 
of the national accounts and taxed. Key aspects of Reno’s shadow state certainly 
apply to the past two decades of Solomons history. These are the ideas of a shadow 
state as something ‘constructed behind the façade of laws and government 
institutions’ that establishes ‘a form of personal rule’ (Reno 2000:434). People 
such as prime ministers Mamaloni, Kenilorea and Rini, MEF leaders such as 
Jimmy Rasta and Andrew Nori and a cast of envelope-stuffing Asian business 
leaders all bear considerable similarities to the practitioners of the shadow state, 
as a form of personal rule, which Reno found in parts of Africa. As in such 
African states, the Solomons has seen clandestine circuits, particularly linked 
to a shadow economy of logging, systematically corrupt the Public Service and 
institutions for its accountability. As in Africa, in the Solomons, accountability 
institutions, such as the Public Service Commission, the Auditor-General’s office, 
the Ombudsman and the Leadership Code Commission, were progressively 
dismantled and de-fanged because they were potential obstacles to personal 
rule and to the ability of rulers to capture rents. 
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RAMSI is a ‘shadow government’ that reverses this latter feature; it has been 
dedicated to strengthening these very institutions, even if it did in practice 
sometimes ‘suck out’ Solomons civil service capacity.6 It shadowed the 
commanding heights of the state with foreign advisors in a manner more like 
the influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 
Africa. Taiwan’s influence has different points of commonality and difference 
again. One could say that Taiwanese aid has been directed to strengthening 
the hands of patrimonial personal rule (against the rule of institutions), in 
this respect more consistently with the shadow state analysis. The clandestine 
circuits that link Taiwanese diplomats to Solomons political leaders fit the idea 
of a shadow state operating as personal rule by a mix of state and non-state 
actors operating behind the façade of a formal state structure.
All of the shadow governments we discuss here are in part ‘clandestine circuits’ 
wielding power behind a ‘façade of formal sovereignty’ (Reno 2000:437). Reno 
(2000:442) speaks of ‘the existence of a Shadow State [as]…a matter of degree, 
rather than an all-or-nothing proposition’. On this continuum, the Solomons 
of the 1990s could have been closer to what Le Billon (2000:785) has described 
as the shadow state of the ‘commodification of Cambodian forests’ than to 
1990s Sierra Leone.7 Reno (2002) has discussed the similarities between what 
some describe as the shadow state controls of the Russian mafiya of the 1990s 
and shadow states in Africa. Reno sees the critical difference as being that the 
6 John Wood commented here that in respect of these three accountability institutions, there indeed seems 
to be more evidence of sucking in of Solomons civil service capacity by RAMSI than sucking out. The 
Auditor-General’s office, for example, has been transformed from an office of three people who did almost 
nothing, failing to complete an audit in 20 years, to ‘an office of 30 local Solomon Islanders and a small number 
of RAMSI personnel who regularly make reports to Parliament’ (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:155). 
7 In some senses, Cambodia and Solomon Islands are both cases where an ‘abundance of shadows’ (J. 
Ferguson 2006:15) apply, wherein rulers borrow ‘“the shadow, not the substance” of a Western capitalist 
economy’. Cambodia is an interesting case in that international pressure for ‘good governance’ resulted in a 
‘legalizing [of] shadow state politics’ in the aftermath of a period in which the following logic expressed by a 
prime ministerial aide had kept economic activity in the shadows: ‘To provide revenues to the Public Treasury 
is not the norm. Now, we make a lot of money. If we inject this money in the Ministry of Finance what will 
be the use? And who will benefit from this money? We don’t know! If I do not steal this money, somebody 
else will do it and will kill me with the weapons bought with it’ (interview with senior official conducted by 
Le Billon 2000:799). In the post-conflict period after this, ‘[t]he “shadow state” is thus a domestic response 
to the political challenges and opportunities posed by multi-party democratic governance and the neo-
liberal perspective of “government by the market”, in which “the market is viewed not merely as a means 
of allocating goods and services but as a form of social regulation” (Graf 1995:141). Rather than opposing 
such a dominant paradigm, state actors seek to co-opt it, thereby benefiting from its financial opportunities, 
including access to aid, while simultaneously reshaping it into an instrument of power’ (Le Billon 2000:799). 
‘Good governance’ influences delivered a biased legal framework in Cambodia that gave exclusive rights 
of forest exploitation to a favoured few. This was an effect not totally dissimilar to the insipid impact of 
RAMSI on forest exploitation. The co-prime ministers of Cambodia were able to mimic a green, democratic, 
accountable discourse of transition ‘while integrating forests into their own power bases’ (Le Billon 2000:802). 
‘Under “anarchy”, marginalized segments of society were able to manoeuvre to gain some access to forest 
resources and to integrate themselves into the growing monetised economy, thereby counterbalancing 
somewhat unequal power relationships. Under “order”, this room for manoeuvre gave way to an exclusionary 




Russian state was quite capable of controlling the Russian mafiya, including 
through the use of force, whereas it was beyond the capacity of many weak 
African states to control the warlords who were the key figures in their shadow 
states (just as it was impossible for Solomons prime ministers between 2000 and 
2003 to control the MEF or Harold Keke).
Comparative projects such as Peacebuilding Compared that progressively add 
cases over a long period of research might do best to remain open minded about 
the similarities and differences of accumulating cases to extant conceptualisations 
in the literature. This is the way we feel about the shadow state concept as we 
have deployed it in this case and our Indonesian cases (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). 
There are ways in which it fits quite evocatively with the Solomons experience, 
especially when we leave ourselves open to the idea of competition among a 
variety of different kinds of shadow states. Other cases invoke even more variety 
in ‘shadow networks’ (Duffield 2002), as in our Bougainville case study, which 
could be conceived as one in which the ‘shadow armies’ of private security 
forces (Sandline) backed by shadowy international mining interests were in 
play, and were decidedly shadowy players (J. Ferguson 2006:15). The ‘shadow’ 
metaphor is not only about darkness, deviousness and non-transparency; it is 
also about a parallel economy, parallel government or parallel military that sticks 
with the formal economy/government/military like a shadow sticks to a person. 
But governance in the Solomons is also importantly shaped by civil society 
networks that are not at all clandestine and not very corrupt. Pre-eminently, 
we are thinking of the church here. So we do wonder whether there might 
be more comparative purchase in diagnosing networks of governance, some of 
which hide in shadows, others that do not; some of which are a form of state/
economy parallel to the formal ones, others that are simply on a different plane 
(a ‘higher’ one in the case of the church!). Just as individuals simultaneously 
identify with different layers of identity (Chapter 7), so they can move among 
multiple overlapping and fluid networks. 
Reasserting control by Solomons institutions 
over foreign interests in a shadow economy
It could be argued that the Solomons is a case study of how the World Bank 
good governance agenda of statebuilding and its predecessor, the neo-liberal, 
small government agenda, have fared equally badly (Carroll and Hameiri 
2007). An alternative analysis is that the institutional change most needed is a 
dismantling of the shadow state(s), at least where it involves payment of foreign 
cash to advance commercial or foreign diplomatic interests rather than national 
interests. Second, the institution building most needed is not top-down from 
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Honiara, but strengthening linkages bottom-up from village governance. It is 
not police cars in Honiara, but village constables on foot in remote areas where 
logging tensions bubble up. Many Solomon Islanders focus on corruption and 
shadow governments as the key challenges, rather than statebuilding, when 
they commonly say: ‘It’s not the car we need to change, it’s the driver.’ 
The Centre for Independent Studies (Sodhi 2008:5) was unfortunate enough to 
release a paper just before the global financial crisis in which it drew lessons 
from Iceland—a country no more endowed with natural resources than the 
Solomons, but blessed with institutions that had delivered it prosperity. By 
the end of that year, the list of nations that were dramatically less solvent than 
Solomon Islands was a short one, but it included Iceland. Fishing, logging and 
tourism present the most important, sustainable economic futures for Solomon 
Islands. They would actually develop better if they were more uncoupled from 
foreign control (if foreign shadow governments could be put back in their boxes) 
and better linked to the local governance of the nation’s 900 islands. Before 
the Tension, fishing was better supported for local economic development by 
dispersed fish-collection centres with refrigeration (Aqorau 2001). These were 
looted or destroyed by young men during the period of chaos. In the case of 
logging, Greenpeace (2008) and the Solomon Islands Development Trust have 
long made the case for progressive elimination of logging licences for foreign 
investors in favour of community eco-forestry linked to international markets. 
With fishing, the most strategic thinkers in the Solomon Islands Government 
favour the elimination of all licences for foreign fishing fleets in favour of 
developing indigenous capacity, where necessary in partnership with foreign 
technology and skill transfer.8 In tourism, the need is to connect the already 
strong skill sets of the Honiara and Gizo hotel and hospitality industries to 
village hospitality development, and inter-island transport to tourist paradises 
on culturally enriching and environmentally pristine remote islands. 
This is not to say that there are not also important areas such as minerals 
exploration (for example, nickel on Isabel Island) in which direct foreign 
investment that is collaboratively linked to village governance around mine sites 
is the best development model. It is just to say that the sites where uncoupling from 
foreign economic development agenda setting is needed are more important sites 
than those where more foreign involvement would be a benefit. Where foreign 
help is most needed is with education investment to help Solomon Islanders 
become more sophisticated in choosing economic development options with 
bottom-up and top-down linkages that actually deliver development benefits to 
8 Sustainable fishing is becoming more possible for Pacific countries because of increasingly effective 
cooperation through the Tuna Commission since 2004 and compliance becoming easier to monitor because of 
international cooperation in monitoring, NGO participation, satellite monitoring and paper trails for tracing 
the catch that make it hard to sell fish in Europe and Japan without documentation of where the fish was 
caught and processed. The effect is that a catch unsupported by a paper trail attracts a lower price. 
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the country’s citizens. Australia’s aid program since 2003 has been spending 15 
times as much on law and justice as on education (AusAID 2007:2). New Zealand 
has been concentrating its assistance much more on education. The education 
budget remains badly skewed towards funding for the children of the elite to 
participate in higher education. There has been a great deal of fraud in this 
program, with students continuing to receive scholarship payments for years 
after they have dropped out of their course, for example. 
Where the Centre for Independent Studies’ analysis (Sodhi 2008) seems right 
is that too much of the aid to Solomon Islands is ‘boomerang funding’ into the 
pockets of Australian consultants and companies9 and that in spite of higher 
levels of foreign aid support than can be found almost anywhere in the world 
(67 per cent of GDP in 2005) (Anderson 2008:13), Solomon Islanders in the past 
decade have been considerably worse off economically than they were in the 
1970s, with still only a small minority having access to electricity and telephony. 
For the moment, they are much better off in health, particularly with respect 
to malaria, thanks to foreign assistance, though globalisation could ultimately 
reverse its health benefits through HIV/AIDS.
Resilient civil society that can heal itself
One element in common between Solomon Islands and Bougainville is that Moore 
(2007:171) concludes that there were attempts to mediate the peace through 
‘more than twenty-five peace negotiations and forums’. As in Bougainville, in 
the Solomon Islands, there were many more failed peace talks than successful 
ones. A peacebuilding strength of Solomon Islands civil society was to have the 
resilience to push on from failed talks, using the tiny accomplishments that had 
been secured at the early talks as a slight foundation on which to build ultimate 
agreement for quite a successful disarmament process. 
Even though RAMSI has not empowered civil society as strongly as it might have 
and although the Solomons’ state institutions are top-down in ways that fail to 
foster bottom-up linkages, Solomon Islands civil society has proven resilient. 
Most of the reconciliation work that has mattered has been local in civil society, 
led by chiefs, women, churches and militants from inside their prison cells. 
The Solomon Islands Development Trust and the Solomon Islands Christian 
9 Sixty-two per cent of total Australian assistance to Solomon Islands in 2006–07 was spent on expert 
technical assistance compared with an OECD average of 24 per cent (Hayward-Jones (2008a:5). One extreme 
example of profligacy was a peak of 53 expatriate staff in corrections that continued through 2006. Even on 
the night shift, when prisoners were locked down, high-priced expatriates were being paid to sit in Rove 
prison. As one of the Australian corrections staff said, ‘I can’t imagine what they do all night’ to earn the 
higher salaries they are paid compared with locals. By mid-2009, the number had more than halved to about 
20, but still one would have thought this an expensive and peculiar aid priority. 
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Association have been particularly strong indigenous NGOs with a bottom-up 
philosophy. This philosophy has also captured the imagination of many of the 
international NGOs, who have been large investors in Solomons civil society. 
Oxfam is one such NGO; a good example of the indigenous organisations it 
supported is Kastom Garden. Kastom Garden works with unemployed rural 
youth to reconnect them to productive garden-based work. Not all disenchanted 
youth who are being destroyed by kwaso (homebrew) are open to reconnection 
to their land and culture in this way, but for those who are it provides a path 
back to agricultural economic development. Kastom Garden also helps rural 
communities diversify the output from their gardens, improves their gardening 
techniques and provides more productive seed varieties and strains resistant to 
common crop diseases. 
Unfettered media
Table 8.1 lists a media comparatively not dominated by the government as a 
strength in comparative terms, even though it faced repeated threats and 
demands for compensation from thugs operating at the behest of powerful 
interests and has practised self-censorship of reporting high-level corruption. 
Some would say the media elites are part of Malaitan elite networks. We, 
however, saw nothing like the fragmentation of the media into separate Muslim 
and Christian media that occurred in Ambon, for example (Braithwaite et 
al. 2010a:Chapter 3). The news pages, editorials and letters columns of the 
Solomon Star newspaper are engaging and diverse in opinion. The Solomon 
Islands Broadcasting Corporation has some outstanding programming, some 
of it replete with florid criticisms of the government and RAMSI alike. Public 
interest activists such as John Roughan of the Solomon Islands Development 
Trust and his son, Paul Roughan, when he led Transparency Solomon Islands, 
were never really muzzled for the want of a media outlet for their critiques. 
Special mention must be made of the world-class contribution of Mary-Louise 
O’Callaghan in getting the Solomons’ story into the international media via her 
columns in The Australian. 
The compensation roadblock to truth and 
reconciliation
A distinctive perversity of peacebuilding in Solomon Islands is that perpetrators 
have little interest in apologising for their violence. Instead, they managed a 
backstage identity as combatants and a front-stage identity as victims, so as 
to maximise large compensation payments from the government. Successive 
governments have served the nation poorly by paying them. 
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While we have seen that compensation has deep historical roots in Solomon 
Islands societies, a government compensation culture has evolved as a shallow 
and quick fix for teetering governments focused on surviving the next vote 
of no confidence. We have seen that this government compensation culture 
increases long-run risks of violence (Chand 2002). It becomes possible for 
leaders of both sides to win (and taxpayers to lose) when both sides ignite 
violence confident of a state payout to desist. The scam is even better for leaders 
when they skim payouts intended for combatants and refugees into their own 
pockets, as happened on both sides in the Solomons. Once that kind of iterated 
gaming of state compensation has set in, the best way to turn winners into losers 
is to convict them in criminal courts. Hence, in the context of the distinctive 
Solomons history of government compensation to major criminals, RAMSI’s 
robust law enforcement was needed. 
A challenge for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to tell the truth 
of the damage that the government compensation culture has done and to 
convince the society that government compensation has encouraged violence 
more than ended it. A good starting decision has been legislation that precludes 
the commission from getting involved in compensation. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission will be worthwhile if it achieves nothing more than 
persuading the nation that government compensation for horizontal disputes 
must end, and has ended. Courts are the places where such compensation can 
be pursued against perpetrators. That of course does not preclude suits against 
the government where the government is the perpetrator. Reintegration support 
for refugees and rank-and-file fighters who hand in their guns is best funded 
directly to them by international donors, precisely so such funds cannot be 
extorted from governments—and so they cannot be embezzled by ministers 
and provincial premiers for that matter! Even international donors that fund 
reintegration payments to ex-combatants must make clear that they are one-off 
donors who cannot be gamed repeatedly with compensation demands. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission needs to reconnect citizens to 
thinking about reconciliation as something people do between one another, and 
communities do with each other. Competition for state compensation crushes 
reconciliation as something that can build peace by touching people’s hearts. 
Solomon Islanders already understand this. They just need to see new institutions 
of reconciliation working well in a new spirit of national healing, forgiveness 
and rebuilding for the next generation. The reason why the Sycamore Tree 
restorative justice program discussed in Chapter 6 has had success in bringing 
combatants together is that the combatants in a sense own the program. Because 
the state has nothing to do with it, compensation bids to the state do not crowd 
out the genuine interpersonal and inter-group work of reconciliation. 
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In the end, crime did not pay
As in most of the conflicts we have so far considered in Peacebuilding Compared, 
in the Solomons, the most important leaders who started the conflict fared 
poorly out of it. Harold Keke, tortured by mental illness, serving several life 
sentences in Rove prison, is the most dramatic instance. He has little freedom 
of movement even about the prison during his long confinement and is severely 
disturbed. Part of this problem could be a bullet that struck his brain. But many 
lesser militant leaders were either killed or ended up in prison. Some of the 
political masterminds of the conflict have not gone to prison, but their influence 
and reputations ended up in tatters. Guadalcanal Premier Alebua rapidly lost 
political support during 2001 and the former prime minister would never be a 
major force in Solomons politics again. In June 2001, he was lucky to survive 
gunshot wounds to the eye, chest and arm after an attempt by disgruntled 
militants from his own side to assassinate him. Later in the decade, he had to 
take his wounded body into prison.
Andrew Nori’s law firm was allegedly paid S$517 549 in ‘legal fees’ by the 
government for his negotiations on behalf of the MEF/Joint Operation. Once 
this became public, he was deeply discredited, particularly in the eyes of MEF 
combatants who felt they received so little for their sacrifices in defending 
their people. One MEF member burnt down Nori’s law offices in protest, 
was captured by the police and died after attacks on him in the police cells. 
In February 2001, the Registrar of the High Court initially refused to renew 
Nori’s practising certificate—a decision Nori eventually had overturned. Nori 
has so far been clever enough to avoid any legal sanction for his central role in 
an alleged coup. But Nori told John Braithwaite that his reputation had been 
damaged ‘irreparably’ and that some things he had done in representing MEF 
demands to the government had been ‘a personal and professional mistake’ for 
which he was sorry. Another informant said that there had been a suicide in 
Nori’s family as a result of his travails. As far as the police leaders of the Joint 
Operation were concerned, their police careers have ended and so have those of 
hundreds of police who worked for them. Dozens of former officers up to deputy 
commissioner level did prison time over the coup. Jimmy Rasta and his wife 
gave years of their lives to Rove prison and he faces another attempted murder 
trial starting in November 2010, notwithstanding his landslide election victory. 
The hopeful thing is that they continue to give to the prison’s reconciliation 
work today, and to released combatants whom they employ in their business.
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10. Statebuilding that contained 
conflict but shelved specifics that 
fuelled conflict
Diagnosing specificities or templates for pillars?
In Chapter 9, we argued that a necessary ingredient for peace was to end gaming 
the state with compensation claims by replacing it with a rule of law. As always, 
the rule of law turned out to be a beautiful theory that ushered in some ugly 
practices by RAMSI and the post-conflict state. But it was a fairer rule of law 
than that which preceded it. When the bar has been progressively raised on 
some critical barriers to enduring peace—including ending the culture of 
gaming government compensation, the culture of corruption and harassment on 
the streets—perhaps we should count a peace operation as a success.
Solomon Islands is still a state riddled with corruption, but today it has an auditor-
general and media that expose this publicly, an admirably multidimensional 
anti-corruption strategy and some of the very worst kleptocrats, even former 
prime ministers, have been convicted. Zero tolerance of corruption would mean 
no-one left standing to run the nation. Determination to prosecute the most 
seriously corrupt at every future point in the nation’s history, however mighty, 
can gradually reduce the heights of corruption to which one must jump before 
being sanctioned. Commitment to progressively lowering the bar to cut down 
the worst few cases can mean that future generations come to look back with 
shock at the corruption tolerated by their forebears. 
Where there has not been continuous improvement is in bottom-up reconciliation 
and bottom-up development. A challenge for the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is to signal the need to reverse this. Certainly, there were short-
term statebuilding imperatives for RAMSI centred on Honiara. But the retreat 
from AusAID’s previous village-up civil society development strategy should 
not have gone as far as it did. Primary and secondary education are in desperate 
need of restoration to a higher proportion of donor support for Solomon Islands. 
Inferior access to health centres on the Weather Coast is an injustice at the root 
of this conflict that can be fixed. 
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RAMSI support to keep combatants secure in prison could now be pruned right 
back. Indeed it might be time to consider the proposals of ex-MEF leaders for 
a Forgiveness Bill that might pardon most ex-combatants in 2012 (as discussed 
in Chapter 6). It might be time for Sir Peter Kenilorea’s agenda of upending 
policing, so that village constables become key personnel in preventing rural 
unrest from spreading to the capital in future (see Chapter 5).
Prosecution of foreign loggers who pay bribes to chiefs or cabinet ministers, 
who make sexual slaves of children in remote parts of the archipelago, who 
assassinate environmental activists, is overdue. Perhaps the most disappointing 
thing about RAMSI is that its law enforcement emphasis has not extended to 
international commercial interests who corrupted the Solomons tax system and 
its customs administration, who funded the buying of votes of no confidence in 
the Parliament and, worst of all, who destroyed regulation of the sustainability 
of the export industries—logging and fishing—that are the Solomons’ greatest 
hope. What a tragedy it is that Australian Prime Minister Howard missed the 
opportunity to insist in 2003 that independent law enforcement against those 
who corrupt the regulation of logging and fishing be a condition of going in to 
save the prime ministership, and possibly the life, of Sir Allan Kemakeza. 
Sustainable trees and sustainable fish stocks are keys to the future of Solomon 
Islands. These are areas where the nation does not need more foreign investment, 
but less. Strong leaders are needed to transcend the shadow governments of 
foreigners to make these assets work for the villagers of all the nation’s islands. 
These indigenous leaders already exist; their formidable capacity can be drawn 
back into Solomon Islands institutions as expatriates exit.
Allen and Dinnen (2010) have discussed the ‘often neglected’ importance in 
the onset of political instability and the tensions of ‘the disruption to political 
patronage networks engendered by the combined impact, in the late 1990s, of 
declining demand for Solomons log exports due to the Asian financial crisis and 
the reform agenda of the Ulufa’alu government’ (see Hameiri 2007, 2009a). This 
government instability has been a key weakness of the state that has undermined 
effectiveness in nipping violence in the bud and has fostered profligate resort to 
state compensation payouts to criminals in desperate attempts to buy political 
survival. Political instability has led to even more desperate resort to playing 
the ethnic violence card in politics. 
Designing an architecture of politics to render it more stable is no simple 
challenge. We share Jon Fraenkel’s doubts about imported electoral engineering 
solutions from other parts of Melanesia that have not worked well there, or have 
been counterproductive (Fraenkel 2004b, 2006; Fraenkel et al. 2008). Indigenous 
innovation is needed to craft more stable versions of Solomon Islands political 
culture. That will best emerge from a rich, open, creative, plural discussion of 
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options, as opposed to deals among extant elites, which risk elite gaming and 
positioning to preserve privilege. The Working Committee on Political Party 
Integrity Reform has shown some promise, as indicated by a Lowy Institute 
report (Hayward-Jones 2008b) on what seemed a constructive, imaginative 
dialogue. In common with Fraenkel et al. (2008), that dialogue makes a good 
case for the dissolution of Parliament when a motion of no confidence succeeds. 
Because such a large proportion of sitting members loses their seat in every 
Solomon Islands election, members might be reluctant in no confidence motions 
if their success would require dissolution of Parliament. The other remedy 
advanced in this book is targeted prosecution of the most serious political 
corruption cases. Passing plain envelopes stuffed with cash to buy votes to 
unseat a prime minister through a vote of no confidence is clearly the kind of 
serious corruption that would be caught by a policy of gradually lowering the 
prosecutorial bar on anti-corruption enforcement. Like Fraenkel et al. (2008:9), 
we suspect that ‘one or two convictions of would be lobbyists offering cash 
in the run up to a Prime Ministerial election’ would help greatly to chill the 
practice.  
Other peace processes have been much more successful than the Solomons’ 
in securing the return of refugees chased from their homes and rebuilding 
those homes when they have been demolished. The nettle of improving land-
dispute resolution has not really been grasped. While it is encouraging to see 
Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Limited and Gold Ridge return to becoming the 
huge employers and exporters they once were (more painfully in the case of 
Gold Ridge), and while it is hoped that one day Malaitans might work in some 
of the jobs they were chased from, it is disappointing that for now Malaitans 
are unwelcome to apply for the jobs and that areas around these key economic 
projects are no-go zones for Malaitans. A national capital in which most of 
the population are squatters is a risky upshot, especially with high-violence 
areas such as Burns Creek where governments discourage further squatting 
by refusing to provide basic services such as running water. Where can they 
go, these Malaitans with a long, proud history of labour migration from their 
island, with so few employment opportunities? One response to this knotty 
dilemma could be a formidable opening of Australian and New Zealand labour 
markets to Solomon Islanders. 
There is little sense in which the planners of RAMSI in Canberra in 2003 designed 
a mission that was attuned to helping with the specific structural and proximate 
factors listed in Table 8.1 as implicated in the onset of this conflict (Allen and 
Dinnen 2010). There is also no sufficient sense in which RAMSI attuned its 2003 
strategy, or subsequently retuned it, in light of the peacebuilding weaknesses 
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specified in Table 8.1 and Chapter 9, most of which had already been identified 
by the National Peace Council and subsequently listed in its 2004–09 strategic 
plan (NPC 2004). 
This is not to deny that RAMSI did not very quickly turn around some critical 
risk factors: guns, unsafe streets in the capital and fiscal insolvency. And we 
will list in the next section some ways that RAMSI did learn to craft peace by 
creating spaces in which locals could diagnose specificities of reform. Some of 
the challenges listed in Table 8.1 were viewed by RAMSI as matters of national 
sovereignty. Included in this category were the challenges of reconciliation 
that heals indignities felt by people, fixing the dysfunctional culture of state 
compensation, fixing land law and land administration, fixing forest and 
fisheries administration, repatriating refugees and reintegrating combatants, 
rebalancing uneven development, constitutional reform to improve linkages of 
governance down to and up from villages, Gold Ridge, youth unemployment 
and alcohol abuse, internal migration, building health centres on the Weather 
Coast and a good number of others. At the same time, improving all elements of 
the criminal justice system, tax and customs administration and various other 
state functions we have discussed, in which RAMSI was highly interventionist, 
were somehow not in the category of matters to be left to national sovereignty. 
One interpretation is that instead of diagnosing Solomon Islands’ problems 
RAMSI might help fix, RAMSI went in with fairly standard World Bank good 
governance objectives and templates for fixing them. A slightly different 
interpretation is that RAMSI’s planners in 2003 did have an analysis of what 
were the root causes of the conflict that RAMSI should seek to remedy.1 But it 
was an analysis that was short on specificity. What RAMSI’s planners hoped to 
do was re-establish the rule of law and rebuild a weak or failed state. Yes, the 
Solomons was a weak state and had suffered a collapse of rule of law. But not 
all aspects of state performance in critical areas were weak. Few countries have 
had a larger malaria problem than the Solomons and few countries have fared as 
1 When Susan Woodward (2007) argues that planning interventions with the aim of fixing root causes of war 
can make things worse, she is mainly targeting the kind of analysis of root causes that RAMSI did engage with 
to a degree—one that draws on general empirical lessons that when states are failing and there is widespread 
poverty and the like, war is more probable. ‘First, policies currently designed to address the root causes are 
based on research in the 1990s that has largely been discredited or superseded, but the policy world has not 
adjusted to the criticisms and newer scholarship. If the analysis is wrong, it may be better not to address 
“causes” at all’ (Woodward 2007:64). Other aspects of her analysis, however, are relevant to even the most 
contextually attuned attentiveness to root causes. In particular, she argues that the changes wrought by the 
war itself can so transform the situation on the ground that addressing original root causes can be off point. 
More generally, for any problem, addressing its original causes is not always as cost effective a cure as some 
conceptually quite different approach, as we know from what works when we are ill. In spite of all of this, it 
seems to us a sound methodology to always ask what were the structural, proximate and triggering factors in 
a particular conflict and to consider whether there are important things peacebuilders might consider doing 
about any of these in the cause of future prevention. We could be wrong, however, and the Peacebuilding 
Compared project will examine whether peace is more sustained after wars where more of the (a) consensus 
and (b) contested, structural and proximate factors in the conflict are addressed. 
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well in programs to reduce it. Few developing countries have courts of law in 
their capital as professional and independent as the Solomons’ and few have as 
professional and independent a central bank. 
A diagnosis that correctly yet sweepingly says that a large part of the problem 
was a weak state does not help. It does not help because all states have their 
weaknesses and many of those weaknesses are irrelevant to the onset of armed 
conflict. A mostly strong state that has specific weaknesses, such as Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq and George W. Bush’s United States, can get itself into needlessly 
nasty conflicts because of those weaknesses. The question is which specific state 
weaknesses that drive conflict are fixable. Then the need is to work with locals 
to help to fix them. And one might add that there is a need to diagnose which 
specific non-state institutions encourage violence and to work with locals to 
help reform them—a whole-of-society as opposed to whole-of-government 
approach. 
RAMSI was slow and limited in learning to conduct that kind of diagnosis. In 
its early years, it was not responsive to the specificities of the weaknesses it 
found—nor did it respond to the identification of strengths by building out 
from them. It did not follow a responsive strategy of ‘pick problems and fix 
them; pick strengths and expand them’ (Braithwaite 2008:115–26). First, it had a 
statebuilding mind-set, so that assisting with village development, for example, 
was not in its sights. Its diagnosis being that a weak state was the problem, it 
instead set out to strengthen what it saw as the core institutions of the state: 
the institutions of law and order, the finance ministry, state accountability 
institutions and the institutions of the Public Service (including administration 
of the Parliament). The names of the RAMSI pillars capture this core-of-the-state 
ethos: ‘law and justice’, ‘economic governance’ and ‘machinery of government’. 
Yet leaving the Solomons with a prison administration with much improved 
security professionalism is a less valuable legacy than helping to leave it with 
an improved land administration would have been. By this we mean a land 
administration that solves some of the problems of land injustice that fuelled 
the conflict or that resolves the insecurity of land tenure that shackles economic 
development (Fitzpatrick and Monson 2009). ‘Registration of customary 
land by tribes/clans’ has been on the list of the ‘Demands by the Bona Fide 
and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’ from 1988 to this day (Parliamentary 
Inquiry 2009:198). Malaitans have different perspectives on the land law and 
administration solutions needed, but agree with their adversaries that this was a 
root case that must be addressed. It was not part of the RAMSI methodology to 
go back to the Bona Fide Demands to consider which of them should be picked 
up as peacebuilding priorities.2
2 This is not to deny that some of the Bona Fide Demands were implausibly tall orders—such as relocating 
the national capital. 
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At one level, it was reasonable of RAMSI planners to believe that they could not 
fix everything and that it was best to concentrate on a finite set of challenges and 
tackle them well. But a more attuned, limited set of challenges might have been 
the specificities with the best chance of preventing recurrence. For almost none 
of these challenges are internationals the most effective players (one exception 
being deployment of soldiers). The question is where internationals can best 
add value to local efforts to fix the problems that matter most. That is not the 
question the planners of RAMSI asked. It was also not the way Prime Minister 
Howard and Foreign Minister Downer of Australia framed their intervention 
strategy. 
A positive development in terms of a return to the kind of specificity of 
peacebuilding analysis that we found the National Peace Council to be doing 
before it was closed has occurred with the recent Solomon Islands Parliamentary 
Inquiry (2009) into RAMSI. Its report focused in quite a systematic way—on 
the basis of an impressive body of testimony from across the archipelago—on 
what it concluded were root causes of the conflict that should be addressed. The 
Special Coordinator of RAMSI and the high commissioners of Australia and New 
Zealand all testified that they did not see it as their responsibility to address the 
root causes (Parliamentary Inquiry 2009:205), which the inquiry accepted. The 
members of the inquiry agreed that it was the responsibility of the Solomon 
Islands Government to do so. They concluded that the first step of the way 
forward is for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to recommend an 
approach to tackling root causes and other conflict-prevention priorities. Then, 
the next step is for the Solomon Islands Government to assert leadership in its 
response to the commission’s findings. This does indeed seem a way forward at 
the time of writing. Once that Solomon Islands government leadership to tackle 
key risks and build on key peacebuilding strengths has been grasped, one might 
hope for a policy shift to supporting those Solomons priorities on the part of 
Australia and New Zealand. Persevering with core pillars of statebuilding as 
donor priorities would then surely be inferior to that responsiveness. 
Learning the craft of peace
RAMSI started work in 2003 with a clarity of focus on three core pillars of 
the state that many modern statebuilders would find admirable. RAMSI was 
not monolithic, however. Many within the mission lost sight of that clarity of 
focus. In the jargon of the field, those who lauded the initial RAMSI template of 
statebuilding pillars would say ‘mission creep’ set in. We suggest it was mission 
learning that set in among those who broke ranks with statebuilding templates 
and that RAMSI’s non-monolithic qualities were its saving grace. Actually, one 
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of the things many RAMSI personnel learnt was how to constrict the mission’s 
involvement in certain areas and allow local actors to expand their peacebuilding 
ambitions. 
A key example is the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in 2009. For years this had been government policy, and even before RAMSI it 
had been a bottom-up priority of the church and civil society networks. Before 
2009, RAMSI put considerable energy into resisting a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission so as to maintain focus on building its three pillars. Australian 
thinking was that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission would give ‘mixed 
messages’ concerning the core criminal enforcement, rule-of-law focus of the 
mission. An officer of the Commonwealth Secretariat recalled that ‘we received 
repeated requests, starting around 2003 [from the Solomon Islands Government], 
for advice on comparative models of truth and reconciliation processes from 
other Commonwealth countries’. When the secretariat dropped into Canberra 
on the way to offer such assistance, 
Canberra had expressed alarm at the idea of a formal truth commission…I 
was left in no uncertain mind by Canberra and the High Commissioner 
in Honiara, and the head of RAMSI, that I should let the request from 
Solomons for comparative TRC ideas just bubble along. This was 
considerable pressure…given Australia is an important Commonwealth 
country too. 
By 2009, Australia and RAMSI had stopped all resistance to a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and were even offering support. Does this mean 
RAMSI had lost its way, drifting dangerously into mission creep? We would 
rather say that RAMSI had learned to listen. The learning diffused RAMSI’s focus 
little because locals asserted the leadership over the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission model they wanted and called in most of the outside help from 
the UNDP and the International Centre for Transitional Justice, not from 
RAMSI. Other examples from the pages of our book of how RAMSI learned to 
be responsive to peacebuilding specificities articulated by local voices include 
the following.
• RAMSI withdrew from the police posts where local voices said they were 
least needed. It did so in a way that left behind the physical assets that 
local police said they needed to remain effective, also learning lessons from 
policing failures that RAMSI police leaders had experienced in Timor-Leste 
on this matter. 
• RAMSI had a defensible point of view on the dangers of federalism reform as 
something that might fragment the cost-effectiveness and accountability of 
a small state, and compound opportunities for corruption. Belatedly, RAMSI 
leaders recognised that this might be their view, but they could not keep the 
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lid on a federalism debate that most Solomon Islands leaders wanted. So it 
eased its resistance to that federalism conversation. 
• RAMSI listened to the community critique that its law enforcement had 
been excessively focused on visible militants and insufficiently focused on 
shadowy ‘big fish’. Some quite big fish were put behind bars after 2006 and 
this critique diminished somewhat.
• RAMSI listened to the critique of Sir Peter Kenilorea, and indeed of the 
nation’s two most recent prime ministers, that policing was becoming too 
Western and too Honiara centred, supporting the development of a part-time 
village constable program with advice from a Bougainvillean with experience 
of their village auxiliary police program. Or at least some key players in 
RAMSI listened.
• When something positive was accomplished in policing, RAMSI public 
relations shifted away from publicising RAMSI’s contribution to praising the 
Solomon Islands Police Force in order to build community confidence and 
trust in their own policing institution (as opposed to public relations for 
RAMSI). 
• AusAID staff within RAMSI have supported a renewed shift to village-based 
development assistance informed by village voices. 
• RAMSI police—or some of them—learned that they had mismanaged the 
riots outside Parliament and on the streets of Honiara in 2006. They realised 
there were things they needed to learn from the wisdom of indigenous 
policing practices that had many times in the past prevented that kind of 
rioting from spinning out of control. They also learned lessons from formed 
police units in nations with wider experience of riot control than Australia 
and New Zealand. 
How did this learning happen? RAMSI leaders could be as defensive as those 
of any peace operation. And many were so defensive that they learnt little from 
their own mistakes, blaming them on local incompetence. Yet a strength from 
quite early on was that RAMSI built in a commitment to evaluation modalities 
that would allow it to learn from its internal and external critics. The result 
was a culture of grudging, if sometimes slow, responsiveness to critique. This 
was evident at a conference organised by The Australian National University in 
Canberra in 2006. Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, an Australian journalist married 
to a Solomon Islander who had lived in the country for many years, delivered a 
scathing account of RAMSI’s unresponsiveness to local voices at the conference. 
RAMSI police leaders were furious after her presentation, asking pointed 
questions about who had the bright idea of inviting such an unfair critic. Within 
days of follow-up conversations with those police leaders and then others in the 
Australian Government, RAMSI had made one of its best personnel decisions: 
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hiring O’Callaghan as a communications adviser. From that office, she helped 
push RAMSI into countless community relations listening projects touring the 
villages over the next four years.
One of the criticisms O’Callaghan made of RAMSI police that day was of 
inadequate training in the culture and languages of the countries to which 
Australian police were deployed. That situation has greatly improved since 2006, 
with Pacific islander trainers working at the Majura International Deployment 
Group headquarters of the Australian Federal Police, more apt scenario training, 
improved post-rotation debriefing and sharing of lessons with the next rotation 
of personnel. Past antagonisms and mutual misunderstandings between 
AusAID, police, military and non-Australian components of RAMSI have been 
partially remedied by extended placements of AusAID, military and foreign 
trainers at Majura and placements of AFP officers in AusAID and at Australia’s 
military peacekeeper training centre. Both high-level and low-level committee 
structures within RAMSI on the ground have also been adapted to foster cross-
cultural learning not only between foreigners and Solomon Islanders but also 
to foster police responsiveness to the culture of development agencies and vice 
versa. Many Australian RAMSI officers do not learn from Pacific island and New 
Zealand contingents, but most return from RAMSI enriched by what they have 
learnt not only from Solomon Islanders but also from the inhabitants of other 
Pacific islands. 
This learning has also been institutionalised at a higher level by continuous 
Pacific Islands Forum reviews of RAMSI.3 Even more important have been 
reviews conducted by the Parliament of the Solomon Islands (especially the 
one in 2009), which incorporated televised engagements with citizens on all the 
main islands of the nation. The People’s Surveys (McMurray 2008) that were 
part of RAMSI’s performance indicator reviews also generated more systematic 
public opinion feedback on where citizens were more and less disappointed with 
what RAMSI was doing. The lively local mass media also pushed productively 
for greater RAMSI responsiveness. We hypothesise that it has been RAMSI’s 
learning to be more responsive that has maintained the high public support for 
it in those surveys. 
In sum, a feedback and responsiveness culture was gradually institutionalised 
within RAMSI and by the Solomon Islands state and civil society. On all fronts, 
the most important way responsiveness took more steps forward than backwards 
was by creating spaces in which RAMSI leaders could leave their Honiara 
compound to enter dialogue in villages and towns. There were, however, certainly 
3 These occurred from 2007 under the auspices of the Enhanced Consultative Mechanism among RAMSI, 
the Solomon Islands Government and the Pacific Islands Forum. See: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/
doc/1G1-165067373.html> (viewed 29 June 2010). 
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backward steps, such as cutting funding from the National Peace Council. The 
result of this dialogue is the ‘peacebuilding creep’ we are describing in this 
conclusion as something different from ‘mission creep’. In these spaces where 
dialogue was enabled, RAMSI became responsive to suggestions as to who 
would be best able to do what. Perhaps it was the church rather than RAMSI 
which should advance this agenda; perhaps it was chiefs who should be given 
modest resources to support that agenda rather than national or foreign elites in 
the capital; perhaps a Truth and Reconciliation Commission supported by the 
UNDP could take on another, and so on. There were also timing issues in such 
collaborative dialogue: ‘Last year [a particular group] was my most appropriate 
partner on this challenge, next year you will be the better partner; can we 
work together as partners on this next year?’ Rather than mission creep, this 
was mission creativity. In part, it allowed societal creep onto RAMSI’s agenda 
and far beyond, including onto some of the neglected specificities and needed 
diagnostics of contextual peacebuilding. 
Figure 10.1 RAMSI Special Coordinator James Batley receives a gift of betel-
nut from a community elder of Chief Moro’s village on the Weather Coast in 




Responsiveness to local context and local voices was a slow, sometimes 
backtracking process for RAMSI. We think there might be some inevitability 
about this. We wonder if the reason policing of the colonial era seemed more 
responsive to the realities of Solomon Islands societies than policing of the RAMSI 
era was simply that colonial policing had been making mistakes, evolving and 
learning from local context for longer. We do not have historical data from the 
evolution of colonial policing in Solomon Islands to support this inference. We 
simply find it an interesting hypothesis to support our future empirical work 
on this question. 
We do not know of examples of weak states progressing in a linear fashion to 
become strong states in matters of years, as opposed to decades or centuries. 
The durations of international peace operations are measured not in decades 
or centuries, sometimes not even years, but in months. So we might simply say 
that the experience of history at this stage of Peacebuilding Compared is that 
learning how to be a strong state is always a slow dawn. So we must be humble 
in what we expect in a few years. Some of the kinds of responsiveness on 
which we have lamented slowness could be challenges we might never expect 
a peace operation to meet. Consider responsiveness to the criticism of locking 
up lots of bit players while letting the ‘big fish’ off. Even the most commercially 
sophisticated economies that have extremely strong states—the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany—take long years to build cases for 
criminal prosecutions against ‘big fish’. And then their prosecutions frequently 
fail. Hence, it seems unrealistic to expect a struggling transitional justice system 
with limited technical support from donors to have this capacity during the 
short life of a peace operation. RAMSI was an unusual mission in lasting more 
than a few years; and it was only after a few years that it locked up some really 
big fish. Hence, even though most of the big fish about which Solomon Islanders 
remain concerned roam free, we might still regard RAMSI as extraordinarily 
successful in its responsiveness on this matter. Certainly, RAMSI achieved some 
prosecutorial results against major targets more quickly than the International 
Criminal Court has done, or could do. 
The kinds of learning we have been describing are inevitably slow and perhaps 
would be possible only with a persistent and well-resourced intervention such 
as RAMSI. For a less well-resourced peace operation of shorter duration than 
RAMSI, the ‘slow-food’ (Boege 2006; Bowden et al. 2009) approach of the ‘light 
intervention’ in Bougainville (Regan 2010) has considerable advantages in its 
different approach to learning. Bougainville saw countless waves of patient 
bottom-up reconciliation built on previous waves, expanding the geographical 
reach of the peace and the breadth and depth of renewal across society. The 
architecture of the top-down peace settlement was also sequenced, with linkages 
that required one side to meet a commitment before the other side would deliver 
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their next undertaking in an agreed sequence (Regan 2008; Wolfers 2006). This 
sequenced architecture was a slow creation of Bougainvilleans themselves, with 
drafting assistance from a tiny clique of foreign advisors. It only began as a 
successful peace process on the ashes of a number of previous peace agreements 
that had failed. The contribution of the international peacekeepers was a small 
fraction of RAMSI in numbers, duration, budget and scope of operations (see 
Braithwaite et al. 2010b). There was in Bougainville nothing approaching the 
ambition John Howard and Alexander Downer took into Solomon Islands—as 
revealed in our interviews—of staying until a credible state was built to replace 
a failed state. 
The role of peacekeepers was nevertheless extremely important in enabling 
the slow cooking of peace by and for the people of Bougainville. It became 
slow food that filled their stomachs with wan bel (‘one belly’, actually meaning 
harmonised relationships) that they savoured and secured because they, rather 
than the foreign peacemakers, owned it. The peacekeepers gave confidence 
to combatants who were afraid to meet to reconcile before they arrived; they 
created safe spaces at crucial times in which the peace could mature. 
We do see one choice for internationals, then, as a slow-food approach, in which 
peacekeepers keep guns and spoilers out of the kitchen. And another choice is a 
slow-learning approach in which a multidimensional peace operation gradually 
comes to terms with the challenges of statebuilding over many years. When the 
latter path is taken, our analysis internal to the Solomon Islands case supports 
the comparative conclusion of Howard (2008) that the responsiveness and 
mission learning that we call ‘peacebuilding creep’ is the key factor that turns 
failing aspects of the mission into more successful ones. But we also conclude 
RAMSI could have adapted to the contextual challenges faster had it gone in 
with a radically different initial framing of the mission. 
Reframing for faster, fuller responsiveness
We have argued that a strength of RAMSI is that it created spaces for dialogue 
where it could learn to be responsive to local agenda setting. It falteringly, 
yet increasingly, became a learning organisation, partly because of some good 
early design work on continuous reviews and performance evaluation that was 
responsive to feedback from Solomon Islanders. 
We have also concluded that RAMSI’s fundamental weakness was that at 
first it framed the intervention with the wrong question. This was: how do 
we build the fundamental pillars of a state that has failed? Alexander Downer 
framed it even more counterproductively in our interview as staying until the 
intervention had ‘re-engineered’ the Solomon Islands state. Our argument has 
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been that there were many dimensions to this error. We also note as an aside that 
it follows from our analysis that it is possible for a mission to be motivated by an 
even more counterproductive framing question than the one RAMSI had—for 
example: ‘How do we achieve regime change?’ The most important two errors of 
the RAMSI framing were, first, that it was blind to the strengths of the Solomon 
Islands state and society as manifest in village institutions, churches, women’s 
networks, sporting organisations and much more that delivered human security 
to most villages even at the height of the conflict. Second, it did not take as a 
starting point a diagnosis of the specificities of the root causes of the conflict. 
So what might have been a sensible framing? We suggest three questions that 
might have formed a better starting frame for a collaborative peace process.
1. What is currently working to provide most people in Solomon Islands a 
high level of community safety and human security, and how might these 
strengths be supported?
2. What were structural and proximate factors that contributed to the conflict 
(as in Table 8.1) and how might these be remedied?
3. What new risks to the peace do locally knowledgeable people fear (such as 
revenue collapse as a result of ending log exports)? What can be done to 
hedge these risks?
Assiduously and collaboratively working at answering these questions cannot 
secure fast and full responsiveness in peacebuilding. Yet we contend they are 
simpler questions that could have delivered quicker specificity of targeting 
than the more abstract ambition of building core pillars of a state stigmatised as 
having failed. Or worse, regime change followed by who knows what?
We construe successful peacebuiding as a craft. A craftsperson does not follow 
a template. That is what factories do when they make a piece of furniture, for 
example. When a craftsperson makes furniture, there is no recipe that says do 
this much planing, this much sawing, gluing, sanding. The craft is a creative, 
evolutionary practice rather than a templated one. Furniture making as craft is 
about looking at how the piece is evolving in the process of the craft, how to 
go with the grain by now planing some more here but not there. As Sparrow 
(2000:201), from whom we have adapted the furniture metaphor, puts it, being 
a craft means resisting the idea of work being organised around tools; tools are 
organised around work. Furniture making is a solitary craft, though one learnt 
in communities of practice, and through apprenticeship, just as peacebuilding 
is. Peacebuilding is, however, a collaborative rather than a solitary craft. A 
richer analogy might be to the craft of the musician in an orchestra. The first 
violin is collaborating up to the conductor, down to the other violins, laterally 
to the woodwind section and last, but far from least, she is profoundly attuned 
to the emotional effects of the music in causing the audience to gasp, laugh, cry 
Pillars	and	Shadows
164
or lapse to serenity. A collaborative craft is not about following a fixed mandate 
because creative success turns on hearing and seeing opportunities to connect 
creation to positive human emotions. ‘We would not have great symphony 
orchestras if conductors focused only on keeping musicians from playing out of 
tune’ (Heimer 1997). 
But is the sheet of music played by a musician a template? Well, yes; neither 
the craft of peacebuilding nor the musical craft is a template-free zone. In this 
volume, we have referred to many templates: the software in the Solomon Islands 
Customs Division that makes it impossible to change certain fields on the customs 
valuation without leaving behind your electronic signature, and completely 
impossible to change other fields, is a nice example of a sharply prescriptive 
template. What our conclusion resists is an international template that is an 
overarching constraint on where a mission cannot go and must go on questions 
of governance development. A mission needs a mandate that empowers and sets 
limits on how and why peacekeepers can arrest people, use different levels of 
force and take over certain functions from a sovereign government for an agreed 
period. It need not be a mandate that rules out forms of development assistance 
agreed in local dialogues and falling within the competence and budgetary 
capability of the mission to support with other partners. Accountability of a 
peace operation is not best assessed as compliance with the letter of a prescriptive 
mandate, but more in the way that some accountability was achieved for RAMSI, 
with Pacific Islands Forum and Solomon Islands Parliament hearings and reports, 
community surveys, measurement and reporting of good and bad outcomes 
and robust debate in local media. So perhaps we learn to see elements of the 
peacebuilding craft from the solitary furniture maker, and other elements from 
the symphony metaphor, but we get closer to the craft mentality by pondering 
jazz improvisation. Musical scripts are used and adapted continuously, but in 
ways generated by interactive learning from the moves of other musicians in an 
ensemble and from audience reactions. That is not to say there are no limits to 
the mandate of the jazz musician; however good you are, you cannot jump on 
the stage and take over someone else’s gig!
The craft of peacebuilding is one of collaborative learning, of getting the timing 
right, deciding which different sets of collaborators should be assembled at 
different times to work sequentially on new problems. It is the craft of not 
playing the grand finale to the concert before the audience has begun to warm 
to the music, of not being mandated to stage an election until citizens have 
begun to believe in democracy. It is an uncharted social process engaging many 




The pillars of great public buildings in capitals of the West symbolise the 
solidity of the state. It is an odd kind of learning from ancient Greek and 
Roman statebuilding that the West sent architects to Athens and Rome to draw 
templates of the only residues of those republics that stood: the pillars that once 
held up the rubble around them. Of course, the pillars were a misleading symbol 
of how the architectures of ancient states and more modern ones were gradually 
cobbled together over centuries. 
Part of our analysis in this book has been that developing states need to pay 
attention not just to building neat pillars but also to the messy business of 
managing shadow states (Reno 1995) that fracture and corrupt those pillars. In the 
Solomons case, the shadow economy of logging and a complex of relationships 
among foreign business and diplomatic interests and local politicians and 
militants have shadowed and recurrently opened cracks in the architecture of 
the state. We have concluded that RAMSI’s contribution to improving that kind 
of management has been modest. 
The particular way RAMSI set about repairing and constructing pillars of the 
Solomons state was by shadowing each key functionary of the pillar with an 
expatriate—a dual-desk approach. At first, RAMSI officers directly operated 
core organs of government, especially the security and finance sectors. This was 
necessary and successful in stabilising the society. Then the strategy was for 
these in-line expatriates gradually to build the capacity of their counterpart 
at their dual desk until they were ready to take over completely. We have 
concluded this was mostly not successful because outstanding operational 
police and operational finance bureaucrats were not always good trainers 
of their counterparts. They were often prone to frustration at the inferior 
education or experience of those they shadowed and to taking over again as 
soon as something was done badly. RAMSI frequently did not apply the basic 
lesson of peacebuilding that something done tolerably well by locals is always 
better than something done extremely well by outsiders. 
In any case, as Bayley and Perito (2010) and Wilson (2010) have argued in relation 
to police building, it is better for operational peacekeepers to be replaced by 
management consultants experienced in building police institutions and police 
academy experts who set up training for local trainers who do the in-line 
training in the language, and using the cultural scripts, familiar to those who are 
trained. It is an odd theory of how to build an institution to train all members of 
the institution one by one before there is an architecture those individuals can 
inhabit. Much more than training is needed in a police force to build logistical 
capability, personnel and promotion systems, transport and communication 
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systems, data processing, police accommodation, secure armouries and many 
other management systems. So we suggest it was a flawed conception of how 
to build the pillars of the state to put outsiders in to run them in their way 
and then to rely so heavily on those same individuals to remake themselves 
as trainers of counterparts to run those pillars in ways that locals felt would 
be sustainable. As Bu Wilson has said to us, quoting Ed Rees, ‘[w]e would not 
think it sensible to build a health system by flying a thousand doctors into a 
country, so why would we think that was the way to build a police service?’ (see 
further Wilson 2010:185). 
The Solomons case reinforces the lesson from previous research that a boom-
and-bust economy is a threat to peace (N. Ferguson 2006) and increases the 
risk of crime waves (Fischer 1999:Appendix N). Extreme poverty is a structural 
driver of armed conflict (Collier 2007), but even rich countries suffer more wars 
during periods of history punctuated by extreme boom and bust (like the period 
from the 1890s to 1939). Boom and bust in an economy in which the dominant 
exports—logs and fish—have been more in the shadow economy than in the 
formal economy of taxpaying have cashed up both foreign and indigenous 
corruption, contributing to unusually unstable government coalitions. 
The current boom that took off after 2003 is not just a logging boom; it is also 
a boom in donor funding triggered by RAMSI. What a double tragedy it will 
be if, just as RAMSI created the security that amplified the 2004–10 logging 
boom, it amplifies the bust of a final collapse of logging stocks when that bust 
coincides with RAMSI’s exit. RAMSI succeeded with locals in getting guns 
off the street and in securing macroeconomic stability in the short term. But 
prospects for long-run peace and political stability are slim if there is not long-
run macroeconomic stability, no matter how well statebuilding and incarceration 
of militants are executed. Shadow governments could unravel the state again if 
the specific grievances that led to conflict continue to be swept under the carpet.
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Appendix 
Numbers and types of people interviewed, Solomon Islands case
Elected official 15
Civil servant/judge 26
Political leader of oppositional group 1
IFM/GRA combatant 5
MEF combatant 10
Police Joint Operation coup participant 2
Other Solomon Islands Police Force 4
RAMSI military—Australia 7
RAMSI military—New Zealand 7
RAMSI military—Fiji 3
RAMSI military—Papua New Guinea 2
RAMSI police—Australia 25
RAMSI police—New Zealand 5
RAMSI police—Vanuatu 4
RAMSI police—Papua New Guinea 3
RAMSI police—Fiji 1












Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of 




International organisations (United Nations, World 
Bank, and so on)
8
Researcher/university academic 2
Victim/refugee (dozens in other categories are refugees) 2
Other 0
Total interviews 240
Total people interviewed 258
169
References 
Akin, David 1999 ‘Compensation and the Melanesian state: why the Kwaio keep 
claiming’, The Contemporary Pacific 11(1), 35–67.
Alasia, Sam 2008 ‘Rainbows across the mountains: the first post-RAMSI general 
elections’, in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds), Politics and State 
Building in Solomon Islands, Canberra: ANU E Press.
Allen, Matthew 2006 ‘Dissenting voices: local perspectives on the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 21(2), 194–
201.
Allen, Matthew 2007 Greed and grievance in the conflict in Solomon Islands 
1998–2003, PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Allen, Matthew 2008 ‘Politics of disorder: the social unrest in Honiara’, in 
Sinclair Dinnen and Steward Firth (eds), Politics and State Building in Solomon 
Islands, Canberra: ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press.
Allen, Matthew 2009a Research proposal: the political economy of logging in 
Solomon Islands, Canberra: The Australian National University. 
Allen, Matthew 2009b ‘Resisting RAMSI: intervention, identity and symbolism 
in Solomon Islands, Oceania 79(1), 1–17.
Allen, Matthew (forthcoming) ‘The political economy of logging in Solomon 
Islands’, in R. Duncan and S. Pollard (eds), Strengthening Pacific Economic 
Analysis, Manila and Canberra: Asian Development Bank and The Australian 
National University.
Allen, Matthew and Sinclair Dinnen 2010, ‘The North down under: antinomies 
of conflict and intervention in Solomon Islands’, Conflict,Security & 
Development 10(3), 299–327. 
Amnesty International 2000 Solomon Islands: A forgotten conflict, London: 
Amnesty International. 
Amnesty International 2004 Solomon Islands Women Confronting Violence, 




Amnesty International 2009 Solomon Islands: the truth and reconciliation 
commission cannot work in isolation, Public statement, Amnesty 
International, London, viewed 29 April 2009, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/ASA43/001/2009/en>
Anderson, Tim 2008 The Limits of RAMSI, Sydney: AID Watch. 
Aqorau, Transform 2001 ‘Sustainable management and development of Solomon 
Islands fishery resources: new directions in fisheries policy’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 16(2), 120–6.
Aqorau, Transform 2008 ‘Crisis in Solomon Islands: foraging for new direction’, 
in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds), Politics and State Building in 
Solomon Islands, Canberra: ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press. 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 2007 Aid 
Activities in Solomon Islands, Canberra: Australian Agency for International 
Development, viewed 16 April 2007, <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/
cbrief.cfm?DCon=5714_5074_8646_2331_4632andCountryID=16andRegio
n=SouthAsia>
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 2008 Violence 
Against Women in Melanesia and East Timor: Building on global and regional 
promising approaches, Canberra: Australian Agency for International 
Development.
Averre, Kenneth Hall 2006 Pre-trial incarceration in Solomon Islands and the 
reasonableness of its length: a post conflict intervention context, Paper 
presented to the 20th International Conference of the International Society 
for the Reform of Criminal Law, Brisbane, 2–6 June 2006.
Averre, Kenneth Hall 2008 The Tension Trials—A defence lawyer’s perspective 
of post conflict intervention in Solomon Islands, Canberra: State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project, The Australian National University. 
Banks, Glenn 2005 ‘Linking resources and conflict the Melanesian way’, Pacific 
Economic Bulletin 20(1), 185–91. 
Batten, Aaron and Satish Chand 2008 ‘Rolling RAMSI forward: some ideas from 
the literature’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 23(1), 128–46. 
Bayley, David H. and Robert M. Perito 2010 The Police in War: Fighting 
insurgency, terrorism, and violent crime, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. 
Bennett, Judith A. 1987 Wealth of the Solomons: A history of a Pacific archipelago, 




Bennett, Judith A. 1993 ‘“We do not come here to be beaten”: resistance and the 
plantation system in Solomon Islands to World War II’, in Brij V. Lal, Doug 
Munro and Edward D. Beechert (eds), Plantation Workers: Resistance and 
accommodation, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Bennett, Judith A. 2000 Pacific Forest: A history of resource control and contest 
in Solomon Islands, c. 1800–1997, Cambridge and Leiden: The White Horse 
Press and Brill Academic Publishers. 
Berman, Bruce J. 1998 ‘Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: the politics of 
uncivil nationalism’, African Affairs 97, 305–41.
Bevir, Mark and R. Rhodes 2003 Interpreting British Governance, London: 
Routledge.
Boege, Volker 2006 Bougainville and the discovery of slowness: an unhurried 
approach to state-building in the Pacific, Occasional Paper Series No. 3, 
Brisbane: The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.
Bowden, Brett, Hilary Charlesworth and Jeremy Farrall 2009 ‘Introduction’, in 
B. Bowden, H. Charlesworth and J. Farrall (eds), The Role of International 
Law in Rebuilding Societies after Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Braithwaite, John 2005 Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Braithwaite, John 2008 Regulatory Capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it 
work better, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Braithwaite, John, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson and Leah Dunn 2010a 
Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and reconciliation in Indonesian peacebuilding, 
Canberra: ANU E Press.
Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy and Leah Dunn 2010b 
Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing peace in 
Bougainville, Canberra: ANU E Press.
Brigg, Morgan 2009 ‘Wantokism and state building in Solomon Islands: a 
response to Fukuyama’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 24(3), 148–61.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2006 Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices in Solomon Islands, Washington, DC: US Department of State, 
viewed 17 August 2006, <www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61627.htm>
Pillars	and	Shadows
172
Butler, A. 2006 ‘An Australian government perspective’, in Sinclair Dinnen and 
Stewart Firth (eds), Politics and State-Building in Solomon Islands, Canberra: 
ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press.
Carroll, Toby and Shahar Hameiri 2007 ‘Good governance and security: the 
limits of Australia’s new aid programme’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 37(4), 
410–30.
Carter, Richard 2004 Lessons learnt from indigenous methods of peacemaking 
in Solomon Islands, with particular reference to the role of the Melanesian 
Brotherhood and the religious communities, Unpublished document, 
Christian Peacemaking, Honiara.
Carter, Richard 2006 In Search of the Lost: The death and life of seven peacemakers 
of the Melanesian Brotherhood, Norwich, UK: Canterbury Press. 
Castells, Manuel 1996, The Information Age: Economy, society and culture. Volume 
1: The rise of the network society, Oxford: Blackwell.
Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz 1999 Africa Works—Disorder as a political 
instrument, Oxford: James Currey and Indiana University Press.
Chand, Satish 2002 ‘Conflict to crisis in Solomon Islands’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 17(1), 154–9. 
Clastres, P. 2007 Society Against the State: Essays in political anthropology, New 
York: Zone Books. 
Cohen, Stanley 1972 Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the Mods and 
Rockers, St Albans, Hertfordshire: Paladin.
Collier, Paul 2007 The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and 
what can be done about it, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Commission of Inquiry 2007 Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 Civil 
Unrest in Honiara, Second Interim Report, Honiara: Department of the Prime 
Minister, Government of Solomon Islands. 
Commission of Inquiry 2009 Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 Honiara 
Civil Unrest in Honiara: Recommendations, conclusions and findings, Honiara: 
Government of Solomon Islands.
Corrin, Jennifer 2008 ‘Ples bilong mere: law, gender and peace-building in 
Solomon Islands’, Feminist Legal Studies 16, 169–94. 
Corris, Peter 1973 Passage, Port and Plantation: A history of Solomon Islands 
labour migration, 1870–1914, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press.
References	
173
Cullen, Francis T. 1994 ‘Social support as an organizing concept for criminology: 
presidential address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences’, Justice 
Quarterly 11(4), 527–59.
Dauvergne, Peter 1998 ‘Globalisation and deforestation in the Asia-Pacific’, 
Environmental Politics 7(4), 114–35. 
Dauvergne, Peter 1999 ‘Corporate power in the forests of the Solomon Islands’, 
Pacific Affairs 71(4), 524–46.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004 Solomon Islands: Rebuilding 
an island economy, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Commonwealth of Australia.
Diamond, Jared 1997 Guns, Germs and Steel: A short history of everybody for the 
last 13,000 years, London: Vintage.
Dinnen, Sinclair 2002 ‘Winners and losers: politics and disorder in the Solomon 
Islands 2000–2002, Journal of Pacific History 37(3), 285–98. 
Dinnen, Sinclair 2007a ‘A comment on state-building in Solomon Islands’, 
Journal of Pacific History 42(2), 255–63. 
Dinnen, Sinclair 2007b The politics of unrest—external intervention and the 
challenges of state-building in Solomon Islands, Paper presented to Solomon 
Islands: Where to Now?, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, 5 May 2006.
Dinnen, Sinclair 2008a ‘State-building in a post-colonial society: the case of 
Solomon Islands’, Chicago Journal of International Law 9(1), 51–78. 
Dinnen, Sinclair 2008b ‘Dilemmas of intervention and the building of state and 
nation’, in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds), Politics and State Building 
in Solomon Islands, Canberra: ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press. 
Dinnen, Sinclair and John Braithwaite 2009 ‘Reinventing policing through the 
prism of the colonial kiap’, in Peter Grabosky (ed.), Community Policing and 
Peacekeeping, Boca Raton, Fla: CRC Press. 
Duffield, Mark 2002 ‘War as a network enterprise: the new security terrain and 
its implications’, Journal of Cultural Research 6, 153–65. 
Ellison, Graham and Conor O’Reilly 2008 ‘From empire to Iraq and the “war on 
terror”’, Police Quarterly 11(4), 395–425.
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin 2003, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil 
war’, American Political Science Review 97(1), 75–90.
Pillars	and	Shadows
174
Ferguson, James 2006 Global Shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Ferguson, Niall 2006 The War of the World: Twentieth-century conflict and the 
descent of the West, New York: Penguin.
Fifi’i, J. 1989 From Pig-Theft to Parliament: My life between two worlds, Translated 
and edited by Roger M. Keesing, Honiara: Solomon Islands College of Higher 
Education and University of the South Pacific. 
Filer, Colin 1990 ‘The Bougainville rebellion, the mining industry and the process 
of social disorganization in Papua New Guinea’, Canberra Anthropology 13(1), 
1–39. 
Filer, Colin and Martha Macintyre 2006 ‘Grass roots and deep holes: community 
responses to mining in Melanesia’, The Contemporary Pacific 18(2), 215–31. 
Fischer, David Hackett 1999 The Great Wave: Price revolutions and the rhythm of 
history, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Fitzpatrick, Daniel and Rebecca Monson 2009 ‘Balancing rights and norms: 
property programming in East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Bougainville’, 
in Scott Leckie (ed.), Housing, Land and Property Rights in Post-Conflict United 
Nations and Other Peace Operations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
124–52. 
Forsyth, Miranda 2009 A Bird that Flies with Two Wings: Kastom and state 
justice systems in Vanuatu, Canberra: ANU E Press. 
Fraenkel, Jon 2004a The Manipulation of Custom: From uprising to intervention in 
the Solomon Islands, Wellington: Victoria University Press. 
Fraenkel, Jon 2004b ‘Electoral engineering in Papua New Guinea: lessons from 
Fiji and elsewhere’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 19(1), 122–32.
Fraenkel, Jon 2006 ‘Political consequences of Pacific island electoral laws’, 
Demetrius, Canberra: The Australian National University, viewed 5 January 
2009, <http://dspace.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/43135>
Fraenkel, Jon, Matthew Allen and Harry Brock 2010 ‘The resumption of palm-
oil production on Guadalcanal’s northern plains’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 
25(1), 64–75.
Fraenkel, Jon, Anthony Regan and David Hegarty 2008 The dangers of political 
party strengthening legislation in Solomon Islands, SSGM Working Paper 




Frazer, Ian 1985 ‘Circulation and the growth of urban employment amongst 
the To’ambaita, Solomon Islands’, in M. Chapman and R. M. Prothero 
(eds), Circulation in Population Movement: Substance and concepts from the 
Melanesian case, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Frazer, Ian 1997 ‘The struggle for control of Solomon Island forests’, The 
Contemporary Pacific 9(1), 39–72.
Fry, Greg and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka 2008 ‘Political legitimacy and state-
building intervention in the Pacific’, in G. Fry and T. T. Kabutaulaka (eds), 
Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The legitimacy of ‘co-operative 
intervention’, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Fukuyama, Francis 2008 ‘State building in Solomon Islands’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 23(3), 18–34.
Gegeo, David Welchman 2001 ‘Cultural rupture and indigeneity: the challenge 
of (re)visioning “place” in the Pacific’, The Contemporary Pacific 13(2) (Fall), 
491–507. 
Goldsmith, Andrew and Sinclair Dinnen 2007 ‘Transnational police building: 
critical lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands’, Third World Quarterly 
28(6), 1091–109. 
Gordon, Robert J. 1983 ‘The decline of Kiapdom and the resurgence of “tribal 
fighting” in Enga’, Oceania 53, 205–23.
Government of Solomon Islands 2002 Solomon Islands Human Development 
Report 2002: Building a nation, Queensland: Mark Otter. 
Graf, William 1995 ‘The state in the third world’, The Socialist Register 31, 140–
62.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1974 ‘The strength of weak ties’, American Journal of 
Sociology 78(6), 1360–79.
Gray, George 2002 Habuna Momoruqu (the blood of my island): violence and the 
Gudalcanal uprising in Solomon Islands, SSGM Working Paper, Canberra: 
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The Australian National 
University, <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/working_papers/
Tanis-Gray.rtf>
Greenpeace 2008 Securing the Future: An alternative plan for Solomon Island 
forests and economy, Honiara: Greenpeace. 
Pillars	and	Shadows
176
Guddemi, Philip 1997 ‘Continuities, contexts, complexities and transformations: 
local land concepts of a Sepik people affected by mining exploration’, 
Anthropological Forum 7(4), 629–48. 
Hameiri, Shahar 2007 ‘The trouble with RAMSI: reexamining the roots of 
conflict in Solomon Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 19(2), 409–41. 
Hameiri, Shahar 2009a ‘State building or crisis management? A critical analysis 
of the social and political implications of the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands’, Third World Quarterly 30(1), 35–52.
Hameiri, Shahar 2009b ‘Governing disorder: the Australian Federal Police and 
Australia’s new regional frontier’, The Pacific Review 22(5), 549–74.
Harris Rimmer, Susan 2010 Building Democracy After Conflict. Case study: the 
Solomon Islands truth commission, Canberra: Centre for International Justice 
and Governance, The Australian National University. 
Hayward-Jones, Jenny 2008a Beyond good governance: shifting the paradigm for 
Australian aid to the Pacific islands region, Policy Brief, September 2008, 
Sydney: Lowy Institute. 
Hayward-Jones, Jenny 2008b Engineering Political Stability in Solomon Islands: 
Outcomes report, Sydney: Lowy Institute.
Hegarty, David 2003 Peace interventions in the South Pacific: lessons from 
Bougainville and Solomon Islands, Working Paper 2003/4, Canberra: State, 
Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The Australian National 
University.
Hegarty, David, Ron May, Anthony Regan, Sinclair Dinnen, Hank Nelson and 
Ron Duncan 2004a Monitoring peace in Solomon Islands, Working Paper 
01/04, Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The 
Australian National University. 
Hegarty, David, Ron May, Anthony Regan, Sinclair Dinnen, Hank Nelson and 
Ron Duncan 2004b Rebuilding state and nation in Solomon Islands: policy 
options for the Regional Assistance Mission, Working Paper 2004/2, Canberra: 
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The Australian National 
University. 
Heimer, Carol 1997 Legislating responsibility, American Bar Foundation Working 
Paper No. 9711, Chicago: American Bar Foundation.
Herbert, Tania 2007 Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Solomon 
Islands: A report focusing on the presence of the logging industry in a remote 
region, Solomon Islands: Christian Care Centre, Church of Melanesia. 
References	
177
Howard, John 2003 Ministerial statement to Parliament on the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) by the Prime Minister of 
Australia, Parliament House, Canberra, viewed 29 November 2005, <www.
pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech422.html>
Howard, Lise Morjé 2008 UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hviding, Edvard 1996 Guardians of Marovo Lagoon: Practice, place, and politics 
in maritime Melanesia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 
Hviding, Edvard 2003 ‘Contested rainforests, NGOs, and projects of desire in 
Solomon Islands’, International Social Science Journal 178, 539–53.
Ignatieff, Michael 2003 ‘The burden’, The New York Times Magazine, 5 January, 
1, 62.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2007 IMF country report, No. 07/304, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Job, Jenny and Monika Reinhart 2003 ‘Trusting the tax office: does Putnam’s 
thesis relate to tax?’, Australian Journal of Social Issues 38(3), 307–34. 
Jolly, Margaret 2000 ‘Epilogue: further reflections of violence in Melanesia. 
Violence and governance in Melanesia—an introduction’, in Sinclair Dinnen 
and Allison Ley (eds), Reflections on Violence in Melanesia, Sydney and 
Canberra: Hawkins and Asia Pacific Press.
Joseph, Keith and Charles Browne Beu 2008 Church and state in Solomon Islands, 
Discussion Paper 2008/11, Canberra: State, Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Project, The Australian National University. 
Jourdan, Christine 1995a ‘Masta Liu’, in V. Amit-Talai and H. Wulff (eds), Youth 
Cultures: A cross-cultural perspective, London: Routledge.
Jourdan, Christine 1995b ‘Stepping-stones to national consciousness: the 
Solomon Islands case’, in Robert J. Foster (ed.), Nation Making: Emergent 
identities in postcolonial Melanesia, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara 1998 ‘Deforestation and politics in Solomon Islands’, 
in Peter Larmour (ed.), Governance and Reform in the South Pacific, Canberra: 
National Centre for Development Studies. 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara 2001 Beyond ethnicity: the political economy of the 
Guadalcanal crisis in the Solomon Islands, Working Paper 01/01, Canberra: 




Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara 2004 ‘Solomon Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific: 
Political Reviews, Melanesia, (Fall), 393–401. 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara 2006 ‘Crowded stage: actors, actions and issues in 
post-conflict Solomon Islands’, in John Henderson and Greg Watson (eds), 
Securing a Peaceful Pacific, Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press. 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara 2008 ‘Westminister meets Solomons in the Honiara 
riots’, in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds), Politics and State Building 
in Solomon Islands, Canberra: ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press.
Karle, Warren 2004 Conflict in the ‘Happy Isles’: The role of ethnicity in the 
outbreak of violence in Solomon Islands, Monograph Series, No. 5, Canberra: 
Australian Defence College. 
Keesing, Roger M. 1985 ‘Killers, big men, and priests on Malaita: reflections on 
a Melanesian troika system’, Ethnology 24(4), 237–52.
Keesing, Roger M. 1992 Custom and Confrontation: The Kwaio struggle for cultural 
autonomy, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Keesing, Roger M. 1994 ‘Foraging in the urban jungle: notes from the Kwaio 
underground’, Societe des Oceanistes 99, 167–75.
Kenilorea, Peter and Clive Moore (eds) 2008 Tell It As It Is, Taipei: Centre for 
Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS.
Latour, Bruno 1986 ‘The powers of association’, in J. Law (ed.), Power, Action, 
and Belief: A new sociology of knowledge?, Sociological Review Monograph 
32, London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Latour, Bruno 1987 Science in Action: How to follow engineers and scientists 
through society, Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.
Le Billon 2000 ‘The political ecology of transition in Cambodia 1989–1999: war, 
peace and forest exploitation’, Development and Change 31, 785–805.
Leslie, Helen 2002 ‘Gendering conflict and conflict management in the Solomon 
Islands’, Development Bulletin 60, 13–16.
McDougall, Debra 2003 ‘Fellowship and citizenship as models of national 
community: United Church Women’s Fellowship in Ranongga, Solomon 
Islands’, Oceania 74(1/2), 61–80.
McDougall, Debra 2005 ‘The unintended consequences of clarification: 
development, disputing, and the dynamics of community in Ranongga, 
Solomon Islands’, Ethnohistory 52(1), 81–109.
References	
179
Macintyre, Martha 2002 On masculinity and the use of violence in contemporary 
Melanesia, Paper presented to Australian Anthropological Society Annual 
Conference, The Australian National University, Canberra, 3–5 October 2002.
McLeod, Abby 2009 ‘Police capacity development in the Pacific: the challenge 
of local context’, Policing and Society 19(2), 147–60.
McMurray, Christine 2008 People’s Survey 2008, Canberra: ANU Enterprise. 
Maley, William 2009 ‘Democracy and legitimation: challenges in the 
reconstitution of political processes in Afghanistan’, in Brett Bowden, Hilary 
Charlesworth and Jeremy Farrall (eds), The Role of International Law in 
Rebuilding Societies after Conflict: Great expectations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mamdani, Mahmood 1996 Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
legacy of late colonialism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mamdani, Mahmood 1999 ‘Historicizing power and responses to power: indirect 
rule and its reform’, Social Research 66(3), 859–86.
Marshall, Will 2004 ‘Australian lawyer condemns lack of legal rights in the 
Solomon Islands’, World Socialist website, 3 February 2004, viewed 2 August 
2009, <www.wsws.org/articles/2004/>
Meister, Robert 1999 ‘Forgiving and forgetting: Lincoln and the politics of 
national recovery’, in Carla Hesse and Robert Post (eds), Human Rights in 
Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, New York: Zone Books. 
Moore, Clive 2004 Happy Isles in Crisis, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press. 
Moore, Clive 2007 ‘External intervention: the Solomon Islands beyond RAMSI’, 
in M. Anne Brown (ed.), Security and Development in the Pacific Islands: 
Social resilience in emerging states, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Moore, Clive 2008 ‘No more walkabout long Chinatown: Asian involvement in 
the economic and political process’, in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth 
(eds), Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands, Canberra: ANU E Press 
and Asia Pacific Press.
Morgan, Michael 2005 Cultures of dominance: institutional and cultural influences 
on parliamentary politics in Melanesia, Discussion Paper, Canberra: State, 




Muggah Robert 2004 Diagnosing demand: assessing the motivations and means for 
firearms acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, Discussion 
Paper, Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The 
Australian National University.
Naitoro, John 2000 Solomon Islands conflict: demands for historical rectification 
and restorative justice, Update Papers, Canberra: Asia Pacific School of 
Economics and Management, The Australian National University. 
Naitoro, John 2003 Articulating kin groups and mines: the case of the Gold 
Ridge project in the Solomon Islands, PhD dissertation, The Australian 
National University, Canberra. 
National Peace Council (NPC) 2004 Strategic Plan, July 2004 to December 2009, 
Honiara: National Peace Council. 
National Peace Council (NPC) 2006 To Build Lasting Peace in Solomon Islands, 
Honiara: National Peace Council. 
O’Connor, Patrick 2007a Solomon Islands Government defeats no-confidence 
motion, World Socialist Web Site, viewed 2 August 2009, <www.wsws.org/
articles/2007/aug2007/solo-a25.shtml>
O’Connor, Patrick 2007b Solomon Islands Government rebuts Canberra’s child 
sex allegations against Attorney-General, World Socialist Web Site, viewed 
2 October 2009, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/oct2009/moti-o17.
shtml>
O’Connor, Patrick 2009a Evidence backs Julian Moti’s allegation of politically 
motivated charges, World Socialist Web Site, viewed 2 October 2009, <http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2009/oct2009/moti-o17.shtml>
O’Connor, Patrick 2009b Australian Federal Police disclose 1,500 pages of 
documents in Julian Moti case, World Socialist Web Site, viewed 2 October 
2009, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/oct2009/moti-o17.shtml>
Office of the Auditor-General 2007 An auditor-general’s insight into corruption 
in Solomon Islands government, National Parliament Paper No. 48, Honiara: 
Government of Solomon Islands. 
Office of the Special Coordinator 2004 Helpem Fren: RAMSI, a partnership with 
the people of Solomon Islands, Honiara: Office of the Special Coordinator.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2005 Security 
System Reform and Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing.
References	
181
Oxfam 2003 Australian Intervention in the Solomons: Beyond operation Helpem 
Fren. An agenda for development in the Solomon Islands, Melbourne: Oxfam. 
Pacific Islands Forum 2004 Social Impact Assessment of Peace Restoration 
Initiatives in Solomon Islands, Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. 
Parliamentary Inquiry 2009 Parliamentary Inquiry into the Facilitation of 
International Assistance Notice 2003 and RAMSI Intervention, (Chairman 
Hon. Peter Boyers), Honiara: Parliament of Solomon Islands. 
Patrick, Stewart and Kaysie Brown 2007 Greater Than the Sum of its Parts—
Assessing ‘whole of government’ approaches to fragile states, New York: 
International Peace Academy. 
Plunkett, Mark 2003 Stress-Testing Solomon Islands Peace Operation Scenarios, 
Queensland: Griffith University. 
Pollard, Alice A. 2000 ‘Resolving conflict in Solomon Islands: the women for 
peace approach’, Development Bulletin 53, 44–6.
Ponzio, Richard 2005 ‘The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by 
coalitions of the willing’, International Peacekeeping 12(2) (Summer), 173–88. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1993 Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in modern 
Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rawlings, Gregory 2006 Regulating Responsively for Oversight Agencies in the 
Pacific, Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The 
Australian National University.
Regan, Anthony 2008 ‘Sustainability of international peace-building 
interventions—the Bougavinville experience, 1997–2006’, in Greg Fry 
and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds), Intervention and State-Building in the 
Pacific, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Regan, Anthony 2010 Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville, Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Reno, William 1995 Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Reno, William 1998 Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner.
Reno, William 2000 ‘Clandestine economies, violence and states in Africa’, 
Journal of International Affairs 53(2), 433–59.
Pillars	and	Shadows
182
Reno, William 2002 ‘Mafiya troubles, warlord crises’, in Mark R. Beisinger 
and Crawford Young (eds), Beyond State Crisis?, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Rhodes, Roderick 1997 Understanding Governance, Buckingham and 
Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
Roughan, Paul 2004 National Integrity Systems Transparency International 
Country Study Report: Solomon Islands 2004, Vic., Australia: Transparency 
International. 
Roughan, Paul, B. K. Greener-Barcham and Manuhuia Barcham 2006 Where to 
now for RAMSI?, CIGAD Briefing Note 1/2006, Palmerston North, NZ: Centre 
for Indigenous Governance and Development, Massey University. 
Rudé, George 1981 The Crowd in History: A study of popular disturbances in 
France and England, 1730–1848, (Revised edition), London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
Salisbury, R. F. 1962 From Stone to Steel: Economic consequences of technological 
change in New Guinea, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press.
Scales, Ian, Sinclair Dinnen and David Hegarty 2002 Governance at the 
Grassroots:Workshop on participation beyond the centre in Solomon Islands 
15–16 April 2002, Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Project, The Australian National University. 
Scott, James C. 1985 Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance, 
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Scott, Michael W. 2000 ‘Ignorance is cosmos; knowledge is chaos: articulating a 
cosmological polarity in the Solomon Islands’, Social Analysis 44(2), 56–83.
Scott, Michael W. 2007 The Severed Snake: Matrilineages, making place, and a 
Melanesian Christianity in southeast Solomon Islands, Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press. 
Shearing, Clifford and Les Johnston 2005 ‘Justice in the risk society’, The 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 38(1), 25–38.
Skelton, Russell 2006 ‘The hard graft behind the riots’, The Age, 29 April, 1–3. 
Smith, Anthony D. 1991 National Identity, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Sodhi, Gaurav 2008 ‘Five out of ten: a performance report on the Regional 




Solomon Star 2006 ‘Detainees win PM’s heart’, Solomon Star, 28 December 2006.
Sparrow, Malcolm 2000 The Regulatory Craft: Controlling risks, managing 
problems and managing compliance, Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
Steeves, Jeffrey 1996 ‘Unbounded politics in the Solomon Islands: leadership 
and party alignments’, Pacific Studies 19(1), 115–38.
Stritecky, J. M. 2001 Looking through a moral lens: morality, violence and 
empathy in Solomon Islands, PhD dissertation, University of Iowa. 
Tryon, Darrell T. and Brian D. Hackman 1983 Solomon Island Languages: An 
internal classification, Canberra: The Australian National University.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2004 Emerging Priorities in 
Preventing Future Violent Conflict, New York: United Nations Development 
Programme. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005 Solomon Islands Country 
Program, New York: United Nations Development Program, viewed 20 March 
2010 <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=180>
URS Sustainable Development 2006 Solomon Islands national forest resource 
assessment update 2006, Prepared for AusAID and the Department of Forests, 
Environment and Conservation.
Van Klinken, Gerry 2007 Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: 
Small town wars, London: Routledge.
Wainwright, Elsina 2003 Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the future of the 
Solomon Islands, Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Wairiu, Morgan 2004 Forest certification in Solomon Islands, Paper presented to 
Forest Certification in Developing and Transiting Societies Symposium, Yale 
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, New Haven, Conn., 10–11 
June 2004.
Waiwori, Christopher 2006 ‘Quest for political power’, Solomon Star, 10 May 
2006. 
Weber, Eugen 1976 Peasants into Frenchmen, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
White, Geoffrey 2007 Indigenous governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper 
2007/5, Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, The 
Australian National University. 
Pillars	and	Shadows
184
Wielders, Iris 2008 ‘The regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands in global 
perspective’, in Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds), Intervention 
and State-Building in the Pacific: The legitimacy of ‘cooperative intervention’, 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
Wilson, Bu V. E. 2010 Smoke and mirrors: the development of the East Timorese 
police 1999–2009, PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, 
Canberra.
Wolfers, Edward 1983 ‘Centralisation and decentralisation until independence’, 
in Peter Larmour and Sue Tarua (eds), Solomon Islands: Politics and 
government, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific.
Wolfers, Edward P. 2006 Bougainville autonomy—implications for governance and 
decentralisation, Public Policy in Papua New Guinea Discussion Paper Series, 
No. 5, Canberra: The Australian National University.
Wood Report 2005 Report of a Review of Accountability Institutions of Solomon 
Islands by John T. D. Wood, Honiara: Technical Assistance Governance 
Facility for Solomon Islands.
Woodward, Susan L. 2007 ‘Do the root causes of civil war matter? On using 
knowledge to improve peacebuilding interventions’, Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding 1(2), 143–70. 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 2005 A Forest Strategy for Solomon Islands 
2006–2011: Final report from WWF SI forests strategy planning workshop, 
Honiara: World Wide Fund for Nature. 
185
Index
Aceh 9, 58, 92, 128
actors 
 Chinese 101
 civil society 44
 indigenous 57, 77
 international 1n.1
 key 130, 133, 164
 local 2, 44, 157
 non-state 143
 peacemaking 110, 131
 state 143n.7
 war-making 110, 131
Adefuye, Ade 25
Afghanistan 4n.3
Africa 45, 65, 67, 117, 142, 143, 144
 see also Sierra Leone, South Africa
agriculture 3, 17, 18, 55, 118, 123, 
124n.7, 147
aid 4n.3, 32, 33, 48, 82, 112, 143, 146, 
158, 164
Akin, David 47, 99, 100
Alasia, Sam 72n.16, 101n.4
alcohol 69, 92, 93, 98n.2, 99n.3, 100, 124, 
154
Alebua, Ezekiel 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 40, 46, 
55, 71, 81, 84, 85, 103, 110, 113, 128, 
129, 130, 131, 149
Allen, Matthew vii, 5, 7, 20, 24n.2, 
35n.9, 39, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62, 63, 
64n.8, 72n.17, 73, 79, 81, 96, 98, 
114n.2, 116, 119, 120, 123n.6, 126, 
128, 136, 152, 153
amnesties 27, 37, 51, 55, 86, 87, 88, 90, 
138–9
 see also cease-fire, weapons
Amnesty Act 38, 55
Amnesty International 24, 26, 91
amnesty law 87
Anderson, Tim 49, 135, 146
Anglican Church 82
Anglican Melanesian Brothers, see 
Melanesian Brothers 
anomie 5
Aqorau, Transform 72, 121, 145





auditor-general, see Office of the Auditor-
General
Auki 26, 63, 66
Australia 4n.37, 23n.1, 28, 38, 42, 49, 51, 
52, 56, 57n.6, 63, 64n.9, 78, 116, 132, 
136, 137, 139, 141, 153, 156, 157, 158
Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) 41, 57, 
66n.11, 77, 78, 83n.1, 114, 146, 151, 
158, 159
Australian Federal Police (AFP) 64n.9, 
139, 159
Australian Navy 31, 37, 52
Australian Solomons Gold Limited 124
Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI) 49, 50




Bartlett, Alex 29, 46, 55, 64, 84, 85, 86, 
88, 90, 130, 139
Batley, James 65, 160
Batten, Aaron 56
Bayley, David H. 165
Bennett, Judith A. 16, 17, 72n.17, 96, 117
Berman, Bruce J. 67n.12
Bevir, Mark 142
Bible Way Church 83, 84
big-men 16, 71, 97–9, 102, 103–6, 118, 
128
Billy Hilly, Francis 117
Billy, Afu 31
Boege, Volker 2, 161
bottom-up model 77, 78, 82, 91, 93, 
98n.2, 111, 145, 146, 147, 151, 157, 
161
Bougainville 13, 15, 24, 58, 95




 peacebuilding 2, 4, 20, 38, 49, 58, 81, 
82, 91–2, 101–2, 136, 137, 146, 161, 
162
 police 59, 66, 100, 158
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
34–5, 40, 68, 127
Bowden, Brett 2, 161
Braithwaite, John vii, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10n.8, 
23n.1, 25, 41, 49, 67, 68, 70n.14, 81, 
85, 89, 127, 128, 141, 144, 147, 149, 
155, 162
Braithwaite, Valerie 4, 5, 6, 25, 127, 128, 
141, 144, 147
bribery 47, 72, 98, 101, 117, 118, 138, 
152
 see also corruption
Brigg, Morgan 4, 72n.15, 103, 104, 105, 
106, 137
Brock, Harry 24n.2, 126
Brown, Kaysie 76
Browne Beu, Charles 140
Buala peace meeting 27
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor 50n.1




capacity building 44n.3, 56n.5, 57, 58, 
59, 60, 77, 139, 145, 152, 165
Caritas 91
Carroll, Toby 50, 144
Carter, Richard 31, 40, 113n.1, 124, 131, 
132
casinos, see gambling
Castells, Manuel 105, 142
Castles, Shane 139
Catholic Daughters of Mary Immaculate 
Sisters 31
Cawa, Ronnie 84, 85, 116n.3
cease-fire 31, 37, 41n.2, 53
Ceasefire Monitoring Council 41n.2
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 8
Centre for Independent Studies 145, 146
Chabal, Patrick 45
Chan, Sir Thomas 48, 131, 140n.3
Chand, Satish 46, 56, 148
Charlesworth, Hilary 2, 6, 161, 162
China 48, 49, 101, 123, 132
Chinatown 48, 62, 63, 102
Chinese 13, 37, 63, 118, 131, 140–1
 business community 33n.7, 47, 48, 66, 
117, 118, 120n.4
 identity politics 95, 101–2
 see also waku
Choiseul 29, 34
Christian Outreach Centre (COC) 99n.3
church 5, 6, 13, 39, 96, 97, 98n.2, 140, 
144, 163
 associations 45
 peacebuilding 3, 16, 18, 31–2, 111, 
131, 132, 139 
 peace education 42
 reconciliation 44n.3, 82, 83–4, 91, 93, 
146, 157, 160
 weapons surrender to 26
 see also name of church, religion 
Church of Melanesia 69
civil service, see Public Service
civil society 3, 5, 6, 37, 39, 41, 44, 58, 65, 
67, 72, 74, 76–8, 83, 98n.2, 111, 132, 
140, 144, 146–7, 151, 157, 159
 see also Solomon Islands—society
Civil Society Network 37, 111, 132
Civil Society Peace Conference 
Communiqué 83
civil war 8, 16, 87, 106
Clastres, P. 104
climate change 120, 121, 122
 see also environment
Cohen, Stanley 101
Collier, Paul 9, 106, 166
colonialism 6, 17, 18, 35, 66–9, 95, 96, 
98, 104, 109, 140, 161
Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Dealings in Guadalcanal 136
Commission of Inquiry into the April 
2006 Civil Unrest in Honiara 62, 63, 
65, 73, 101
Commonwealth, The 25, 157
Commonwealth Development Corporation 
24n.2





comparativism 2, 6, 8, 9–11, 103, 109, 
119, 135, 138, 144, 147, 157
compensation 5, 20, 23–7, 29, 35, 38, 39, 
44, 45–8, 56, 81, 84, 90, 100, 107, 129, 
141, 147–8, 151, 152, 154
Constitutional Reform Unit 79
Cook Islands 39
Cookson, Michael 4, 5, 6, 25, 127, 128, 
141, 144, 147
copra 17, 18
Corrin, Jennifer 31, 82, 98
Corris, Peter 17
corruption 5, 18, 28, 35n.9, 47, 55–6, 
70–5, 77, 90, 101, 104, 105, 111, 142, 
145, 147, 151, 152, 157, 166
 anti-corruption 5, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 
105, 106, 111, 138, 151, 153
 centralised 44
 police 61
 political 52, 53, 79, 89, 98, 106, 109, 
112, 121, 122, 135, 136–7, 153
 see also bribery, crime
coup d’état 59, 64
 (2000) 21, 26, 27–31, 32, 46, 59, 110, 
117, 129, 130, 141, 149
 see also Malaita Eagle Force—‘joint 
operation’ with police, the ‘Tension’
crime 23, 43, 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 
89, 112, 138, 149, 166
 arson 54, 58, 62, 63, 64, 82, 102, 127, 
149
 domestic violence 55, 66, 124
 embezzlement 5, 55, 71, 91, 92, 112, 
131, 148
 extortion 5, 45, 46, 53, 55, 99, 128, 
148
 financial 71, 101
 fraud 47, 74, 146
 looting 34, 37, 45, 58, 62, 63, 111, 
135, 145
 murder 16, 19, 23, 39, 40, 54, 61, 84, 
87, 99, 123, 129, 138, 139, 149
 organised 38–9, 128
 rape 24, 54n.3, 70, 99n.3, 112
 robbery 35, 45, 55, 128
 sexual assault 57, 64n.9, 139n.2, 152
 theft 45, 51, 52, 54, 56, 66, 69, 82, 90, 
99, 143n.7
 violent 119
 youth 92, 128
 see also bribery, corruption, slavery, 
torture, war crimes 
criminalisation 38, 45, 112
crony capitalism 117
Cullen, Francis T. 43
customs 56, 72, 73, 119, 121, 137, 152, 
154, 164
 see also taxation
Daloz, Jean-Pascal 45
Dausebea, Charles 25n.3, 28
Dauvergne, Peter 117, 121, 123, 124
deaths, numbers of 8n.7, 20, 24, 26, 65, 
135
‘Demands by the Bona Fide and 
Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’ 24, 
124, 128, 155
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
33, 58
Diamond, Jared 17
Dinnen, Sinclair vii, 5, 7, 16, 30, 33, 38, 
41, 45, 49, 55, 61, 65, 67, 68, 70, 79, 
81, 98, 116, 137, 139, 140, 142, 152, 
153
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 87
domestic violence, see crime—domestic 
violence
Downer, Alexander 50, 51, 156, 162
drugs 39, 100, 128
 see also alcohol
Duffield, Mark 144
Duncan, Ron 30, 41
Dunn, Leah 4, 5, 6, 25, 127, 128, 141, 
144, 147, 162
eco-forestry 121, 122, 123, 145
 see also logging
Economic Reform Unit 57, 58
economy, see Solomon Islands—economy
education 3, 5, 20, 42, 43, 71–2, 73, 82, 
98n.2, 99, 112, 113, 124, 127, 137, 
145, 146, 151, 165
Book	title	abbreviation
188
elections 3, 5n.4, 29, 47–8, 50, 65, 72, 76, 
88, 98, 99, 101, 109, 117, 120, 140, 
141, 149, 153, 164
Ellison, Graham 68n.13
embezzlement, see crime—embezzlement
employment 20, 99, 116, 121, 124, 126, 
127, 153
 see also unemployment
Enhanced Consultative Mechanism 
76n.20, 159n.3
environment 18, 68, 72, 117, 118, 121, 
123, 124n.7, 127, 145, 152
 see also climate change
ethnicity 1, 3, 5, 9, 10n.8, 13, 18, 20, 23, 
25, 34, 38, 45, 46, 59, 66, 67–8, 82, 
86, 92, 95, 106, 110, 112, 113, 116, 
117, 128, 129, 137, 138, 140, 141, 152
 see also identity politics
European Union 4n.3, 82, 132
extortion, see crime—extortion
Fa’afunua, Daniel 55
Farrall, Jeremy 2, 161
Fearon, James D. 9, 106
federalism 79, 157–8
Ferguson, James 143n.7, 144
Ferguson, Niall 119, 166
Fifi’i, J. 99
Fiji vii, 7, 17, 25, 26, 28
Filer, Colin 124n.7
Fischer, David Hackett 119, 166
fishing 1, 3, 5, 18, 32, 72, 87, 98, 118, 
121, 123, 124n.7, 140, 141, 142, 145, 
152, 154, 166
Fitzpatrick, Daniel 155
Forest Stewardship Council 121
forestry, see logging
Forsyth, Miranda 105
Fraenkel, Jon vii, ix, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 





Fukuyama, Francis 71, 103, 105, 136, 137
gambling 72, 101, 128, 140, 141
gaming 46, 111, 148, 151, 153
Gegeo, David Welchman 113
Germany 17, 161
Geve, Father 54, 116n.3, 139
Gilbert Islands 13, 37
Gizo 18, 34, 55n.4, 66, 136, 145
global financial crisis 33, 56, 119, 127, 
145
global warming, see climate change 
globalisation 15, 17, 18, 109, 146
Goff, Phil 51
Goh, Robert 71, 117
Gold Ridge mine 24, 32, 89, 92, 112, 114, 
124–5, 153, 154
Goldsmith, Andrew 61, 65, 137
Gordon, Robert J. 49
governance 28, 67, 76, 98, 103, 105, 112, 
122, 139–40, 143n.7, 144, 145, 164
 economic 1, 76, 155
 failure 43
 good 6, 106, 143n.7, 144, 154
 networked 105, 112, 142, 144, 154
 shadow 1, 3, 72, 140–4
 village 6, 79, 112, 139–40, 142, 145, 
154
Government of Solomon Islands 4, 24n.2, 
25, 29, 32, 39, 43, 56, 66n.11, 76n.10, 
77, 86, 88, 122, 126, 136, 145, 156, 
157, 159n.3
Graf, William 143n.7
Granovetter, Mark S. 105
Gray, George 19, 37, 128
Greener-Barcham, B. K. 137
Greenpeace 111, 117, 121, 122, 123, 132, 
145
Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) 39, 
40, 41n.2, 53, 83, 110
Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Limited 111, 
125–7, 132, 153
Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly 24
Guadalcanal Provincial Government 92
Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) 
21, 23, 24





Hackman, Brian D. 13
Hameiri, Shahar 50, 78, 89, 144, 152
Harris Rimmer, Susan 88
Hayward-Jones, Jenny 146n.9, 153
headhunting 16, 17
health 16, 69, 116, 146, 151, 154, 166
Hegarty, David ix, 21, 30, 39, 41, 90, 139, 
152, 153
Heimer, Carol 164
Herbert, Tania 57, 70
HMAS Tobruk 31, 37
Honiara 2, 38, 42, 43, 44, 48, 52, 53, 54, 




 land 19, 23, 73
 migration to 18, 114n.2
 refugees in 24
 riots (2006) 3, 29n.5, 48, 62–5, 73, 
101, 140, 158
 squatter settlements 91, 92, 93, 127, 
153
 unrest 2, 31, 33, 37, 62
Honiara Club Agreement, see peace 
agreements
Honiara Peace Accord, see peace 
agreements
Honiara Women for Peace 31, 82
Hou, Rick 141n.4
Howard, John 27, 49, 50–1, 152, 156, 162
Howard, Lise Morjé 2–3, 33
Hviding, Edvard 13, 14, 15, 121
Iceland 145
identity politics 4, 6, 16, 35n.9, 87, 95–
107, 110, 113, 128, 129, 137, 144, 147
 see also big-men, ethnicity
Ignatieff, Michael 57, 77, 142
Indonesia 4, 5, 6, 9, 25, 41, 58, 117, 127, 
128, 141, 144
international aid, see aid
International Centre for Transitional 
Justice 91, 157
International Criminal Court 161
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 116, 
137, 143
International Peace Monitoring Team 
(IPMT) 38, 39–41, 111, 132
Iraq 4n.3, 51, 138, 155
Isabel Province 27, 145
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) 21, 
24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 
39, 40, 47, 48, 54, 81, 85, 88, 96, 97, 
96, 110, 113, 114, 125, 127, 129, 130, 
138n.1





Jourdan, Christine 16, 99, 100
judiciary 28, 40, 55, 63, 64n.9, 68, 74, 86, 
91, 92, 115, 116, 139, 148, 149, 155, 
161
 see also Tension Trials
justice 43, 44n.3, 46, 50n.1, 53, 91, 116, 
137, 138–9, 146, 154, 155, 161
 community 63
 indigenous 44, 104
 post-conflict 87
 restorative 82, 83, 132, 148
 see also Tension Trials
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara 4, 19, 38, 49, 
58, 67, 77, 82, 126, 131
Kaoni, Stanley ‘Satan’ 54
Kari, Hilda 64n.8
Karle, Warren 24n.2
kastom 25, 42, 46, 47, 96, 99, 104
Kastom Garden 116, 147
Keesing, Roger M. 14–15, 97n.1, 99, 100
Keke, Harold 21, 23n.1, 32, 37, 38, 39, 
40, 51, 53, 54, 84, 85, 87, 110, 111, 
116, 128, 129, 130, 139, 144, 149
Kemakeza, Sir Allan 29, 37, 47, 49, 50, 




Kenilorea, Sir Peter 39, 53, 64n.8, 67, 69, 
105, 118, 131, 142, 152, 158
Kere, Joy 86n.2, 105
key triggering incidents 20, 27, 110, 129, 
154n.1
KFPL Timber 111, 121, 122, 133
Korea 18
Koto, Vika 84
Laitin, David D. 9, 106
land 1, 18, 23, 24n.2, 28, 29, 35, 69, 73, 
81, 97, 117, 124, 125–6, 133, 136, 137, 
141, 147, 154, 155
 as factor in conflict 19, 44–5
 disputes 13, 24, 42, 43, 68, 109, 111, 
112, 113–16, 132, 153
 tenure 3, 113, 114, 116, 155
Latour, Bruno 105
Le Billon 143
Leadership Code Commission 73, 76, 142
Leslie, Helen 31
Lincoln, Abraham 87, 104
logging 3, 5, 13, 18, 32, 33, 47, 56–7, 69, 
70, 72, 89, 98, 101, 110, 111, 112, 
117–24, 129, 130, 132, 138, 140–2, 
145, 152, 165, 166
 see also eco-forestry
looting, see crime—looting
Lusibaea, Jimmy Rasta 21, 29, 30, 35, 38, 
46, 47, 54, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 103, 128, 129, 130, 138n.1, 
139, 141, 142, 149
Maasina Rule Movement 96
McDevitt, Ben 32, 53, 54
McDougall, Debra 98n.2, 114, 115, 116, 
121
machinery of government 76, 77, 155
Macintyre, Martha 100, 124n.7
McLeod, Abby 57n.6
McMurray, Christine 52n.2, 74, 116, 135, 
159
Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) 81, 83, 85, 88, 
129, 138n.1, 149
 areas of control 31, 33, 37
 arrests of members 54
 conflict with Isatabu Freedom 
Movement 37
 coup d’état 21, 28, 129
 ex-combatants 38, 53, 88, 152
 formation 21
 harassment by 34
 internal conflict 40
 ‘joint operation’ with police 21, 27, 
28, 39, 54, 59, 149
 leadership 26, 28–9, 30, 33, 35, 55, 
64, 81, 89, 110, 130, 141, 142, 144
 membership 28, 30, 35
 objectives 35, 46
 operations 27, 31, 39
 payments to 47
 peace deals 21, 41n.2
 peace negotiations 27–8, 31, 37, 38, 
149
 reconciliation 114
 Supreme Council 35, 54
 weapons 26, 27, 33n.7, 37, 39, 53
Malaita Women for Peace 31
Malaitans 17, 18–21, 23–9, 31, 34, 35, 43, 
44, 46, 52, 59, 79, 81–3, 91–3, 95, 96, 
99, 102, 106, 109, 110, 113–14, 116, 
124–6, 129, 130, 131n.8, 138n.1, 147, 
153, 155
Malaysia 18, 70, 101, 117, 120n.4, 126
Maley, William 4n.3
Mamaloni, Solomon 23n.1, 27, 28, 29, 
117, 119, 140, 142
Mamdani, Mahmood 67
Mandela, Nelson 87, 104
Marau 26, 38, 83
Marau Peace Agreement, see peace 
agreements
Marcos, President Ferdinand 117
Marshall, Will 139
Masta Liu 95, 99–100
May, Ron 30, 41





Melanesian Brothers 31, 32, 39, 40, 41, 
54, 59, 83, 111, 130, 131, 132
Melanesian Sisters 32, 39
Melanesian Spearhead Group 103
mining 3, 124n.7, 144, 145
 see also Gold Ridge mine
Ministry of Finance 51, 56, 57–8, 59, 
143n.7, 155
Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs 43, 
116
Ministry of National Unity, 
Reconciliation and Peace 47, 86n.2
Missing Persons Committee 20
‘mission creep’ 2, 156, 157, 160
Monson, Rebecca 155
Moore, Clive vii, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 
33, 35, 37, 39, 47, 51, 53, 54, 59, 67, 
71, 101, 118, 136, 146
Morgan, Michael 5, 70
Moro Movement 96, 97
Moti, Julian 64n.9, 139n.2
Muggah, Robert 20




National Council of Women 45, 64n.8, 
111, 132
National Peace Conference 37
National Peace Council (NPC) 2, 3, 4, 5, 
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 52, 64n.8, 78, 81, 




Nelson, Hank 30, 41
New Britain Palm Oil Limited 126, 127
New Georgia 14, 16, 17, 114
New Zealand vii, 4n.3, 7, 23n.1, 28, 32, 
34, 37, 39, 51, 52, 55, 56, 66, 77, 104, 
116, 132, 135, 146, 153, 156, 158, 159




non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
32, 37, 72, 74, 82, 91, 111, 116, 121, 
127, 132, 145n.8, 147
 see also name of organisation
‘non-truth and reconciliation’ 4
Nori, Andrew 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 37, 38, 
44n.3, 46, 55, 71, 79, 81, 82, 89, 96, 
110, 129, 130, 131, 141, 142, 149
Nuaiasi, Severino 118
O’Callaghan, Mary-Louise 147, 158, 159
O’Connor, Patrick 65, 118, 139
O’Reilly, Conor 68n.13
Office of the Auditor-General 47, 73, 74, 
76, 111, 138, 142, 143n.6, 151
Office of the Special Coordinator 70
oil-palm, see palm-oil 
ombudsman 73, 74, 76, 142
Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 2, 146n.9
organised crime, see crime—organised
Oxfam 4n.3, 31, 86, 111, 127, 132, 147
Pacific Islands Forum 22, 51, 58n.7, 66, 
76n.20, 159, 164
Palmer, Sir Albert 44
palm-oil 24, 92, 125–7
Panatina Agreement, see peace 
agreements
Papua 9, 58
Papua New Guinea vii, 7, 51, 95, 100, 
126, 127
Parliament, see Solomon Islands—
Parliament
Parliamentary Inquiry into the 
Facilitation of International 
Assistance Notice 2003 and 
RAMSI Intervention, see RAMSI—
Parliamentary Inquiry
Participating Police Force, see RAMSI—
Participating Police Force 
Patrick, Stewart 76
payback 21, 23, 89
peace agreements 7, 37, 83, 162
 Honiara Club Agreement 56
 Honiara Peace Accord (28 June 1999) 
25, 26, 27
 Marau Peace Agreement 38n.1
 Panatina Agreement (12 August 1999) 
26, 27
 Townsville Peace Agreement 21, 22, 
31, 37–9, 49, 55, 86, 88, 125, 131, 138
peacebuilding 1, 2, 4, 6–9, 15, 18, 32, 44, 
49, 58, 82, 106, 107, 116, 127, 155, 
156–7, 160, 163–5
 actors 131–3
 peacebuilding ‘creep’ 160, 162
 strengths 14, 109, 111, 135–49, 156
 weaknesses 109, 111–12, 135–49, 153
Peace Monitoring Council (PMC) 38, 39, 
40, 41, 42, 111, 132
peace negotiations 25, 26, 27, 31, 37–48, 
49, 83, 111, 112, 146
 see also National Peace Conference
Peel, Sir Robert 68
Peelian policing 68, 69
People’s Survey 44n.3, 74, 116, 139, 159
Perito, Robert M. 165
pillars, core state 1, 2, 3, 6, 75, 76, 78, 
86n.2, 105, 106, 151–62, 63, 165–6
plantation economy, see Solomon 
Islands—plantation economy
Plunkett, Mark 32, 53, 55
police 
 commissioner 24, 26, 41
 international 39, 51, 53, 55, 60, 61, 62
 see also Australian Federal Police, 
RAMSI—Participating Police Force, 
Royal Solomon Islands Police 
policing 57n.6, 66–70
 see also Peelian policing
politics, see Solomon Islands—politics
Pollard, Alice A. 31, 82
Ponzio, Richard 49
Prison Fellowship International Sycamore 
Tree Program 83, 84, 85, 88, 103, 111, 
131, 148
prisons 27, 50, 51, 53, 67, 88, 89, 93, 103, 
131, 138, 146, 152, 155
 see also Rove Prison
Pillars	and	Shadows
193
prostitution 16, 70, 101, 128, 136, 140, 
152
proximate factors 2, 110, 128–9, 153, 
154n.1, 163
Public Accounts Committee 74
Public Service 27, 73, 74, 76, 104, 105, 
113, 142, 143, 155
 Australian 50
 Commission 73, 142
Putnam, Robert D. 105
Rabuka, General Sitiveni 25, 26, 27
RAMSI, see Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands
rape, see crime—rape
Rasta, Jimmy, see Lusibaea—Jimmy Rasta 
Rawlings, Gregory 73
Reconciliation and Peace Committee 31
Red Cross 31
Reddy, Peter 6, 162
refugees 10n.8, 24, 26, 91–2, 93, 112, 
135, 148, 153, 154
Regan, Anthony 2, 30, 41, 152, 153, 161, 
162
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) 41, 42, 60, 65, 71, 77, 
84, 87, 101, 104, 110, 131, 138, 141, 
142, 143n.6, 146, 148, 152, 156–66
 achievements 52, 71, 72, 76, 118, 119, 
128, 131, 135, 135, 136, 137, 154, 161, 
162, 166
 allocation of resources 44n.3, 55, 67
 arrests by 50, 54, 55, 111
 arrival 22, 33, 52, 53, 56, 73, 81, 92, 
93, 128, 140, 141
 criticism of 25n.3, 56, 62, 64, 66, 67, 
71, 78, 81, 135, 136, 137, 138–9, 147, 
151, 158, 159
 destruction of weapons 51
 disarmament 53, 132
 exit strategy 66, 86n.2, 111, 166
 funding 4n.3
 immunity 89
 intelligence 51, 62
 leadership 32, 41, 158, 159
 objectives 53, 57, 58, 70, 71, 75, 76, 
81, 86, 139, 151
 Parliamentary Inquiry into the 
Facilitation of International 
Assistance Notice 2003 and RAMSI 
Intervention 4n.3, 33, 34n.8, 44, 45, 
55, 56, 61, 79, 86n.2, 88, 92, 116, 138, 
139, 143n.6, 155, 156
 Participating Police Force (PPF) 59, 
61, 62, 63, 64n.8, 65, 66, 111, 157, 
158, 159, 161
 personnel 51, 57, 58n.7, 81, 101, 136, 
143n.6, 157, 158, 159
 pillars 75, 76, 78, 86n.2, 155, 156
 public relations 32, 41, 60, 70, 158
 support for 50, 51, 52n.2, 61, 128, 
135, 137
 target list 88, 90, 138
 weaknesses 102, 103, 111, 112, 135, 
143n.7, 152, 153, 155, 162, 163, 165
Reinhart, Monika 105
reintegration 84, 126
 combatant 92–3, 112, 135, 148, 154
 funds 71, 92, 93, 112, 148
 refugee 91–2, 93, 135, 148
religion 5, 10n.8, 14, 15, 25, 40, 82, 83, 
84, 99n.3, 147
 see also church




Rice, Condoleezza 50, 51
Ringi Cove 33n.7, 111, 121, 122, 123, 133
Rini, Snyder 29n.5, 47, 48, 52, 55, 62, 63, 
71, 101, 131, 140n.3, 142
robbery, see crime—robbery
Roughan, John ix, 147
Roughan, Paul 73, 74, 137, 147
Rove Prison 55, 83, 84, 85, 88, 114, 138, 
146, 149
Royal Solomon Islands Police 1, 5, 21, 25, 
26, 27, 42, 43, 52, 59, 61
 absence of 34
 arrest of 55
Book	title	abbreviation
194
 building 58–61, 65–6
 ‘joint operation’ with Malaita Eagle 
Force 21, 27, 28, 39, 54
 -led peacekeeping 3
 lessons for 62–5
 militants in 38
 Police Field Force 59, 67
 weapons 24, 26, 27, 34, 39, 51
Rudé, George 65n.10
rule of law 3, 27, 44, 52, 57, 89, 93, 137, 
138n.1, 151, 154, 157
rule of the gun 52, 65, 77
rule of the mob 62




Salisbury, R. F. 16
Sangu, Joseph 32, 37, 54, 85
Sato, Yokio 53
Scales, Ian 139
Scott, James C. 17
Scott, Michael W. 116
Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Church 
99.3
sexual assault, see crime—sexual assault
shadow economy 1, 72, 101, 117, 141, 
142, 144–6, 165, 166
shadow state 1, 3, 5, 46, 71, 101n.4, 117, 
140–4, 145, 152, 165, 166
Shearing, Clifford 91
Sierra Leone 90, 141, 143
Sikua, Dr Derek 44, 52, 86, 88
Skelton, Russell 140
slavery 16, 17, 87, 104, 152
slow-food approach 2, 161, 162
slow-learning approach 2, 162
Smith, Anthony D. 95, 104, 105
Smith, Archbishop Adrian 20
Soaki, Sir Alfred 41
society, see Solomon Islands—society
Sodhi, Gaurav 145, 146
Sogavare, Manasseh 4, 28, 29, 41, 46, 48, 
64, 67, 81, 86, 130, 138, 140
Solomon Islands 
 Cabinet 58, 71, 76, 113, 138, 152
 culture 1, 13, 14, 42, 114, 136, 148
 economy 18, 33, 79, 116, 117, 118, 
121, 142, 145, 146
 government, see Government of 
Solomon Islands 
 history 1, 6, 13, 15, 16–18, 69, 131
 intervention in 2, 3, 4, 6, 15, 16, 20, 
27, 32, 50, 51, 71, 77, 78, 135, 161, 
162
 Parliament 22, 51, 98, 138, 159, 164
 plantation economy 17, 67, 96
 political culture 5, 18, 70, 99, 118, 
152
 politics 3, 5, 14, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 
29, 35, 38, 46, 47, 55, 72n.17, 79, 86, 
97n.1, 98, 101, 110, 118, 122, 128, 
129, 137, 141, 143, 144, 149, 152, 166
 population 33, 127
 society 2, 4, 6, 15, 18, 19, 59, 65, 67, 
78, 79, 96, 97, 102, 105, 122, 125, 
133, 138n.1, 139, 142, 143n.7, 148, 
161, 163, 165
Solomon Islands Airlines 37
Solomon Islands Broadcasting 
Corporation 27, 45, 82, 147
Solomon Islands Christian Association 
(SICA) 37, 83, 86, 111, 131, 146–7
Solomon Islands Credit Union League 58
Solomon Islands Development Trust 123, 
132, 145, 146, 147
Solomon Islands Football Federation 140
Solomon Islands Forest Industry 
Association 123
Solomon Islands Inland Revenue 5n.5, 
57, 70n.14
Solomon Islands Plantation Limited 
(SIPL) 24n.2, 32
Solomon Star 62, 67, 123, 147
Solomon Taiyo 32
South Africa 86, 87, 90, 104





statebuilding 1–6, 22, 50, 58, 76–9, 81, 
140, 144, 145, 151–66
Steeves, Jeffrey 29, 98
Stritecky, J. M. 99n.3
structural factors 2, 109–10, 113–28, 153, 
154n.1, 163
Suharto, President 117
Sycamore Tree Program, see Prison 
Fellowship International
Taiwan 4n.3, 18, 45, 48, 49, 70, 77, 140, 
141, 143
Tari, Thomas 34
taxation 5, 13, 45, 56, 57, 70n.14, 72, 
111, 117, 121, 137, 142, 148, 152, 154, 
166
 see also customs
Te Kaha 37
Te’e, Andrew 47, 48, 54, 85, 86, 128
Teke, Kamilo 53
‘Tension’, the 24, 28, 31, 35, 44, 52, 55, 
59, 66n.11, 68, 78, 84, 88, 89, 118, 
127, 128, 129, 131–2, 145
Tension Trials 53, 55, 63, 87, 88, 89, 138
terrorism 49, 50, 62
theft, see crime—theft
Timber Control Unit 117
Timor-Leste 4, 6, 8n.7, 50n.1, 58, 65, 90, 
91, 128, 135, 157
Tobani, Henry 31
Tonga 39
top-down model 56, 73, 78, 93, 112, 144, 
145, 146, 161
Toroama, Ishmael 34
tourism 3, 32, 118, 145
Tovua, Paul 41
Townsville Peace Agreement, see peace 
agreements
Transparency International 72
Transparency Solomon Islands 147
Tribal Land Disputes Resolution Panels 
Bill 116, 136




truth and reconciliation 4, 81, 86, 87, 90, 
147, 148, 157
 see also ‘non-truth and reconciliation’, 
reintegration
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) 5, 37, 81, 83, 86–91, 102, 111, 
148, 151, 156, 157, 160
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 
2008 91
Tryon, Darrell T. 13
Tuna Commission 145n.8
Tutu, Archbishop Desmond 87
Ulufa’alu, Bart 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 35, 46, 
47, 48, 117, 129, 130, 152
unemployment 32, 55, 92, 99, 154
 see also employment
United Kingdom 15, 17, 18, 67, 68n.13, 
118, 132, 161
United Nations 2–3, 4n.3, 8n.7, 9, 17–18, 
49, 65, 132
 Development Programme (UNDP) 
4n.3, 8, 38, 49, 76, 91, 92–3, 111, 114, 
132, 157, 160
  Participatory Planning Program 78
 International Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF) 49
 Police Force (UNPOL) 65
United States 4n.3, 7, 16, 18, 49, 104, 
132, 155, 161
URS Sustainable Development 119, 121
Van Klinken, Gerry 141
Vanuatu vii, 7, 26, 39, 64n.9, 100
Wainwright, Elsina 49, 50
Wairiu, Morgan 123
Waiwori, Christopher 63
waku (Chinese/Asian person) 4, 101n.4
Wale, Matthew 132
‘Walkabout for Peace’ 39
wantok 3n.2, 4, 103, 104, 105, 106
war crimes 7n.6
 see also crime—rape, torture
Warner, Nick 32, 51, 53, 54
weapons 8n.7, 17, 24, 28, 42, 51, 65, 100, 
111, 132, 141n.4, 143n.7, 154, 162, 
166
 acquisition 24, 125
 amnesty 51
 collection 27, 41, 53, 131, 132
 destruction 51, 90
 -free villages 39, 42
 homemade 24, 38, 39
 police loss of 27
 surrender 17, 26, 38, 39, 40, 42, 51, 
52, 53, 91, 93, 110, 111, 135, 148
 theft 39, 51, 90
 trade 16, 39, 57, 69
 see also Malaita Eagle Force—
weapons, rule of the gun
‘Weapons Free Village Campaign’ 42, 111
Weather Coast 2, 14, 21, 22, 39–40, 53, 
54n.3, 82, 83, 96, 97, 107, 116, 127, 
128, 130, 151, 154, 160
Weber, Eugen 16
Western Province 2, 13, 18, 26, 34, 35, 
39, 40, 55n.4, 68, 78, 91, 121, 136
Wheatley, Mike 62
White River 43, 127
White, Geoffrey 14, 15
White, Leo 38
whole-of-government approach 2, 75, 76, 
77–9, 81, 155
whole-of-society approach 77–9, 155
Wielders, Iris 76
Wilson, Bu V. E. 165, 166
Winds of Change 72, 78
Wolfers, Edward ix, 67, 162
women 8, 16, 19, 20, 24, 31, 32, 37, 
54n.3, 64n.8, 82, 92, 97, 98, 99n.3, 
100, 104, 123n.6, 124, 126, 131, 132, 
136, 146
women’s groups 3, 5, 31–2, 37, 45, 64n.8, 
82, 97n.1, 111, 126, 132, 163
Wood Report (2005) 73
Woodward, Susan L. 154n.1
Working Committee on Political Party 
Integrity Reform 153
World Bank 6, 8, 143, 144, 154
Pillars	and	Shadows
197
World Vision 4n.3, 82, 83, 91, 132
World War II 15, 17, 18, 24, 39, 96, 109
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
123, 127
youth bulge 33, 110, 127–8
youth crime, see crime—youth
Yugoslavia 4n.3

